Airpower and ISIS: Encouraging Battlefield Innovation from Tactical Leaders
Airpower and ISIS: Encouraging Battlefield Innovation from Tactical Leaders
A.C. Hall
Today, the U.S. once again finds itself projecting airpower against another radical enemy in the Middle East. Though the fight is on familiar terrain, this is a new conflict and the battle will be different. For the tactical leader, it will be easy to get complacent and attempt to project airpower by picking up where previous generations left off. It will be easy to revert to the same old tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The problem is that the enemy is significantly different, their dynamic is different, and due to political and diplomatic rationale, U.S. resources are different. In order to succeed, battlefield innovation will be required. The tactical leader will need the courage to move past old intellect and embrace innovation.
This innovation begins with an understanding that the enemy, ISIS, is strategically and ideologically different. During the Iraq War, the enemy sought to franchise terrorism out to multiple autonomously running cells with an objective to inflict as much damage on the West and its allies as possible. Their objective was to terrorize and create instability with the hopes of one day establishing a caliphate. ISIS on the other hand, already claims to have established a caliphate. Their primary objective is to acquire and hold territories while establishing a hierarchy of leadership with strict mediaeval governance. Remaining relevant is key and they must hold and control these territories in order to do so. The strategic problem set for the U.S. and its allies rests in their ability to develop clearly defined objectives that deny and degrade this relevancy.
After the strategic objectives are set, empowering tactical leaders to aggressively press out and apply their own tactical intellect in support of these objectives becomes essential. In order to succeed, tactical leaders must develop their own objectives by capitalizing on both intellect and innovation just as those who came before. Many of the Air Force’s current leaders, those that came before, were born out of previous conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. They were the authors and innovators of many of the tactics and lessons learned of today. For over a decade, the previous generation of tactical leaders contributed to the development of counter insurgency (COIN), military operation in urban terrain (MOUT), close air support (CAS) and many other TTP. To compliment innovation, these tactical leaders captured countless lessons learned in order to solidify tactical intellect for future generations. These innovators were the tactical leaders at the time making the real-time decisions that shaped the battlefield.
History has shown that tactical units with the odds stacked against them can achieve significant victories because of great leaders who lacked fear to innovate. Today’s employment of airpower is no different. This innovation begins with the establishment of clear objectives. The objectives set at the tactical level should always be specific, measurable, attainable, and realistic. Each objective should have a tangible impact on the overall strategic objectives and tactical intellect must be the driving force behind both the setting and prosecution of objectives.
A crucial element to this rests with leadership’s ability to ensure that tactical airpower leaders are in a position to enable joint planning and integration. Tactical leaders can employ the most phenomenal tactical intellect and epitomize innovation, yet if their efforts are not joint, expect marginalized successes and possibly failure. Airpower alone will not be sufficient. In order to achieve the strategic objectives, the tactical objectives must be developed utilizing a combined and focused effort between tactical leaders of both air and ground forces. To this end, tactical leaders should be encouraged to refrain from limiting themselves to the same decision matrix of old thought based only on the previous engagements of Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to the nature of this evolving conflict, tactical problems will inevitably exist. Together, tactical leaders of air and ground units must work together to create innovative solutions to these tactical problems.
These innovative solutions will take many forms in the battle against ISIS. They may exist as new TTP that results from an evolving threat, technological workarounds to address shortfalls, a more efficient/effective strike process, a different approach to improving partner nation resolve, or an infinite number of other possibilities. The specific form of this innovation is insignificant so long as it is encouraged and enabled. The goal for leaders at all levels should be to fend off insufficient thought processes that lack innovation. When this occurs, in the absence of guidance from above, the tactical leader will be more likely to set their own objectives that align with the overall strategic guidance and project airpower more effectively.
It is important to note that encouraging tactical leaders to innovate on the battlefield does not vindicate them from thoroughly understanding lessons learned. Capturing and disseminating lessons learned is one of the most important elements for improving the way an enterprise does business and it boosts a unit’s ability to repeat successes and not mistakes. To defeat this enemy, tactical leaders can never forget the value of the lessons learned, but must also remove any reluctance to create new ones. This will only serve to enhance airpower capabilities and effectiveness on the battlefield.
The United Stated Air Force is comprised of exceptionally capable leaders at all levels. In order to succeed in its projection of airpower against ISIS, leadership at all levels must empower and encourage the tactical level leader to make decisions that will shape the battlefield and encourage them to innovate. The tactical leader must embrace this reality and aggressively fulfill this duty. Once fulfilled, the ability to remain flexible and move past a fear of change will ensure the U.S. achieves a decisive victory against this enemy.
Unfortunately, it must be conceded that there exists levels of civilian support for ISIL in currently held population centers such as Al-Raqqah, Mosul and Fallujah. What sort of innovations does Mr. Hall postulate for USAF tactical leadership in subverting this support? Coercion by bombardment?
This is a highly complex problem beyond mere tactical expertise. It requires political choices that remain currently unpalatable. Until such time the hard political decisions are taken and acceptance of a redrawing of influence for the region is taken, mere exercises in USAF tactical leadership will remain insufficient, in my opinion.
Encouraging tactical leaders to innovate and/or adapt is obviously a good thing. People normally innovate or adapt to overcome a problem, and I failed to find what tactical problem or problems they need to solve in this article? Sometimes I need help in finding what is obvious to everyone else, so if the problem is there please clarify it a little more.
The author did point to the necessity for clear objectives, which is something from my seat in the back of the theater that does appear to be missing. He suggests that, “the strategic problem set for the U.S. and its allies rests in their ability to develop clearly defined objectives that deny and degrade [the caliphate’s] relevancy.” I think he errors here, at best this may be one objective to support the larger strategic aims, but it is not a strategic goal within itself. In fact, if it isn’t tied to a desired regional end state then it is a rather worthless objective. At the strategic level it is much bigger than the caliphate.
Back to the tactical level, I have to assume the guys carrying the burden of this fight are deeply frustrated with the lack of a clear strategy and questionable political will. Without clearer aims, innovating at the tactical level will result in better tactics, but it won’t get us closer to our end state.
I tend to have great confidence in the ability of the American service member to innovate and adapt in the field when they know what they need to accomplish. The problem is they don’t have a feasible strategic end state or strategy to get there (clearly not their fault). I think the following quote is relevant, “tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” (hat tip to Dave Maxwell for pointing that Sun Tzu apparently did not say this, so the originator is unknown).
Perhaps a better quote from a recent SWJ Journal article is the following:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/strategy-is-not-enough
“Americans in uniform have time and again been left fighting wars that have decayed into ‘something pointless and devoid of sense.’ If our efforts in the future are to make sense and have a point, we must look to a day when our government gives us the kind of policy guidance we need to do our job.”