In Iraq, Lessons of Vietnam Still Resonate
In Iraq, Lessons of Vietnam Still Resonate by Walter Pincus, Washington Post
What are the right lessons from America’s Vietnam experience that can be applied to the current situation in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East?
The United States in the 1960s and early 1970s found itself backing a shaky South Vietnam government that lacked full support from religious and sectarian groups within its borders as it faced armed Viet Cong insurgents. Today it’s the newly formed, Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in Baghdad facing Islamic State fighters without the total support of some Iraqi Sunni, Kurd and secular groups.
In Vietnam, the insurgents were fed arms, supplies and even fighters from North Vietnam through nearby Laos and Cambodia. Today, equipment, supplies and Islamic State fighters come into Iraq through neighboring Syria…
I fear we make the same mistake of too closely associating Iraq (and Afghanistan) with Vietnam. There are certainly parallels, and I’m the last person to dismiss relevant historical corollaries. However, I believe that we as a society project our anxiety (and ignorance) pertaining to Vietnam onto the ongoing Middle Eastern conflicts. Iraq is in a vastly different strategic circumstance than was Vietnam, and the conflicts therein have their own strategic logic that’s independent of what took place in Southeast Asia. We conflate the two at our own peril.
I read the entire article was astonished that nowhere was the MESSAGE that either the Vietnamese communists (and nationalists of old) had or the jihadists in Iraq-Syria today have mentioned.
Failing to understand what motivates these opponents is a BIG mistake.
Virtually every comment on Iraq today I’ve seen acknowledges the political mistake of the Iraqi state to fail to get and keep the loyalty of Sunnis.
Iraq-Syria is NOT Vietnam, adjust your view to looking forward, not to what suits you about the past.
In Vietnam, and in Iraq, what we sought/seek to do — and what we were/are willing to do to achieve our such goals — this did not/does not seem resonate with sufficient force with the respective populations. This, in comparison with what our opponents sought/seek to do, their related resolve and the popularity of their distinctly different cause(s).
Thus:
a. In Vietnam, it would seem, the enemy (in comparison to ourselves) was able to rally/coerce more of the viable (fighting; supporting) population over to their side. Likewise,
b. In Iraq (etc.) today, it appears that the enemy, rather than we ourselves, is able to rally/coerce more of the “viable” population in their direction.
In the lopsided (in favor of the enemy) popularity/capability context offered above, to see the need for and application of every U.S. soldier. Who, it appears, is acting as a one-on-one “substitute” for (missing) necessarily like-minded — and necessarily committed — indigenous personnel.
Individuals who exist — shall we now finally admit — in sufficient numbers — only in our dreams?