General Mattis: A New American Grand Strategy
A New American Grand Strategy by General Jim Mattis, Hoover Institution
The world is awash in change. The international order, so painstakingly put together by the greatest generation coming home from mankind’s bloodiest conflict, is under increasing stress. It was created with elements we take for granted: the United Nations, NATO, the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods and more. The constructed order reflected the wisdom of those who recognized no nation lived as an island and we needed new ways to deal with challenges that for better or worse impacted all nations. Like it or not, today we are part of this larger world and must carry out our part. We cannot wait for problems to arrive here or it will be too late; rather we must remain strongly engaged in this complex world.
The international order built on the state system is not self-sustaining. It demands tending by an America that leads wisely, standing unapologetically for the freedoms each of us in this room have enjoyed. The hearing today addresses the need for America to adapt to changing circumstances, to come out now from its reactive crouch and to take a firm strategic stance in defense of our values…
Edited and added to a little bit:
Our grand strategy(ies), of late, would seem to have been based on something like the old informal “Open Door” imperialist policies that existed before World War II.
By which I mean that our recent grand strategy(ies) would seem to have been based on the determination to (via outlying state and societal transformations) “open up” other countries so that they might be better accessed, and better exploited, by US and other outside business interests/enterprises.
It is within this context (to wit: the facilitation/promotion of “world/free trade”) that we might best understand our contemporary grand strategy(ies) and, accordingly, our recent interventions; both of which would seem to have been designed and undertaken with the idea of (a) creating the right political regimes and (b) the right business climates needed to (c) attract and keep foreign businesses and investors. (This, with a view toward the “region” as-a-whole; a region which, for various reasons, has been less-“open,” less-“accessible” and less-“useful” than others.)
The fact that our such strategy (and our interventions based on same) have backfired and created — instead of “openness” — regions/environments which are less-conducive to foreign business operations and investment; THIS is what has given us pause re: our such post-Cold War strategic approach.
Likewise it is this negative — rather than positive — strategic outcome that has sent us back to the “grand strategy” drawing board (or woodshed).
Prediction:
Re: any new grand strategy: Do not think, even for a minute, that our enduring strategic objective — as outlined in my second paragraph above — will change.
Rather, consider that only the ways and means by which we might achieve our such strategic objective; this will be the only thing that is debated, reconsidered and redesigned.
Thus, the facilitation/promotion of “world/free trade” — via the transformation of outlying states and societies so that they might better accommodate same — this will continue to be a/the primary focus, and a/the primary purpose, of our future grand strategy(ies).
Long-term American “security,” and “prosperity,” thought to, thereby, be best achieved.
From Christopher Layne’s 2006 book: “The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present:”
“The fundamental argument I make in this book is simple: The story of American grand strategy over the past six decades is one of expansion, and that strategy’s logic inexorably has driven the United States to attempt to establish its hegemony in the world’s three most important regions outside North America itself: Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. That is, the United States has aimed for ‘extraregional’ hegemony.”
“My argument is that by following a hegemonic grand strategy, the United States will provoke a geopolitical backlash.”
“… the “Open door” explains America’s drive for extraregional hegemony. The Open Door school of U.S. diplomatic history holds that, beginning in the late nineteenth century, the United States pursued an expansionist — indeed, hegemonic or even imperial — policy, first in the Western Hemisphere and then in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. The Open door holds the answer to an important puzzle: Why didn’t U.S. grand strategy change when the Cold War ended? Why did U.S. forces stay “over there” instead of “coming home?” The Open door incorporates both economic expansion and ideological expansion and links them to U.S. national security.”
Now, let’s look this over a bit:
Might we say that re: our difficulties — with China in the East, with Russia in the West and with various actors in the Middle East — these such difficulties can best be seen through the lens of:
a. U.S. (continuing) attempts at economic and ideological expansion — which we have linked to U.S. national security — as Mr. Layne suggests above? Thus,
b. These such efforts at expansion explaining, exactly, the related and corresponding “geopolitical backlash” that Mr. Layne predicted and with which we now having to deal with today?”
(Note: Mr. Layne’s suggestion for “A New American Grand Strategy” is “off-shore balancing.”)
With due respect to Bill C. and his oft-repeated critiques of American foreign policy, General Mattis is, of course, correct: America has been in strategic free-fall for far too long. President Clinton was the beneficiary of a post-Cold War world that was still regaining its equilibrium. President Bush’s attempt to present a coherent grand strategy was pre-empted by emerging events, and his administration understandably shifted its focus to address the most immediate threat, with some conceptual room to be desired – caused in no small part by the fact that the United States was, to some degree, in virgin territory. While President Obama’s supporters may point to policies they support, they’ve tended to change the subject to George W. Bush when called upon to defend President Obama’s foreign policy record because the current administration has had no grand strategy. Rather, the White House reacts to events, often poorly, rather than planning and preparing for the long term. General Mattis hits the nail on the head, as usual: it is long past time America reinvigorated its tradition of effective grand strategy. The consequences of shirking this responsibility are increasingly apparent.
As I read the retired generals paper, several thoughts came to mind.
First, the world has always been awash in change, that most certainly does not mean that the strategic, political, economic, and other objectives of this nation must by definition change.
Second, the so called International Order effectively dictated post World War II by American and European Nations often applied only in selected areas of the globe — where there were confroming parties. Many nations have (often successfully) competed against political and economic domination by the Western Powers, whether we chose to notice that fact or not — China and Vietnam are two examples among many.
Third, State systems will exist on this globe probably into eternity, even though the shape of the States may change. Those States will each have their own value systems and it has and will create economic and political disaster for any Nation State, such as the US, attempting to impose its political, social, or cultural “values” on other States or peoples. The most reent examples of those very costly trillion plus dollar failures have been demonstrated by our failed efforts in Iraq and (soon to be, if not already) in Afghanistan.
Fourth, before we try to determine what are the threats to this nation’s “vital interests,” we should determine precisely what are those vital interests. Something obtained abroad is vital to this country only if it cannot be replaced by its equivalent in this country. That is simply a common sense definition of a vital interest. We cannot classify alleged threats unless we identify precisely what is, and what is not, vital to our existence as an economically and politically healthy nation.
Fifth, while it is a correct statement (IMO) that the foundaon of our nation’s strength is its economic strength (and yes I purposely ommitted the word “military”), the cause of our current economic problems / weaknesses is not caused by our debt. It is caused instead by what has caused that debt to increase — and that is not our rate of spending. Instead, our debt levels have been increasing because a major part of this nation’s economy (that was once reasonably taxed) has been torn out of it and shipped overseas, i.e the industrial part of our economy. We have in the last decade lost over 6 million higher paid manufacturing jobs (and thus the government has lost the monies from the taxes paid on those incomes) and seen almost 60,000 factories of varying sizes close. The profits from those businesses still occur, but they are now kept overseas and pay no taxes into America’s tax coffers. Further, everytime we buy a retail good, some part of that money leaves the country to purchase the goods we just bought. We have a major trade deficit at the national level. The US is a country where the cash outflow far exceeds the cash inflow or cash kept at home. That is the reason for this nations operating deficit. At numerous levels it has lost tax revenues — which if paid are going to foreign countries. Before this country worries about ISIS — which will never constitute a vital threat to this country, we had better reverse the disasterous economic policies we have in place which are slowly bankrupting this country — or learn Chinese.
Sixth, this country has spent far too much money and effort in the Middle East, motivated by the Al Qaeda attack of 9/11 — for far too little return. We have only one vital interest (at present) in that part of the world — obtaining the quatities of oil needed to fuel the Western Economies, and nothing else. It is up to those people what their borders will look like, what the basis for their laws will be, what will be their cultural norms, etc. We have to stop attempting to impose our ways on them — we will not succeed. Insead we should simply use that situation for our economic gain by selling weapons to those groups who are willing to fight against others that someday perhaps could pose a threat to this country. We should pursue a balanced approach and maneuver to keep the parties fighting and killing each other off. It is not in our long term interests to see either the Iranian/ Shiite faction or the ISIS / radical Sunni faction prevail. The best way to prevent either from being victorious is to insure each has the weapons and supplies needed to kill off the other in a balanced approach.
Seventh, in the final analysis if a country is willing to pay the economic price to develop nuclear weapons — that effort will eventually be successful. Our alternative is to maintain the necessary MAD capability and to continue to heavily invest in anti-missile capabilities.
Eighth, It is the height of folly to propose that we continue to invest our treasure and blood in a protracted war in Afghanistan or elsewhere. America does not have the military strength to impose its will on the peoples of the world — in any country where they are willing to fight against us into eternity. It is foolish beyod belief for America’s military officers not to have learned that lesson from our strategic debacle in Vietnam. Whether today’s generals (flag officers in general) want to admit or not, our invasion and occupation efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan were doomed from the start, incredibly foolish, and need to end. Large scale COIN efforts are to costly and will never succeed — because those we call insurgents, other call invasion resisters and freedom fighters.
Ninth, We choose our enemies more often than not, and those chosen enemies most certainly act to their strengths and against our weaknesses. Being able to fight against the so-called spectrum of combat is one thing, being wise enough to know when not to employ military strength in a given spectrum / situation, or when to limit the amount of effort being applied is even more strategically important. The strategy of invading and occupying foreign lands with the goal of removing their current political structure and replaceing it with one of American creation and with a Western social and cultural scheme must be recognized as having led the U.S. military into and out of one failed strategic effort after another. The idea that we should remain in Afghanistan is nothing less than the height of folly.
Tenth, we need to recognize and accept that other powerful nations have their spheres of influence and accept that reality — just as we did during the Cold War. During the Cold War the US wisely adopted a strategy of containment and MAD. WE need to do the same with the Middle East, Russia, China, etc — while being wise enough to provide them operating room within their sphere of ifluence or sphere of combat. Our failures during the Cod War, such as in Vietnam, only occurred when we acted outside the strategy of conatinment. The US needs to invest in its military accordingly.
Finally, it is one thing to carry out a campaign against International Terroism, it is another to conduct it on a cost efficient and cost effective basis.