Boots on the Ground: The Realities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria
Boots on the Ground: The Realities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria by Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
The Obama administration and its strongest opponents in Congress may not have all that much in common, but one thing they do share is the constant misuse of the word “strategy.” Strategy does not consist of stating a broad policy goal and empty rhetoric. It consist of stating an actual plan with clearly defined goals, specific means to achieve, milestones for action, estimates of the necessary resources and their availability, estimates of cost-benefits and risks, and metrics to measure success. A sound bite that fits in Twitter or a fortunate cookie is not a strategy.
Getting this wrong is particularly dangerous when one starts talking about the use of military force and mindlessly throwing around terms like “boots on the ground” with no actual definition of what is involved or what the term is intended to mean. Every American has to accept the fact that the coming presidential election means two years of vacuous partisan political posturing, but any form of war is serious and the stakes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are all too real…
“Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria do not have that much in common, but one thing is clear in all three cases. U.S. military action must be tied to a civil-military strategy that offers the best possible hope of producing a stable and friendly nation as its ultimate outcome. No amount of tactical victories in the field, and no amount of U.S. military force that merely defeats the immediate enemy threat, will create that stability. Military success is critical, but it is only a means to an end.”
Why is it that “no amount of tactical victories in the field, and no amount of U.S. military force that merely defeats the immediate enemy threat, will create the stable, friendly nations that the United States desires?
Because the underlying problem is not thus addressed and, thus, will remain.
This underlying problem being that the populations of these states and societies have no intention of — and will not tolerate requirements to — adopt such broad-reaching, alien and profane political, economic and social changes as the United States/the West now requires.
(In this light, to consider if Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria actually do have something in common.)
Thus, “strategy” (civil-military or other) to be determined — and developed — with this reality in mind?
What amazes me is that we are still having this debate “strategy or no strategy referencing the ME”–many do not like my attempt to drag the conversation back to Central Europe where right now and since the Crimea the West in particular the US has been at “war” with Russia and it seems that the WH and his NSC seem to want to ignore it.
I also keep asking the same question over and over since Crimea–“where is the strategy or at least something that looks like a strategy”?
And yet we seem to keep getting articles that actually question it as well and still no answer from the WH and NSC outside of a recent “feel good” NSS.
Right now we have a serious major European war and invasion even using only the UN Charter’s definitions in the middle of Central Europe 25 years after the Wall came down and 70 or so years after the European border questions “should have been resolved”.
When one side fires over 150 tons of artillery and rocket shells a day and in the last 1.5 days it seems to have gone to the 250 ton ranges it is in fact a “war”.
Then when one sees some of the statements from the Dept of State complaining the fighting has increased not decreased since Minsk 2 JUST what did they think would actually happen when you give the Russian military 70 additional hours to complete their mission?
Samantha Power ✔ @AmbassadorPower
G7 stmt of support for yesterday’s Minsk Package of agreements on #Ukraine. Extremely troubling Russian attacks cont pic.twitter.com/LprakO1Rpa
@GeoffPyatt: #Debaltseve. We are confident these are #Russian military, not “separatist,” systems pic.twitter.com/vVuH7USqyL #GEOINT
AND yet we worry they have no strategy for the ME??–I am worrying they simply are ignoring anything anywhere in the world that will force this WH and NSC into a decision making mode other than using words which has gotten them nowhere in Syria, Iraq and Israel not to speak of the Ukraine.
Diplomacy is a great thing but it requires two sides willing to negotiate and when in the case of Russia diplomacy is in act part and parcel of their new UW strategy for political warfare and yet when this WH and NSC does not see that we are again in serious trouble. Fredrick the Great even stated that diplomacy without a military is a waste of time.
At one time the US had prepositioned equipment for 24 brigades in Europe and what do we have now in Europe three and 12 A10s.
When top US military leaders openly state the Russian threat, when the Sec of State is finally releasing sat photos confirming actual Russian troops inside the Ukraine when bloggers have been doing it daily since Crimea, MH17 and now eastern Ukraine-and when the NSC/WH utter not a single word that has a serious ring to it–that is not a comforting thought and it definitely does not give one a warm and fuzzy feeling this WH and NSC knows what they are doing?
OR is it simply “easier” to “win” against a bunch of black flag wavers that do not have a nuclear trigger finger than an aggressor that indeed has one and has threatened to use it against the US.
But again many of the NSC and this WH never sat under their desks/tables in grade school during nuclear practice drills.
Look at the media over the last two days after Minsk and the heavy fighting that is on going using basically pure Russian troops and units–not a single public press conference from this WH—ever wonder why.
Think Iran and the personal legacy of this WH and you will find the answer measured against the outcome/future of a 43M civil society.
Getting back on topic, which is Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Cordesman argues that strategy does not consist of broad policy goals, but it consists of an actual plan with clearly defined goals, specific means, milestones, risks, metrics, and so forth. Part of our problem as a nation is we rely on a national security lexicon that largely hails from Clausewitizian days. Today we have multiple definitions for strategy, war, security, and so forth, so we end up talking past each other when we we’re often in agreement.
Step one should be coming up a new lexicon for national security in the 21st century. War is war means little for those developing strategy or plans or both, especially when we can’t define war and strategy. It is hard to be a profession without a lexicon. The traditionalists will huff and puff that they know what war and strategy are, yet articles written by many so called experts indicate otherwise. Discussions with so called experts also indicates there is no agreement.
I would argue what Cordesman is describing a plan, not a strategy. Agree or not with the President’s approach, he does seem to have a strategic approach for dealing with the Middle East. It isn’t one amiable to a detailed list of ends, ways, and means. He is trying to shape the outcome, instead of directing a major military operation to produce an outcome. Strategy and plans in my opinion are very different. The second requires the details that Cordesman identified, the first is broader and more interactive as it responds to challenges and opportunities in the strategic environment in hope of guiding the system in a desired direction more favorable to our longer term interests.
I don’t think the President, Congress, or the American people want to sacrifice too much protecting a corrupt Iraqi government that is a surrogate of Iran, and at the same time they don’t want Iraq to fall to IS. That creates an interesting tension that a deliberate plan with specified ends, ways, and means will not be able to address. On the other hand, if we want to take Mosul from IS, that would require a very detailed plan with ends, ways, and means. If we’re trying to shape strategic outcomes in the region we need seek understanding, constantly assess, and seek opportunities based on a very dynamic strategic environment. We’re constantly seeking means (partners), we have ways, and ends are unclear because reverting back to the status quo is not desirable. I think that is the biggest rub. IS exists because of conditions in Iraq and Syria that are not sustainable, so defeating IS alone will accomplish what?
Finally, strategy often is often closely held, so critics assume we don’t have a strategy because their favorite media outlet says we don’t. We might actually have one, and it may be a good one or deeply flawed. Random thoughts to further confuse the debate.
In the highlighted section above, it no longer is possible to conceive of an Iraq with current boundaries under exclusive Shiite/Iran control or a Syria under exclusive Assad/Iran control in some areas and daesh control in others. Likewise, Afghanistan will probably evolve to areas under Taliban control and other areas under Afghan and ANSF control.
Self-rule, if not outright new boundaries in particular areas, is a probable prerequisite for stability. Kurd and Sunni areas require greater autonomy from Assad/Iranian and Iraqi Shiite/Iranian control. Tactical victories could be designed to achieve that strategic self-rule to promote stability if the U.S. and other coalition partners could agree ahead of time and place coalition, Syrian, and Iraqi Sunni forces in Sunni areas, Iranian, and Iraqi Shiite forces in Shiite areas, and Kurd and U.S. forces in their northern territories. The U.S. then would be positioned for this (edited) TTP outlined by Cordesman:
Such U.S. and non-Arab forces based in Kurd areas could respond to emergencies and conduct raids into Sunni and Shiite controlled areas without actually “occupying” those areas. Likewise, other U.S. forces in Jordan could raid into Syria from the south as required to reinforce other Jordanian and Sunni coalition elements. Someplace like Al-Assad airbase is centrally located to provide other reinforcement east or west without actually being around Sunni or Shiite populations on a routine basis. This would preclude the condition noted by Cordesman in this quote, by only “holding” populated territory with forces unlikely to incur the ire of the population:
Not sure that the “build” part of the last sentence above still applies. “Transition” seems more appropriate in this case to credible forces able to hold and governments able to rule their respective Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd areas. The areas of southern and western Syria also would require some alternative to Assad/Iranian rule that is not addressed by current bombing strategies and proposed training of moderate Sunnis. Substitution of Sunni genocide of Alawites and others is just as unacceptable as Assad/Hezbollah and ISIS genocide of Sunnis and Kurds.
This gets back to having safe haven in Kurd areas, Jordan, and isolated areas like Al-Asad for air-enabled forces that can raid, air assault, and perform CAS and close combat attack, plus MEDEVAC/CSAR. Having such safe havens also would simplify supply as Kurd areas could be resupplied through Turkey, Jordanian areas through Jordan, and Al-Asad by air.
It seems unlikely that Iraq forces or newly trained Sunni elements could retake lost urban areas along the Tigris and Euphrates. A lead armored BCT and U.S. Marines would probably need to retake respective river valleys en route to Kurd areas where a residual U.S. force would remain. Just as the 82nd and 101st cleaned out bypassed cities during the first OIF, Iraq and Sunni trainees could be left behind in river valley cities to “hold” and transition to stability operations. U.S. forces would not be far away in Jordan, Kurd areas, and Al-Assad if the locals required assistance.
Tell me what you think (good and/or bad) re: the depiction/comparison I have made below:
a. I have read that avoiding future Vietnams was the first priority of President Nixon re: his national security strategy.
b. Likewise avoiding future Afghanistans and Iraqs appears to be the top priority of President Obama.
c. Getting the out of Vietnam appears to have been a top priority of President Nixon back then — in much the same way that getting out of Afghanistan and Iraq appears to be a/the top priority of President Obama today.
d. Accordingly, in neither President Nixon’s Vietnam, nor in President Obama’s Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, do we see a serious attempt being made to:
1. “Produce a stable and friendly nation” or to
2. Put more “boots on the ground” in order to achieve same.
e. Nixon had then — as Obama has now — moved on.
f. Thus, from Mr. Cordesman’s piece above: “U.S. military action must be tied to a civil-military strategy that offers the best possible hope of producing a stable and friendly nation as its ultimate outcome.”
g. Again, that does not appear to be the direction that President Nixon was heading re: Vietnam. His strategy was focused on getting out of Dodge only — and this sooner rather than later. And his strategy was focused on not having anymore Vietnams.
h. Same-same with President Obama and Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria today.
(Thus, in both cases described above, to see that our presidents were prepared to accept — as “ultimate outcomes” — something other than “stable and/or friendly nations.”)
i. To conclude: Nixon then — and Obama today — considered that the wars that they had inherited were gross mistakes. Accordingly, these executives, when they came to power, moved to — not win these wars — but to put them in our rear view mirror. And they simultaneously moved to focus our attention, and our efforts, on other, more pressing, more important and more intelligent priorities.
When I hear someone compare Iraq with Vietnam, I get interested. Our military departed Vietnam with 92% of the population under government control. That statistic indicates some degree of success and popular support. My observation was that the strategy of attrition put in place by Westmoreland was successful (tactical search and destroy with overwhelming firepower). Pacification was successful following TET of 68. There was never an uprising in support of the North Vietnamese nor threats of jihad against the US. There was a Kennedy who put the US in Vietnam in numbers and a Kennedy that led the charge to cut off all funding for South Vietnam. I get upset with those who would put forth Vietnam as a military failure.
Mr. Cordesman is consistent and accurate, but he is not any more strategic than than those he criticizes. Applying his own definition, we did not have a strategy for strategic success in Vietnam, we had a strategy for tactical success. To blame the failure on President Ford is unfounded. After all, when one “defeats” a phase 3 Maoist approach to insurgency it does not make the insurgency go away, it merely converts it back down into a lower phase, where it rebuilds energy to surge once again into a conventional state on state battle to attain ultimate victory. Unstated is that the Maoist approach can win in any phases if the government quits.
The US will never understand the strategic lessons of Vietnam and why what we attempted failed there until we are able to step back and honestly assess the entirety of the conflict, and not just the relatively short portion at the end that we participated in, seen in the context of what we hoped to accomplish there.
That is why we applied a virtually identical strategy to achieve virtually identical tactical results with nearly identical lack of durability in Iraq. It is not the fault of Mr. Obama’s unwillingness to pour more good money after bad that made the strategy of tactics fail – it was the flawed nature of the “success” itself.
To defeat ISIL only succeeds in turning a weak, emergent state with a government we disapprove of (but are well equipped to deal with) back into a powerful, fragmented revolutionary insurgency. Given our demonstrated ineptitude for dealing with insurgency, why would we do that?
Anthony Cordesman is wrong about Vietnam, and he is wrong about Iraq. There was a time when powerful states could force a suppressed population into accepting an illegitimate political outcome determined for them by that powerful state. Those days have been ending for the past 100 years or so and are probably over.
Time to move on and formulate a new strategy that begins with an understanding of the problem and then moves toward a workable solution; not determining the solution we want, and then seeking approaches to force that end to work.
First there were to be only 300 “non boots on the ground”, then the number slide magically to 3200 and the recently it was noted there will be a limited number and now the “limited number” appears to be 4000 based in Kuwait.
And we are not going back into Iraq and this administration claims to have a strategy–still waiting to see exactly what that strategy is?
3200 plus 4000 is just shy of the 10K we pulled out in 2010 so why did we leave in the first place if 5 years later we are going back in.
No defensive weapons for the Ukraine outside of words and yet we are going fully back into Iraq does that make sense?
“BREAKING: More than 4,000 US troops will be deployed to Kuwait http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/02/15/More-than-4000-troops-will-be-deployed-to-Kuwait-possibly-to-fight-Islamic-State/2061424019948/#ixzz3Rpuk2BKH …”
No doubt we can get rid of ISIS if we put enough “boots on the ground”. Then what? We already tried this once. What will be different this time? Not much that I can see. Unless you have a strategic plan for making the Shia Iraqi government play nicely with everyone else, you don’t have a strategy.
I have been writing a large number of comments concerning the IS and Iraq that we never fully “understood” what we were and are still “seeing” and a few readers did understand the meaning between the two words.
The IS has tried a number of times to talk with the West starting with the recent interview with one of their inner circle who was in jail with al Baghdadi and who made an interesting statement “we do not know where this is really going”.
This is an extremely interesting article as it attempts to understand the drivers of IS in a clear and concise manner and those that have dealt with AQI/QRJB and the other Sunni insurgent groups in the past will recognize a number of points as I heard them often when dealing with Iraqi insurgents after they were detained.
“A shot at paradise in the worst place on Earth”: @gcaw on how Islamic State sees itself http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ …
Now one can start to see the relationship of Russia to the ME especially to Iran, Syria and I hate to say it the Ukraine.
And that was not mentioned in the NSS by the NSC and the WH—there is an old saying from the Cold War days–where goes Soviet propaganda so goes Soviet FP.
Kremlin propaganda ramps up narrative of Putin as the great “hope” for Middle East region http://sputniknews.com/analysis/20150213/1018220221.html …
Still cannot understand the drive for “boots on the ground”?
the constant stream of articles around the foreign policy failures of this administration especially in the ME, Iraq and Syria just keep on coming as yet the drive to send troops back into the ME is the “so called strategy” in the face of IS?
The UAE article has been confirmed by other articles and yet the WH/NSS seems to ignore them.
Expert: seizing #Mosul may take 10 months, 30,000 troops http://fb.me/259Wfiait
UAE Amb to the US Yousef Al Otaiba writes in advance of CVE summit that “ISIL Can’t Be Beat on the Battlefield Alone” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/isil-cant-be-beat-on-the-battlefield-alone-115233.html#ixzz3RzrLCKlC …
The impending massacre that wasn’t, Obama’s bungled mission, and the Libya that could have been. A devastating piece: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143044/alan-j-kuperman/obamas-libya-debacle?gp=140292:f47c722455083cef …