How to Defeat ISIL
How to Defeat ISIL by Bing West, National Review
… So what should we do? The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin Dempsey, has suggested that we “initially contain, eventually disrupt, and finally defeat [the Islamists] over time.” Notice that the general used the word “defeat.”
What is necessary to put flesh on Dempsey’s objectives? First, both parties in Congress must agree that this Islamist army is a mortal threat to America’s core values and must be destroyed. General James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, has testified that ISIL, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, poses a potential threat to the homeland. The phrase “potential threat” is fraught with ambiguity. Until catastrophe occurs, many will argue that ISIL is a murderous religious cult confined within regional geographic boundaries. That was how Mr. Clinton viewed Osama bin Laden before 9/11. If the commander-in-chief does not perceive a mortal threat and if the press grossly underreports the persecution of Christians and other minorities, then the public will see no reason for our military to become heavily involved…
I read Bing’s article twice and wondered whether these two passages negated his whole argument: ‘Muslim ground forces to push the Islamists out of Iraq and Syria’ and ‘Muslim leaders have failed their people’.
Which Muslim armies are ready for such a campaign today or tomorrow? Not one I would contend, nor in an alliance of the willing. Then he assumes the very same failed leaders will act. There are few leaders in the local, Arabic-speaking Muslim world who answer to their people.
Mr. West’s advocacy lacks realism in key details:
– Iraq isn’t going to relinquish its sovereignty in exchange for U.S. military intervention. It’s something that has to be negotiated.
– Iraq’s Shia leadership isn’t going to accede to a U.S. zero sum position that entirely shuts out the Iranians.
– The Iranians are politically capable of lining up with the United States, as seen in its accepting the American supported pick for the new Iraqi prime minister. In my opinion, West’s position would repeat the gross mistake made in 2002 where the United States pocketed Iranian assistance with intelligence and influence over the United Front during OEF, only to forthwith resume a hostile attitude.
– The American public is against sending a ground force back to Iraq. Really, West should be advocating CAS and attack missions, embedding JTACs, and dispatching SF teams.
– I also think the more reliable ground force partner in the Syrian theater of operations against IS is the SyAA and NDF. However, that requires admitting our American policy toward Syria contributed to the rise of IS, which might enabke a corresponding oreign policy realignment towards the Syrian government.
What is going on in Syria and Iraq was not created by ISIS. To attempt to “defeat” ISIS would only suppress the popular movements and grievance they draw their strength from at best, and probably only modify the leadership in some small way.
What is going on in Syria and Iraq is not a military problem and therefore has no military solution. Sure, there is room for military action. Military forces can act to mitigate the high end of violence that affects the people of the region as old, obsolete and inappropriate systems of governance are leveled to make way for better systems to someday emerge (a process that can take generations, btw); military forces can temporarily suppress or disrupt the symptoms of the underlying problem; and lastly, military forces can help to create time and space for those civil leaders who actually own the problems of governance that are energizing this mess. But “defeat”? Not likely.
In truth, the states of Syria and Iraq no longer exist. This is now a region of factions built around core identities supported by ideologically aligned militias. What once was the Iraqi government and military is now just another such faction and militia. Likewise Syria. These are “zombie states”. Much like what happens to a person in that current popular genre of fiction once bitten, these states have turned, and no longer are what they once were. They may look like states and we may still think of them as states, but make no mistake, to do so is dangerously misguided.
We supported a similar zombie state in Lebanon in 1983. In truth, we were perceived as Christian Americans coming to the support of the Christian Maronite faction and militia; and were therefore attacked by the Muslim factions.
If the West acts at all in the region once occupied by the states of Syria and Iraq (Zombieland?) we should do so in a manner that is equally balanced across all of the major factions. Not to defeat what cannot be defeated, or to restore what is not restorable; but do shape the region in line with the three missions I outline above, with the purpose of posturing ourselves for influence with all of the parties with whatever emerges going forward.
A new take on why the Christians were overrun by the IS—does not place a good light on the myth of Kurdish fighting abilities.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/17/how-the-u-s-favored-kurds-abandoned-the-yazidis-when-isis-attacked.html
Edited and added to:
Let’s look at the situation from the standpoint the United States’ overriding political objective and consider a (possible) historical analogy.
The overriding political objective of the United States has been — and still is – the transformation of “different” states and societies more along modern western lines.
During the Cold War, and in the face of the challenge presented by (1) a peer rival with (2) a compelling global transformational goal of its own, we chose the defensive strategy of “containment” as the means by which to achieve our objective. Herein believing that, over time, the problems presented by the communist system would eventually cause these folks to come around more to our way of thinking and our way of living. Sure enough, this seemed to work out (at least temporarily).
Having, in this manner, (1) defeated our peer rival and (2) achieved a “better peace,” now the United States moved to adopt and implement a more offensive strategy — known as “engagement and enlargement” — for favorably transforming those lesser and remaining states and societies that still had not made the move toward adopting our way of life, our way of governance and our values, attitudes and beliefs.
It is against this backdrop (protection of great power rivals now diminished; the United States moves aggressively to transform the lesser and remaining states and societies as it desires) that Islamist movements such as AQ and ISIL/S are formed.
(Herein, the United States shows that it is prepared to work with governments that quickly and enthusiastically adopt a pro-western “reform” agenda — or to work to overthrow those governments [Egypt, Libya, Syria, etc.] that do not show sufficient transformational zeal.)
Thus, the Islamist come to understand (much as did the American Southerners by the mid-19th Century) that they must stand up and defend themselves against the looming loss of their preferred way of life, their preferred way of governance and their unique values, attitudes and beliefs. Otherwise, they must expect to see their foundational ideas and concepts, much as did the populations of the “Old South,” become “gone with the wind.”
Given this (possible) similar situation and (possible) historical analogy, might we see Bing West’s suggestions (re: the need for a more fully-involved, aggressive, ruthless and decisive approach?) in a new light?
The United States, as it did in the American Civil War, has formally thrown down the gauntlet. The Islamists, much as did the American Southerners, have formally picked the gauntlet up and, thus, the battle — of our making and our choosing — then as now — has been joined.
Thus, do we follow through — as we did in the American Civil War — with the full force of America’s might; to achieve the state and societal transformations that we require?
Or do we adopt, now in the face of greater resistance than we expected, some other method — as we did in the Cold War — for achieving our global transformational objectives?
(Herein, the global economy — and the developed and developing world — being in a position to “wait” while this latter method finally achieves our goals? In the American Civil War, the United States felt that it could not “wait” and, thus, had to act decisively.)
double post
Damn double post again