A-10s Saved the Day in Botched Afghanistan Raid

What Dave says is clearly correct. However, let’s point out that the A-10 has had its share of fratricide as well. At an Nasiriyah a Marine controller cleared A-10s to make up to seven passes that struck Marine AAVs that Pennsylvania Air Guard pilots should have recognized. Some say up to 10 Marines were killed in those attacks while an official CENTCOM report claimed it was only one and the others were enemy fire.

In 1991 at the Battle of Khafji in Saudi Arabia, an A-10 Maverick killed up to 11 friendlies. In Basra on April 6, 2003, an A-10 destroyed two British Warrior IFVs killing one and wounding five.

As in the an Nasiriyah fratricide that involved an erring ground controller, this could have resulted from a JTAC failure, not a B-1B shortcoming. Later in 2007, the USAF began installing Sniper XR pods on B-1Bs that allow highly magnified views of the target area coordinates for confirmation. Let’s also point out that plenty of Predator/Reaper/Gray Eagle/Shadow full motion video is also being fed into TOCs for confirmation in many TICs.

Beyond these facts, the article simply omits that an A-10 will not be able to survive against modern radar air defenses. An F-35 can survive in that environment. In addition, a B-1B can lob small diameter bombs a substantial distance to fly under radar air defenses and turn away before reaching their envelope. An A-10 could do this to some degree but lacks the B-1B and other fighter’s speed that makes lobbed bombs travel farther. In addition, the B-1Bs afterburner along with other fighters can get those aircraft on scene much sooner. A B-1B also can lob multiple bombs simultaneously for larger threats on the battlefield.

Finally, these continuing claims that the A-10 is the only game in town also neglects to mention that AH-64D/Es, OH-58Ds, and Marine Cobras can provide close combat attack and Marine CAS while flying under air defenses. Their smaller Hellfire and gun munitions are less likely to create fratricide and can be used in close proximity to friendlies and civilians. Remotely piloted aircraft also can contribute to many TICs with lethal support.

Keep in mind that the following argument is just my speculation about the USAF Reaper to answer the groupthink notion of non-permissive A2/AD environments and claimed over-investment in “non-stealthy” UAS. Wouldn’t we all agree that only Russia and China present the sole “high” air defense threats? Iran, Syria, and North Korea might be the sole “medium” threats in terms of both air defenses and fighter aircraft. I argue that it would take a relatively brief time for manned stealth aircraft to reduce medium air defense and fighter threats to acceptable levels for non-stealthy remotely piloted aircraft and manned helicopter operations.

You might counter that if stealth aircraft reduce the air defense threat to acceptable levels, the A-10C then can fly. The problem is that in 1999, NATO allies began Operation Allied Force on March 24/25th. Over a month later on May 2, an F-16 was shot down by a radar SA-3 missile and an A-10 was damaged by an older shoulder-fired MANPAD. The old SA-3 is also what was thought to have downed the F-117 in the first few days of the 78-day air war.

These are very old air defense systems that pale in comparison to what Russia, China, and medium threats possess today. The SA-6 that shot down Scott O’Gray’s F-16 in 1995 is circa the 1973 Yom Kipper war and it gave Israeli F-4s fits. Keep in mind also that during the Cold War, systems like the old SA-6 had the USAF believing that very high attrition rates would result to A-10s. That was 30+ years ago. Today’s air defenses are far, far more advanced and more affordable to adversaries than the manned fighter aircraft they would need to counter our stealth fighters. Even stealth aircraft are challenged by them according to General Hostage in the Breaking Defense articles.

The Allied Force example suggests that cautious air defenders even with very old equipment can make their systems survive longer than a month by limiting how often they turn on radars and when/who they choose to engage. If you are flying a “low” flying non-stealthy 4th generation manned aircraft such as the A-10 or F-16 a month into any conflict you still face substantial potential risks. That probably is not the case for an F-35 or F-22 flying at medium and high altitudes. If you are operating a non-stealthy remotely piloted aircraft at medium altitude, the risks are limited except to radar missiles and no pilot is at risk so does it really matter?

Then examine a semi-recent incident off Iran where a single F-22 pilot showed up to ruin the plans of a pair of Iranian F-4s that appeared to be threatening a USAF Predator over international waters. They didn’t know the Raptor was there underneath them checking out their weapons load until he suddenly revealed himself on their left wing according to a story told by General Mark Welsh who said the USAF reservist told the Iranian pair that “you really ought to go home.”

Lesson? We can fly non-stealthy UAS to include Reapers, Global Hawks and Tritons off the 12-mile limit of any country and along international borders whenever we desire provided standby air support protects them and we retaliate in some manner if threats attack them with their aircraft or air defenses. True, we can’t fly non-stealthy RPAs over the top of China, Russia, or any medium threat country. However, neither could we fly stealthy RPAs over medium to high threat territory very often in peacetime without them eventually being shot down visually by adversary fighters.

We can fly Reapers high over most other low threat troubled areas to include current Iraq, particularly at night, without much concern of losing an aircraft. Even if a Reaper/Predator/Gray Eagle is lost they are relatively cheap and have no stealth technology able to be compromised/copied by adversaries.