After the Fall of Homs: Explaining Bashar Assad’s Hold on Power
After the Fall of Homs: Explaining Bashar Assad’s Hold on Power
Jeff Collins
Homs, Syria’s third largest city and locally known ‘capital of the revolution’ fell into the hands of dictator Bashar Assad’s forces last month. While a ceasefire in February saw a partial retreat of rebel forces the most recent ceasefire witnessed the evacuation of 1,000 fighters from the Old City and the return of government control after two years of besiegement. Bombarded day and night by artillery and airpower, and completely surrounded by government forces the rebels were blocked from importing food and prevented from letting civilians escape. In the end, their leadership concluded pragmatically that the continuation of a longer presence in the city entailed more civilian loss of life and starvation among their own ranks: withdrawal was the only sound option remaining.
While the capturing of Homs represents a major symbolic victory for Assad it also serves as another example of his incremental step-by-step approach to recapturing long-held rebel positions following chemical weapons attacks in August 2013. In the past six months Assad’s forces have largely secured the strategic M5 highway linking Damascus, the capital, with Aleppo, the largest city, in the north. In contrast to the comments of many Western leaders last year – including President Obama – the likelihood of Assad being disposed is now more remote. This has left some prominent observers, including former U.S. ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, calling on Western capitals to reconcile themselves to the notion that Assad in power is not only the most likely outcome of the ongoing civil war but the best option out of a series of lousy alternatives, including control – however partial – by radical Sunni Islamists.
In understanding this turn-of-events we need to look at what scholars (see here and here) have identified as the interconnecting variables underpinning Assad’s longevity: First, the structure of the regime has created a level of ‘coup proofing’ preventing the likelihood of an internally-directed overthrow. As it stands now, there are four intelligence agencies spying on the military, the population and each other. Second, the regime enjoys a bedrock of support from minority groups concentrated in the more urban and western half of the country. These groups – Christians, Druze, Alawites, and middle-class Sunnis – are not only sceptical of majority Sunni rule, who compose most of the opposition forces, but have benefitted from patronage and security under the 40 year reign of the Assad family, themselves Alawites. More radical elements among opposition forces have not offered any sense of consolation to the above, in fact they have done the opposite by engaging in sectarian killings.
Third, opposition forces are divided. The Syrian National Council remains in exile and lacks domestic legitimacy. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) has been wrecked by infighting and profiteering, even ceding some of its arms caches and Turkish border positions to the breakaway Islamic Front. These divisions have prevented the rebels from mounting a large offensive since last summer. Instead, the FSA and the Islamic Front have found themselves combatting the foreign fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), itself a breakaway faction of the al-Qaeda inspired Jabhat al-Nusra. As a testament to the severity of this infighting between January and March of this year some 3,000 rebels were killed fighting ISIS, with the largest rebel force in Aleppo, Liwa al-Tawheed, losing 500 fighters alone; this in comparison to the 1,300 it lost in two years fighting the regime.
In contrast to the rebels, the nearly 400,000 strong Syrian army remains largely intact. Considering the casualties it has suffered and the sectarian composition of its ranks – although the officer corps is predominantly Alawite – only 10 percent have reportedly switched sides. The regime’s sophisticated air defences also remain secure thus deterring potential interveners. Furthermore, the sectarian minority linkages between the army, intelligence services, bureaucracy and ruling Baath Party have allowed the regime to mobilize local militias to augment the regular forces. Thus, unlike his opponents, Assad still retains the ability to “conduct a centralised military strategy”.
Finally, divisions within the international community have aided in Assad’s continuing grip on power with supporters – Iran, Russia and China – on one side and Western countries, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states backing a range of secular and religious groups on the other. This split has arguably been the most crucial factor in ensuring regime survival. Among Syria’s supporters, Russia brokered the chemical weapons agreement in 2013 that prevented US-led airstrikes and in parallel removed a crucial obstacle to the regime’s hold on power: foreign intervention. At the UN Security Council Russia and China have vetoed the most modest of new proposed sanctions while Iran provides advice on sanctions avoidance. Despite exhausting $17 billion (US) in hard currency reserves it is estimated that the regime earns up to $500 million (US) a month in transfers and lines of credit from Iran to purchase food and fuel. Similarly, and aside from renewing weapons contracts, Russia has assisted the Central Bank of Syria in printing more money to ensure government salaries are paid and regime loyalty reinforced. In terms of the campaign, Iran has provided crucial manpower in the form of Hezbollah fighters, Revolutionary Guard advisers, and Iraqi Shiite militiamen (particularly the Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas brigades).
In light of these variables one can understand both the failure of the Geneva peace talks and Assad’s plans for re-election to a third seven-year term in July: his regime is surviving and he sees no incentive to compromise. With this in mind the involved powers – especially the West – will have to either uncomfortably accept Assad’s regime and work with him (and Russia and Iran) in a more constructive matter to contain and lessen the bloodshed or step-up their ‘game’ and provide the necessary resources for the FSA to push back the radical Islamists and reduce the Assad regime to at least a rump state around Damascus with the final goal of total overthrow. In short, it’s time for pragmatic decisions.
