Special Operations – An Army Core Competency
05.26.2014 at 04:06am
Special Operations – An Army Core Competency by Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland and Lt. Col. Stuart L. Farris, Army Magazine
Due to the 2012 defense strategic guidance’s emphasis on “small-footprint approaches,” perhaps now more than ever, special operations offer talents and skills that are increasingly relevant in modern conflict. As such, they must be recognized as an Army core competency.
Why can’t SF/SOF conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security? Actions in “Lions of Kandahar” and another book about the assault on Shok Valley, Operation Red Wings, the reinforcement actions during latter stages of Operation Strong Eagle, other night raids, and the raid on Osama bin Laden using Army special ops helicopters all sound like variations of combined arms maneuver. Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police sounds like wide area security for isolated areas not requiring a fulltime larger national ANSF presence.
SF/SOF performs all the warfighting functions just like other combat arms branches. What is so unique about SF/SOF to justify a core competency? Other services also have SF/SOF so why is it just an Army core competency? Marines also perform combined arms maneuver and wide area security.
“These are certainly necessary Army core competencies, as they accurately describe capabilities and functions required by a preponderance of Army forces, yet we have learned they remain insufficient to adequately address the full range of existing threats. They do not sufficiently account for the increasingly relevant competencies that special operations forces bring to bear in modern conflict. This includes the critical ability of working to prevent conflict — or, perhaps more practically, working by, with and through regional allies, partners and host-nation forces toward what could be described as managing conflict. In other words, special operations play a key role in helping to keep conflict and violence within the limits of political tolerance — at a manageable level—negating, or proving an alternative to, the perceived need for large-scale, long-term and costly military interventions. One only needs to look to the contemporary examples of Army special operations’ contributions in the Philippines, Colombia, Yemen, North Africa and El Salvador to recognize and understand the value of this ability.”
Re: Threats. Should we see the problems — such as those found in the Philippines, Colombia, Yemen, North Africa and El Salvador — within the context of ” real and serious threats” — to the national security of the United States?
Probably not?
Thus, while the two current “core competencies” may, indeed, be needed to deal with real and serious threats, the task of “preventing conflict” and/or “managing conflict” — in places where no such grave threat to US national security is likely to spring forth from — these such tasks, conducted by our special and/or other forces, would seem to fall into some lesser category of importance.
My argument here viewed another way:
If one believes that the United States is likely — minus preemptive efforts and for grave national security reasons — to have to engage in large-scale, long-term and costly military interventions in such places as the Philippines, Colombia, Yemen, North Africa and El Salvador (why?), then the argument made by the authors would appear to be on solid ground.
If, however, one does not believe that such interventions are likely, then these arguments — in light of this knowledge — may need to be re-thought.
(An alternative idea — one that is not based on “threats” per se: The argument made by the authors might be considered feasible if the primary purpose and use of the US Army — now and in the future — came to be to deal with, almost exclusively, problems other than those which had the potential to rise to the level of grave threats to the national security of the United States. Example: Conflicts more akin to MG [USMC] Smedley Butler’s “banana wars.”)
I am not quite sure it is a “problem” with SOF that Big Army has. It is a way of thinking. SOF tends to be results focused and Big Army is process focused. Combined this with poor use of both conventional manuver & SOF forces. Combined with Big Army’s risk aversion, stifleing fear of “what if something happened” and lack of trust in the abilities, capabilities and skills of its junior leadership (both officer & NCO). SOF tend to push down responsibility and utilize experiance. Meaning they will listen. Big Army tends to run on what higher thinks about abilities. SOF adds capabilities, Big Army doesn’t and will pass the buck to SOF. SOF is also capabile of passing the buck as seen by the focus of SF on Direct Action etc, instead of conducting FID.
No one has been able to explain to me why SF was conducting DA and conventional forces were tasked with training. I totally got using SOF for high value, but most of what tier 2 SOF was doing was hitting objectives, that conventional infantry could have just as easily taken care of.
Additionally neither group is on the same sheet of music in terms of language. SOF has terms for terms we already had.
Take all of this into account and and you see the following:
1. Poor employment of SOF & Conventional Forces. We did not make the most out of either one.
2. Senior Leadership were risk averse and passed on missions within their capability, or were directed to.
3. Lack of a coherent strategy.