A Response to an Article on the Marine Corps in The Fiscal Times
A Response to an Article on the Marine Corps in The Fiscal Times
Butch Bracknell and Adam Tharp
David Francis must have been working against deadline when he wrote “Why Afghanistan Might Be the Marines’ Last Fight” (The Fiscal Times, May 6, 2013), a paper-thin analysis of the strategic requirement for a US Marine Corps in the 21st century. Francis gets about as many things wrong in the article as right; our challenge is deciding where to start in highlighting his lack of research.
While the Marine Corps is tasked by the Secretary of Defense with the "primary responsibility for the development of amphibious doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment," it is not a niche service waiting for the next "Inchon." Instead, Marines have used the efficiencies of the sea as a means to quickly move around the globe to execute the congressionally mandated mission of "seizure of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign…and other duties as the President may direct."
Marines were the first non-special operations forces into Afghanistan in November 2001, conducting an amphibious, ship-launched helicopter assault over 400 miles inland to Khandahar. Likewise, in the initial Iraq invasion, 80,000 Marines accounted for nearly 75% of maneuver forces. When the 25,000 man US Army V Corps culminated in Baghdad, it was the Marines who moved a hundred miles north to take Tikrit. Due to its expeditionary prepositioned maritime capabilities, the Marines were in Kuwait prepared for the invasion weeks before the Army was able to marshal sufficient combat power to conduct the mission. Marines relieved the 82d Airborne in Al Anbar, Iraq in early 2004. After being told by the U.S. Army that Al Anbar was a lost cause, they turned the region into a case study of how to execute counter-insurgency doctrine. After restoring security to Al Anbar, it was the Marines who quickly moved into Afghanistan's untamed Helmand province and conducted the majority of the integrated air-ground offensives and high-risk missions.
While maintaining a reinforced Marine Expeditionary Force in Helmand, the Marines simultaneously continued to sustain their seaborne presence, executing missions in Haiti, Lebanon, Libya, and Liberia, among other places. These operations were possible only because of the Marines’ ability to be on-station, maneuvering from the sea, self-sustaining, with integrated aviation, ground forces, logistics, and operational enablers. If the Marine Corps has been a "second land army," it is only because the U.S. Army needed the help to answer the nation’s extraordinary concurrent calls to arms in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the Marine Corps maintained a robust forward deployed, maritime readiness posture.
The Marine Corps is not “actually part of the Navy” and have not been referred to as the “infantry of the Navy” since ships plied the seas under sail power. The Marine Corps is an equal member of the Joint Chiefs and a separate service from the United States Navy. The two services share some budgetary authorities administered by the Department of the Navy, but this does not make the Marines subordinate in any way to the Navy (the service). The only funding that is administered by the U.S. Navy – the service, rather than the Department – is funding for Marine aviation, which is overseen by the Secretary and is not at the beck and call of the Navy service chief.
Francis relies on one biased “expert,” Gordon Adams, without seeking out a true strategic affairs professional who might be able to shed light on the true nature of naval expeditionary operations in the 21st century. Rather than simply recycle Secretary Gates’ missives about the Corps, which, with due respect, were badly misinformed, Francis might have considered the full range of naval expeditionary operations without falling back on “Inchon.” Marines have operated from the sea scores of times since Inchon, including a noteworthy feint during Desert Storm which required Saddam Hussein to commit his operational reserve, making the ground forces envelopment of the Iraqi army possible.
Marines have been responsible for dozens of noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian relief operations in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The rescue of Scott O’Grady in Bosnia? Marines. Securing diplomatic missions worldwide? Marines. Core of the massive humanitarian response to the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2010 environmental disaster in Japan? Marines. To view naval expeditionary operations through the narrow lens of opposed landings reflects a failure to understand how our integrated, joint military operates. Naval expeditionary forces have a unique ability to loiter in troubled areas of the world for weeks or months at a time, without access to ports or airfields, virtually self-reliant for support, awaiting employment or simply demonstrating American commitment to security.
In the future, Mr. Francis might be well-served to dig deeper than one ill-informed academic when discussing the merits of cashiering the most flexible, lethal, well-trained, and adaptable force in the history of warfare. The Marines will not survive as a service because of nostalgia or political connections. The Marines will prosper because they bring an integrated, flexible, forward-deployed, disciplined and effective set of capabilities to the national security toolbox that cannot be replicated by another service or special operations forces.
“Cannot be replicated” is a rather strong statement. The Marines have been used extensively and have performed excellently. Although I agree that the argumentation in the Fiscal Times article tends to the specious, it isn’t a “hack” argument. The Marines are capable of fielding a MAGTF. If a draft is implemented, it can field as many of them as can be resourced. But so can the Army, if properly resourced. The distinguishing feature of the Corps is its already extant integration into the Naval fleet for lots of the logistics and service support that make it easier to deploy and allow it to focus its culture on the warfighter to such great effect.
Allow me to make this argument. The USMC’s distinguishing feature is Naval integration. Meaning, its unique elements are capped by the size and structure of the Navy. Hence, when the Navy is WWII-huge, there can be half-a-dozen or more MARDIVs running around, invading stuff. The marginal value derived from the USMC that makes having two Land domain specializing services worth having shrinks rapidly as the size of the Corps outgrows the Navy’s capacity to field it rapidly and/or keep it fwd deployed. In that sense, any excess size of the USMC becomes what fixed wing Marine Aviators that aren’t doing CAS are to the Navy & AF, nice to have, but functionally indistinguishable from the Army. So it is very valid to ask, what does the USMC provide strategically that is worth having that isn’t done elsewhere on greater scale?
The answer seems to be rapid expeditionary deployment. But until the Navy can field a USMC Corps-sized element faster than the Army can field a Corps, its size would have to be capped based on what the Navy can deploy. The law makes it 3 active divisions and 1 reserve, although arguably, even that is already too big.
As for Iraq or Afghanistan, in neither case did the Marines continually bring something that was not replaceable. The USMC movement into Afghanistan to establish a conventional force presence may have been expedient, but once present it was easily replaceable by the Army. A “beach landing” if you will. GEN Conway might have gotten the chance to exercise the Corps on the drive to Baghdad, but nothing about OIF I was Marine-capability dependent. The multi-month build up to the invasion could have put 1st Armor and 1st CAV in the field just as readily as any of the MARDIVs. It was just cheaper to do with a MARDIV and because the Phase 3 sourcing at the Pentagon was a free for all where everyone wanted to play, lest they miss their chance to play war.
The USMC provides valuable strategic capability. But we don’t need to overstate the case; a USMC short a MAGTF or even a MARDIV doesn’t really matter until the Navy can move them. Anything beyond that is Army 2.0, and if we are crying austere-this-that-and-the-other, the USMC does indeed become a low-hanging fruit.
[EDITED FOR CLARITY]
One other thing the USMC brings to the table that many seem to overlook is a fully-integrated support package. They don’t have to depend on the USAF for any lift capability or close air support (and with the USAF’s stated intent of shutting down the A-10 it’s questionable just how much CAS they might be able to provide).
Wow – so much inaccuracy and half-truth here that takes away from a valid core argument as to the unique capability and relevance of the Corps.
Unfortunately, rather than taking a positivist role on advocating the unique and valuable role of the USMC, which is well established, the authors use distorted and outright false snipes at the Army to justify it. I don’t know what the inferiority complex that drives this trend among Corps partisans, but advocating for your service doesn’t mean you have to demean the other – especially when many points are outright false. You’re certainly entitled to your own opinions, but not your own facts.
A few examples:
“80,000 Marines accounted for nearly 75% of maneuver forces. When the 25,000 man US Army V Corps culminated in Baghdad, it was the Marines who moved a hundred miles north to take Tikrit.”
Huh? These numbers are demonstrably false by any assessment – The Army fielded ten maneuver BCTs while the corps fielded five RCTs. Yes, there were ~80k marines (not all trigger pullers), but there were 240,000, not 25,000, soldiers. Granted, only about a quarter were “trigger pullers”, but that ratio applies to the Corps as well, and the Army supplied the joint logistics for the total force.
I think most 3ID folks would dispute the “culminated” notion, it just happened that Baghdad was a big city of several million people that needed securing. Besides, the force levels were driven by OSD and the TPFDD – for a good account read Gordon/Trainor’s “Cobra II”.
“Marines relieved the 82d Airborne in Al Anbar, Iraq in early 2004. After being told by the U.S. Army that Al Anbar was a lost cause, they turned the region into a case study of how to execute counter-insurgency doctrine.”
Unfortunately the *Army* never declared Anbar lost. That was USMC (I MEF) G2 Col. Peter Devlin in 2006 – (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/10/AR2006091001204.html). Quote:
“The chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed an unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing that country’s western Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there, said several military officers and intelligence officials familiar with its contents.”
This was over two years after the USMC took control of Anbar at the divisional level.
The USMC did great work in Anbar – superb – but also had an Army Brigade as 1/3 of its manpower. You might want to read about it as well, or, watch the video. (http://www.ahctv.com/tv-shows/against-the-odds/against-the-odds-video) Or read about it. For a more USMC perspective, Marine Bing West covered it well in his book “The Strongest Tribe”. (Full disclosure, I was in 1/1 AD working for I MEF; even wrote an article about it).
Finally, the Afghan assertion plays well, they did move aggressively in Helmand, after refusing to task organize to fight in the more critical fight around Kandahar. See here (http://www.amazon.com/Little-America-War-within-Afghanistan-ebook/)
Look, I’m good with defending the Corps, I admire the Corps. But the half-truths and distortions here don’t help your case at all.
If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after [238] years of service, he must go. But I think you will agree with me that he has earned the right to depart with dignity and honor, not by subjugation to the status of uselessness and servility planned for him by the [] Department [of Defense].
— So sayeth a former Commandant. Nothing is new under the sun.
If the only argument on behalf of the Marine Corps is that it can perform the same mission types as the Army, presuming the Army logistically supports it, than the U.S. does not need a Marine Corps. Simply move their divisions to the Army and let’s reduce the redundant costs in Headquarters, training locations, manuals, etc. If the only reason for the Marine Corps is that its forces can perform Army missions and arrive from Navy Ships, those Navy Ships can carry Army soldiers as they did in WWII just as efficiently as they can carry Marines. The fact that the Marines have their own Air Wings / Air support is nice, but the Army also has aviation units (Helicopter squadrons) and obtains the rest of its Air support from the Air Force.
If the writers wish to support the need for a Marine Corps, then they would do well not to argue that they are a better Army, albeit one incapable of logistically supporting itself for more than a couple of days and a few miles.
In fact, the Marine Corps is not making that argument. The Marine Corps mission is strictly tactical. It is the one branch of the military that has no strategic purpose – which should make the powers to be in Washington D.C. wonder why it is a separate branch of the military and, in fact, under the Articles of the Constitution it is not an authorized branch of the military, but that is a debate for another day. And, for those who wish to point to the 1948 law, Congress cannot create something contrary to what the Constitution authorizes. (Tenth Amendment.)
Regardless, the Marines realize their mission predicament and that their survival requires them to divorce themselves from Army missions and to return to being Soldiers of the Sea, i.e. a Naval tactical arm. Thus, they are moving in the direction of being the light weight / short term intervention force when needed to “temporarily” and hopefully rapidly extend Sea Power ashore. And, regardless of any bravado aside about being an independent branch, their operating units are wholly dependent (with minor exceptions) on the Navy being willing to allocate its budget to the Ship types needed to carry and deploy them.
The other reason the Marines may very well survive in some strength into at least the near distant future has to do with the Army’s apparent inability to grasp the precarious political situation in which they find themselves and their continued failure to restructure themselves accordingly. Without their directly saying so, the Army is on the political outside with the President and many members of the Congress. They are being held responsible for the costly strategic failures this country has suffered / is suffering in Iraq and Afghanistan. Someone has to take the blame for those costly failures and it is going to be the Army, at least if its leaders and officers continue supporting COIN operations, and by their trying now to structure / shape themselves into a “culturally oriented” intervention force. Military intervention under the current administration, and possibly the next one, is not a politically popular platform on which to take a stand, but the Army brass (stuck in the past it appears) doesn’t seem to understand that fact.
Let’s see, McChrstyal (sp?) said an additional 80,000 men and an open ended commitment in Afghanistan to do the job, and Petraeus (taking time out from being interviewed by his biographer) told President Obama they could perform the same mission with only an additional 30,000 men and two years would do the trick in Afghanistan. Now there is a clever political move on the part of Army brass and a way to earn the President’s trust.
If the Army Chief of Staff and his generals were politically astute they would damn and dump the Petraeus COINs into the fountain; argue for a Light Footprint advisory support groups structure when needed to support foreign countries, as described by Major Lujan (?) in an excellent paper; argue that all inland ground operations (including special operations) are in its domain and that those forces should belong to them in order to eliminate redundancy of missions; and then argue that they need to restructure their forces into the ground force organization that succeeded in the First Gulf War. If they were politically astute they would publicly damn military occupations of hostile lands as a failed Bush / Petraeus vision, similarly damn nation building as not something the Army (Military) can succeed at, and argue to reinstate the Weinberger / Powell Doctrines.
Absent the above, the Marines will have no problem politically surviving at a decent strength level. The Army on the other hand will, without much fanfare, be reduced further and further by a President who is slowly proceeding along that path. He actually is quite clever at how he is going about it.