US Unsettled by China’s ‘Three Warfares’ Strategy: Pentagon Report
US Unsettled by China's 'Three Warfares' Strategy: Pentagon Report by John Garnaut, Sydney Morning Herald
The US and its military partners are reaching for new tools to counter an unconventional ''three warfares'' strategy that China is using to advance aggressive territorial claims, according to a Pentagon report.
It says the People's Liberation Army is using what it calls ''legal warfare'', ''media warfare'' and ''psychological warfare'' to augment its arsenal of military hardware to weaken the resolve of the US and its regional partners to defend islands and oceans in the East and South China seas.
''They have introduced a military technology which has not previously been considered as such in the West,'' says the report, China: The Three Warfares, which was commissioned by the Pentagon's most senior strategist, Andrew Marshall, and circulated to the US Pacific Fleet. This technology has ''sidestepped the coda of American military science,'' it says.
The report's warnings of China's use of ''coercive economic inducements'' and other non-traditional methods underscores Prime Minister Tony Abbott's challenge in balancing economic and security interests, as he prepares to meet China's President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People on Friday night. This week Mr Abbott signed a landmark agreement to develop military technology with China's arch-rival, Japan, while Australian business leaders joined a forum at Bo'ao that was initiated by representatives of a PLA ''influence'' platform, as revealed last year by Fairfax Media…
This could perhaps be described as unconventional and political warfare with Chinese characteristics.
For those that missed it I do think it is worth reviewing George Kennan’s #269 Policy Staff Planning Memo from 1948. The entire memo can be accessed here: http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm Excerpts from Kennan’s memo:
QUOTE 1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition,
political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national
objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP–the Marshall Plan), and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.
…
3. This Government has, of course, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, been conducting political
warfare. Aggressive Soviet political warfare has driven us overtly first to the Truman Doctrine, next to ERP, then to sponsorship of Western Union [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This was all political warfare
and should be recognized as such.
4. Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of
political warfare–one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and
coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any
foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert
operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government. END QUOTE
I am very cognizant of Frank Hoffman’s warning to consider “Colin Gray’s definitions of warfare as the physical act of fighting, which invalidates both words in “political warfare.” The actual definition, if one accepts Gray, makes the definition problematic since it entails everything short of going to war–and thus NOT warfare. ”
My purpose is not so much to introduce new terms, definitions and doctrine but to try to push us to think more strategically by trying to understand that everything is not terrorism and insurgency and by understanding that our opponents are executing forms of unconventional and political warfare for which we must develop strategies to counter.
And just to counter slightly Frank and Colin Gary, unconventional warfare does include the physical act of fighting. But if political warfare does not involve the physical act of fighting perhaps a better term would be unconventional statecraft which is a term I believed coined by a JAG officer named Dru Wall (I read it in a draft of an article that he is writing.)
Maybe what we need to do is to have two concepts: unconventional warfare and unconventional statecraft.
Looking at the current state of affairs in the ECS and SCS, I’d have to say that China’s use of these methods has been unproductive, likely counterproductive: if anything, they’ve enhanced the unity and will to fight of their rivals. Capacity to fight, of course, is another question. Looking at China’s 3 most likely antagonists, will remains strong and rising in all of them. Capacity in the case of Japan is high, in Vietnam significant, in the Philippines practically nonexistent. Any guesses on where the Chinese will push hardest?
David—if we step back from the authors’ China example are we not in fact seeing a combination of unconventional warfare being practiced by the Russian spatnaz together with FSB/GRU on the ground agents and proRussian supporters in eastern Ukraine coupled with political warfare being practiced by Russia directly against the Ukraine in order to achieve it’s stated aims of holding a country inside it’s self defined “sphere of influence”.
Seems that if we analyze the Crimea/Russia and the Ukrainian events from the last year we would have an excellent case study in how unconventional warfare and political warfare have in fact succeeded in blunting “soft power” driven by diplomacy.
But when we do one has to see a US strategy for the Ukraine and for that matter a NATO and EU strategy—which I cannot currently see and that is causing if we look deeper confusion on the part of the Russians as they fine tune their unconventional/political warfare—they are already by Plan E as they adapt to the changing events almost daily.
Speaking of adaptation of strategy—we the US seem at least in the Ukraine to not be able to expound our strategy in a coherent way that the Russians can fully understand and we seem to not be able to anticipate the next changes on the ground with a forward thinking explainable strategy that adapts as the situation adapts—in the public it seems as if the US is ten dollars short and a week late in the game.
Would also bet that if took the time the Putin Doctrine or strategy has been evolving publicly since about 2008 for all to see.
In fact if we take the next step there is not even a China strategy other than a “pivot declaration” that can been seen or at least be seen/understood by the Chinese.
The three warfares is nothing new, so I am puzzled by the fanfare about it in the US–as if China has this secretive and nasty weapon that it is unfairly unleashing. US does the same thing.
Is pot calling the kettle black? Or as the Chinese saying goes, the thief yelling thief?
It is simply the application of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, open and available to anyone, no secret.
It seems that the Chinese (and the Japanese) lend more credence to and embrace the treatise more so. US could learn from Sun Tzu, and if one reflects upon what Sun Tzu stated, US is violating and has violated many of the principles present therein, i.e., peace is best, war must be just, occupation of other countries ruins one’s own economy, etc.
The Japanese violated Sun Tzu also, in many ways in the past. War must be just, not to occupy the lands of others, defenders will fight to the death, and very notably, be kind to captured enemies–treat them well.
The wisdom of the ancients are in plain sight, it is up to us to accept, reflect and embrace. Violate at your own peril.
I needed to review again after a similar comment on another article and post. I realize the reason it didn’t stick is there nothing insightful about this. Comments below indicate I’m not the only one with that view. This is not warfare, it is political and economic competition/ confrontation. These tools can be used to pursue objectives alone, or they can be used to set conditions for warfare. We have used media, psyop, and economic elements of power for decades. If a country can achieve its objectives without warfare, that generally is the wisest choice, so why the surprise that other nations use statecraft?
This comment in a similar article I reviewed just leaves me dumbfounded.
“The Pentagon study urged the development of effective countermeasures to Beijing’s psychological, legal, and media warfare efforts.”
Of course one can argue the military doesn’t always get it right, but it already counters adversary psychological and media efforts. Other element of the U.S. government use economic power as soft and coercive power, so the claim that the Pentagon must develop a capability that already exists is perplexing. Competition in the information domain is not new. As Dayuhan points out below, China’s use of these three warfares is backfiring on them. If anything, we have either proven to be superior in these efforts, assuming we are countering them, or China is just inept and we don’t need to do anything in the case of China. Russia is another story, but this article resurfaces the myth of the Asian unconventional warfare intellectual dominating the dumb Westerners with these secret oriental weapons.
Saw another recent article referring to China’s use of cyber intrusions as part of their “unrestricted warfare doctrine.” This is so called doctrine is a white paper proposing China written by a couple of sharp Chinese officers. A white paper is not doctrine, it is a think piece. Consider how many white papers and theses are generated in the U.S. each year (or month) on what the U.S. should do in regards to strategy? They are not strategy, they are part of a debate intended to influence strategy.
Most countries use cyber to conduct espionage, China does it on a larger scale than anyone else. That hardly means it is unrestricted warfare. Another state, or an advanced non-state actor, used a virus or worm to disrupt Iran’s nuclear weapon program. Was it unrestricted warfare, or the opposite? The opposite being a very restricted disruption that limited damage to a specific facility.
The media loves the hype, and claiming the sky is falling generates sales. The bottom line is that warfare is violent, but non-violent means can be used to support warfare. In some cases the non-violent means are decisive, and violent means is the enabler. If it does not include the use of violence, then it is probably just non-violent statecraft to pursue objectives.
We should always seek to evolve and get better, so if our adversary actually advances the art we need to keep pace, but it seems the case may be overstated for the three warfares.