The Leaderless Doctrine
The Leaderless Doctrine by David Brooks, New York Times
We’re in the middle of a remarkable shift in how Americans see the world and their own country’s role in the world. For the first time in half a century, a majority of Americans say that the U.S. should be less engaged in world affairs, according to the most recent Pew Research Center survey. For the first time in recorded history, a majority of Americans believe that their country has a declining influence on what’s happening around the globe. A slight majority of Americans now say that their country is doing too much to help solve the world’s problems.
At first blush, this looks like isolationism. After the exhaustion from Iraq and Afghanistan, and amid the lingering economic stagnation, Americans are turning inward…
What’s happening can be more accurately described this way: Americans have lost faith in the high politics of global affairs. They have lost faith in the idea that American political and military institutions can do much to shape the world. American opinion is marked by an amazing sense of limitation – that there are severe restrictions on what political and military efforts can do…
“What’s happening can be more accurately described this way: Americans have lost faith in the high politics of global affairs. They have lost faith in the idea that American political and military institutions can do much to shape the world. American opinion is marked by an amazing sense of limitation — that there are severe restrictions on what political and military efforts can do.”
Would it be more correct to say the following:
Americans, because of our experinces in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, have lost faith in the idea of the universal appeal of our way of life and our way of governance.
Because of this, Americans have come to realize that there is little that American political and military institutions can do — in the near term — to shape the world more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
When it was thought that populations, liberated from their oppressive regimes, would quickly, easily and mostly on their own adopt modern western ways, then American political and military institutions looked to have new utility. Within this context, regime change and state-building became the vogue.
Now that we understand that regime change/attempts at state-building (1) do not equal rapid westernization and (2) may result in states and societies becoming organized, ordered and oriented along lines that are even more detrimental to our interests.
Thus, we realize that we are back to “Square One.”
“Square One” being the process by which we have to work (1) by, with and through often contrary and odious regimes (2) over long periods of time to (3) transform states and societies as we desire. Herein, the United States helping the regime — as in the days of the Cold War — to stand against populations who have other, shall we say non-western or non-western-compatible, aspirations.
(Note: It would seem very difficult indeed — to associate the process described in my last paragraph above — with the concept of known as “self-determination.”)
Robert made an interesting comment (will paraphrase it roughly) in the last couple of days in one of the blogs that fit the Ukraine, China, and now this particular article.
The world right now has one emerging superpower (China) one imploding and dying superpower (Russia) and one slowly degrading/decaying superpower (US).
IMO—while–the rest of the world is trying to figure out what their roles are ie the EU, Africa and Asia.
While that occurs do not expect much in the way of a strategy out of the US.
From the final paragraph of the article:
“We live in a country in which many people act as if history is leaderless. Events emerge spontaneously from the ground up.”
That is the very definition of our political system. We believe that power originates in the people and is granted, on a limited basis, to the government to do what it has to for the common good. It is enumerated in our 10th Amendment: Those powers not expressly granted to the government are reserved to the states or the people.
The rest of that paragraph:
“Such a society is very hard to lead and summon. It can be governed only by someone who arouses intense moral loyalty, and even that may be fleeting.”
Witness your congress in action. This is the essence of the current state of American democracy.
Bill C. is right that this belief in a leaderless system is tied to a population’s values. What values one holds dear from that basis of that “intense moral loyalty” that can get people to follow a leader – what legitimizes that leader in the eyes of the population.
Bill is also right that what Westerner’s perceive as universal values are not, in fact, universal. They were developed in the West during a period of economic growth that allowed for an expansion of the “middle class”, an event that has not occurred in many parts of the world.
Carl points out those weapons are needed to fight, but what are you fighting for? Where two groups of people have values that create that “intense moral loyalty” that a person is willing to fight and die for – and those values are diametrically opposed, one group will necessarily have to gain the upper hand over the other group via coercive force. But maintaining that coercive force is not cheap, easy, or even possible over the long term.
Change to a society where Western values are accepted by the majority of the population will not come in many parts of the world by simply holding hands and singing Kum Bah Yah. But neither can they be secured over the long term with weapons and coercive force. In order to limit the need for coercion on that level you need to determine the source of those values.
“A Leaderless Doctrine.”
As we all know, to be a leader, one must stand tall, look good, set the example, inspire and motivate others, get the job (and more) done and, generally, do those things that one wants others to do — most often — better than they can.
So, from a leadership perspective, does the United States, personified, look like someone who — above all others — the troops (or, in this case, the world generally) would follow today: (1) on a day-to-day basis and/or (2) up the hill and into battle?
If so, why.
If not, why.
So we ask some of our troops (nations; populations) what do they think of the United States as their leader.
And the troops answer:
“She/He was the best I ever saw and I would have — and did — follow her/him anywhere. But she/he looks to have made some big mistakes (economically, strategically and militarily) which have put the whole team (our nation) and the mission (improving peace and prosperity throughout the world) in jeopardy. So right now our leader is in the “wounded warrior recovery mode” and, as such, cannot lead us much of anywhere right now.”
So we ask the troops (nations; populations) whether, in the interim, they have cast their gaze elsewhere and found another leader they can follow.
And the troops answer:
“We’ve looked around, but no one looks like they can anywhere near fill the boots of our old leader (the United States). So we will probably just have to fend for ourselves — and/or do the best we can working with whoever is left — until such time as our old leader and inspiration (the United States) gets her/his stuff back together and gets back into the game.”
After the latest meeting in the UK between the US/Russia—the soft power concept of the WH ie really just diplomacy is fully dead and buried in the face of the first true challenge to the 21st century by a country that wants to turn back the clock to 1970 using language/ethnicity to justify annexation.
This opens the world to now the changing of borders in approximately 365 locations especially in Asia and Africa.
Now lets see if the current globalized world of the West grasps the seriousness of the moment and fully understands that we are now in a true Cold War being fought on an economic front and that economic power is in the end far more powerful than the guns that are being used to intimidate.
In some aspects one could have seen this coming as it has historically always happened with a declining superpower trying to reestablish itself especially when the declining power does not see themselves as declining.
Gorbi got it right yesterday in his comments– we are indeed back into a Cold War with a military being in the wrong place as we chased shadows for 13 years forgetting that the rest of the world did not share our fear of those same shadows and was developing in other directions.
Should we say that it is not so much America itself that is being challenged/questioned today re: the leadership role but, instead, the American model?
This model now being thought of as being — if not outdated — then seriously flawed.
This being evidenced by the fact that we seem to be stumbling around both domestically and internationally, not achieving our desired ends, and only causing our population — and other populations — significant disruption and harm.
This seems to indicate to both the American people — and to people world-wide — that something is seriously wrong with the American model.
The American model, thus, no longer having the “juice” needed by which it might lead.
From a foreign policy perspective, this failure of the American model being evidenced by the fact that the United States has recently abandoned the idea of achieving its desired ends by way of the populations, and has now determined that it must, as was the case during the Cold War, achieve these desired ends via the regimes.
From a foreign policy perspective — and re: the American model — what greater evidence of lack of leadership ability do we need?
“The events in Syria were precipitated by a lot of Syrians who seemed to have exactly the universal values we espouse. They took a lot of fatal casualties from Iranian supported government extremists before they started fighting back. When the fight started they didn’t get much more than lip service from the West by way of support. The takfiri extremists came out of the cracks in the ground when the fighting started and were recipients of a whole lot of money from rich Gulf extremists with which to inflict their vision upon Syrians whom we weren’t supporting. Given all that, it seems that there is a sufficient population of Syrians who mostly value things as we do. They can’t fight without money and something to fight with, which we are reluctant to give them. What you say is a fallacy looks more to me like the Iranians and takfiri killers are more willing to try hard than we are, not that there are not enough reasonable Syrians.”
Carl- I disagree with that narrative- one in which, if I’m not mistaken, the Saudis would love for us to believe (I’m always surprised that we side with Sunnis over Shia in a knee-jerk way). From what I’ve heard Syria is little more than a proxy between Saudi Arabia and Iran- and we’re being played as we so often are in the Middle East (as in other places). Our sad penchant for simplifying complex situations into a Hollywood-type “freedom seekers versus bad guys” narrative plays well to our linear-thinking and ignorant populace and allows us to be manipulated by the different factions on the world stage.
I wish we could show less concern with our means with respect to foreign policy and more concern with our means with respect to domestic politics- but we seemed to have gotten those two backwards- which, in my mind, leaves us useless in both. As much as I’d like it a different way- the rest of the world is playing poker and we’re trying to play checkers.
“We’re in the middle of a remarkable shift in how Americans see the world and their own country’s role in the world.”
Let’s break this down: We’re in the middle of a remarkable shift in:
a. How Americans see the world.
Concur. Americans no longer see the world as one in which the non-western populations will — voluntarily — adopt our way of life and our way of governance. (It appears that the “shinning house on the hill” is not now — nor maybe has it ever been — as big an influence and “draw” as we hoped and imagined.)
b. And how Americans see their role in the world.
Non-concur. Americans still see their role in the world as one in which they must — one way or another — transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
Question: The implications of this un-even shift for the US military?
Answer: America’s military will become more focused on (1) working by, with and through the regimes to (2) overcome resistant populations and, thereby, (3) help our other governmental and non-governmental assets transform the outlying states and societies more along modern western lines.
Thus: The ineffective “shinning house on the hill” being replaced on the line by the more-reliable “shinning bayonet” and, via this more-effective and reliable instrument, getting the outlying state and societal transformation job done.
(Or should I substitute the words “America’s national leaders” for the word “Americans” here; to acknowledge that these two entities do not see eye to eye on these matter?)