The Crimean Crisis Isn’t Just About the Crimea

And if that revisionism — if that reassessment of the great settlements of 1989-1991 — gets underway, then there are other revisionist powers watching and waiting to see just how much Vladimir Putin gets away with. They’ve been waiting, and they’ve seen, and they’ve learned. They’ve seen that the hegemon of the post-1991 order is exhausted and reluctant. They saw Benghazi. They saw Syria’s illusory “red line.” They saw the Iranian capitulation-deal. They saw the Chinese ADIZ. They saw all this, and so this Crimea invasion happens — as much an experiment as anything, mind you — with a bill that may eventually come due in the Senkakus.

I’ve been impressed by Outlaw’s arguments elsewhere, and believe this quote from this article captures the current dangers of a too small Army and a too eager Navy and Air Force attempting unsuccessfully to maintain our world influence and ability to deter conflict solely on their own.

Outlaw notes the obvious. Our ground military forces in Europe have declined to levels that embolden Putin and give him and China confidence that there is neither the will nor capacity to intervene. We should not intervene militarily in Crimea, but if Putin were to move on to the rest of Ukraine, would we have a sufficiently large Army (with 420-440,000) to replicate a forward presence in Poland the same way we deterred war in Germany for decades?

Beyond that, there is a reluctance by Air and Sea services to admit that a need exists for a large Army conflict presence even in the Pacific. There is a failure of imagination in how the Army could accomplish Joint support if Joint facilitators existed to get the Army into the fight anywhere in the world in a more rapid manner. Army forces bring a variety of capabilities impossible to fit in numbers on an amphibious ship. Given airlift capabilities to the Pacific, Army forces would not face the same surprise missile attack threats as forward Navy, Air Force, and Marine forces would face.

For instance, we see the USAF arguing that the A-10 is a single-purpose aircraft which is a convenient argument to kill it ignoring how much of their remaining force is single purpose. The proposed Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) is certainly single purpose as is a C-5 and C-17. Only the C-130 provides insight into possibilities if the USAF were to expand the requirements of the LRS-B. Think low-observable aerial refueler. Think stealthy airdrop for small vehicles and SOF/Airborne troops and their supplies.

Then look at the current decision to curtail the LCS at 32 ships. Good decision…because it allows a variant of the LCS to be improved to fill out the remaining requirement of 20 ships and then some to also supplement amphibious ship capability and partly solve the ship-to-shore connector dilemma. Secretary Hagel mentioned that an LCS variant would be considered as one of the alternatives to fill out the remainder of the requirement. I’ll make an argument for one LCS variant that could be improved to solve a number of problems.

The Independence class LCS has had far fewer horror stories and has far more potential. Imagine if the trimaran was expanded in beam to allow elevators on each side to lower amphibious tractors into the water from its wide enclosed 15000+ square foot mission bay. In the opposite direction vehicles and supplies could be elevated to the flight deck for external sling load transport to shore. We know that amphibious ships face grave peril if they move to 12nm or closer to launch tractors. We also know that Marines could not be asked to endure 6-8 hours of ship-to-shore transit if launched from a more survivable 75-100nm. Launch from an LCS would create the speed to get to 12nm more rapidly limiting the time for tractors in the water.

Finally, modular anti-aircraft and anti-missile mission packages could be moved onto the elevator to launch vertically or other modular packages with torpedoes could lower to launch. The expanded beam would create an even larger flight deck to facilitate lily pad movement of transitting Army aircraft with no intention of staying to encroach into Marine marinized aircraft domains but with capabilities and numbers far surpassing what can fit on an amphibious ship let alone an LCS.

Unless the DoD and all services embrace a Joint philosophy in using the Army more effectively in the air and sea domains, our options will continue to be limited. If a modified future LCS could evolve to a small amphibious ship and mini-destroyer, it could assist the Joint force in executing an Offshore Control strategy by boarding/stopping ships and placing Army and Marine troops on the ground adjacent to sea chokepoints. If we could more effectively get airborne and amphibious troops onto Taiwan to fight guerilla warfare, or into other areas where supposed A2/AD threats exist, then those who would otherwise exploit our unwillingness to act given our limited options…might see the light.