Rebooting Country Studies
Rebooting Country Studies by Anna Simons, War on the Rocks.
For all the talk about “big data,” what about deep understanding? Surely in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan—and faced with other conflicts burbling all over the place—some enterprising office in the Department of Defense or Department of State is busy re-conceptualizing the nature of what constitutes a good country study for those deploying abroad in the 21st century. And surely that office is being run by individuals with ample experience both in non-Western countries and with the U.S. military. Right?
I ask because the field grade officers I know and teach at the Naval Postgraduate School need more than just data (facts), information (assemblages of facts), and knowledge (cumulative information). Until the pendulum swings back and Congress proves willing to issue declarations of war in circumstances that permit no-holds-barred fighting, the military will continue to be asked to act with finesse. Yet, one problem with finesse is that it requires more than just being able to populate databases with names, dates, and information about who’s connected to whom. Data, information, and knowledge certainly matter. But, what they can’t do—ever—is make what others do make sense. They can’t explain how others perceive events, conditions, their predicament, or you…
I had a nice chat with Professor Simons this afternoon. I will looking for the books she references.
Great and insightful comments in the article. Would only add two things:
1- I didn’t see a bunch of American officers who just didn’t get it, rather I saw a bunch of American officers who DID get it, but were overcome by the American military systems which prevented them from doing anything about their appreciation of Afghan society. The strategy, unimaginative and intellectually empty operational campaign plans, personnel system requirements and influences, and the military hierarchical structure and culture kept insightful officers from making much of a difference. In fact- even when some could buck the system- their micro efforts were undone by the overall strategy and macro systemic forces mentioned.
2- I think the astute points raised about data in the beginning are a reflection of the systemic forces I mention in #1 above- those within our military that make things like counterinsurgency efforts so hard to do. We don’t require data because we as individuals are in love with math- but because the systems that Robert McNamara and others before and after him built- JCIDS, PPBES, JSPS, etc.- and our surrender to all things analytical- drive most of our actions- I’d argue. This is a reflection of why we couldn’t get away from data collection in Afghanistan- even though we knew it was bad, and why we couldn’t use our appreciation of Afghan society to drive meaningful changes in our efforts.
We are- I would argue- slaves of our systems- and I’m cynical appreciation like that mentioned in the article at the War College level can overcome the subtle, but insidious systems we have in place. I have yet to see any study by any military organization looking into the part our systems and processes have played in our failures in the last decade- if anything we are building on them.
If one’s goal is to transform outlying states and societies — such that these might be made to run more along modern western lines — then does it make sense to understand just how different these outlying states and societies actually are?
From this perspective to understand the author’s overall suggestion and her specific concluding comments re: “what we are up against,” “what there is to work with,” “how different other peoples’ sensibilities can be” and “how others are likely to improvise and adapt in order to try to overcome?”
Thus, the “rebooting of country studies” to be viewed within the context of our political objective re: outlying states and societies (noted in my first paragraph above).
In David Maxwells’ recent SF article he mentions that the Army eliminated the SORO which had been producing solid area studies which if one looks at the Algerian study merges what the author is calling for a data with the human domain side.
It appears the USASOCOM might in fact restart the SORO area study program.
Note the context within which the author believes new “country studies” are needed:
“But, presuming that Washington persists in sticking to its current path, it seems only prudent—nay, responsible—to develop a new kind of country study.”
(Found in the second paragraph from the bottom.)
Greetings to all this interesting thread.
Ref the possible resurrection of SORO and its earlier research reports and similar products:
[1] Resurrection SORO and perhaps also the parallel sets of research firms — for starters, HumRRO, IDA, CRESS — would be smart moves.
Two repositories exist with probably all of reports produced for DOD by SORO and other earlier research products:
[1] Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), formerly the Defense Documentation Center (DDC), based at Cameron Station, VA/ DTIC/DDC was chartered to make microfiched copies of ALL such DOD-funded reports provided as hard copy.
— One has to push, prod and nag the good people at DTIC to do searches and retrieve the microfiche file and then format that into PDF for release.
— The holdings at DTIC include now-unclassified area studies and PSYOP planning guides for [COUNTRY], which are still real gems of detailed and basic research.
[2] Marquat Memorial Library (MML) at USAJFKSWCS at Fort Bragg, NC.
MML used to have one huge collection of DDC products for support of CA, PSYOP, SF, advisors/trainers of foreign military counterparts, and other SOF-related courses and units’ pre-deployment training programs (PTP).
Hope this helps. Today is Friday, 3 January 2014.
Regards,
Stephen H. Franke
LTC, FAO/SOF/MI/Attache
(FAO 48G “Gulfie” and Yemen-watcher)
US Army Retired
San Pedro (Los Angele Waterfront Area), California