U.S. Soldiers Find Surprise on Returning to Pech Valley: Peace
U.S. Soldiers Find Surprise on Returning to Pech Valley: Peace – Azam Ahmed, New York Times.
… No one is exactly sure how the Afghan forces have managed to make some gains that eluded the Americans for so many years in the Pech Valley. But it presents a sketch portrait of what Afghan-led security might look like in some places after the international military coalition is gone next year.
Interviews with American and Afghan officials and local residents paint the progress as an amalgam of many things: the absence of foreign troops as an irritant, the weakening of the Taliban and an improved Afghan Army. Officials also noted the beginning of de facto agreements in some areas between Afghan soldiers and militants about what is and is not off-limits — not a particularly positive sign, but still an indication of how the battle might change when it is Afghan fighting Afghan…
Arrogance hides most stupidity. As if the Afghans know nothing of the Art of War and Peacemaking. After ten years of interacting with the locals what have we learned? It appears that the real defeat mechanism of this insurgency is the local deal. But instead of embracing this fact we scoff at the idea of de-facto agreements between Afghan soldiers and local fighters as “not a particularly positive sign.”
Government forces have set up more than a dozen new outposts and checkpoints farther into the valley in a bid to secure the main road that runs through the Pech Valley through Nangalam. If the smaller outposts and checkpoints have not been attacked this might imply that a local truce is in effect and that some profit sharing between government and local fighters from a local security or road usage tax is on-going as well.
The local deal is exactly the method through which local commanders accomplish their mission against enemy opposition and have done so for millennia. If we actually had some serious scholarship on the Afghan Art of War and Peacemaking… we might not respond quite so condescendingly to local ways of warfighting and peacemaking. Instead, we lament the fact that no one is exactly sure how the Afghan forces have managed to make gains that eluded the Americans for so many years in the Pech Valley.
Before we bash ISAF and U.S. Army stupidity and congratulate the ANA for its superiority let’s examine the total recent history of the area. The first time we turned the valley over to the ANA, they stripped the bases, sold what they could, and left the place a disaster. This 2 year old article implies that we left in March 2009, yet had to return 4 months later imposing the PEP program of embedded U.S. troops with the ANA.
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0831/Will-US-exit-strategy-work-in-Afghanistan-Brutal-valley-emerges-as-test
If the link doesn’t work, google the Christian Science Monitor article: Will US exist strategy work in Afghanistan? Brutal valley emerges as test.
I’m assuming the picture in the current article is of our troops looking at the former Camp Blessing which now is a COP rather than a FOB. However, note that they cite that the ANA there today is not the same one of two years ago when the 101st was there. This is a perfect example of how it took the long haul for a nonexistent ANA to become a progressively better fighting and negotiating force. In the old days, they simply would have run or cowered low in fighting positions as exemplified by nearby Wanat (former Camp Blessing is 5 miles south of Wanat) and COP Keating. The new article also cites better leadership of the local ANA which takes time to identify and develop.
Note also that this appears to be an ANA success, the centralized ANSF versus the local ALP that the SF are building. They also refrained from going into Korengal valley which was too hard for even our SF and 173rd Airborne and was replete with timber smugglers thus violating national policy, as do the nearby Wanat Waigal valley residents who smuggle gems. Its hard to win hearts and minds when you outlaw their means of making a living.
It remains to be seen if negotiated ceasefires last when we leave. However, most certainly it is heartening to see a stronger ANA able to address main efforts throughout Afghanistan. That is the primary difference between a strictly ALP strategy that may lead to future warlords and ethnic/tribal/valley/village separation from the main state. Only the ANSF (and GPF US Army) can withstand a concentrated massing of effort over Texas-sized territory by whatever forces in Pakistan decide to overthrow the 2014 Afghan government.