Five Questions Concerning Hagel’s “We’re Ready to Go”
08.27.2013 at 10:47pm
Five Questions Concerning Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s “We’re Ready to Go”
Only after a brutally honest assessment of certain critical issues should we even begin to discuss any form of overt intervention in Syria:
- What is crucial to the US regarding Syria?
- What if we did nothing?
- What are the potential consequences of each posited response by the US?
- What are the consequences of failing to achieve any of the above?
- What lengths/limits are we willing to commit/accept to achieve our goals?
Location, location, location relevant to who wins/loses next to Israel and many other currently somewhat stable Muslim states that could become otherwise.
The “otherwise” from above and increased terror attacks on Israel by whichever extreme side prevails leading to a Sunni Extremist-Israel or Israel-Assad-Hezbollah-Iran war. Also access by extremist groups to chemical weapons.
Chemical weapons affecting adjacent civilians if we bomb those, or being used by Assad against Israel or Jordan if we don’t. The same latter response is possible if we go after Assad directly or military C2 nodes leading to lower level leaders making decisions to use chemical weapons without higher authorization. Limited strikes against Assad’s aircraft and air defenses leave him only SCUDs with chemical weapons used potentially against civilians or Israel/Jordan/Turkey. Cruise missile strikes alone could be largely ineffective against a warned Assad who disperses aircraft/forces and shoots down many missiles.
A coalition land attack by larger Arab/Turk Armies with NATO/U.S. air support would end the matter rapidly leaving Arab Armies to stay behind and split up the former Syria. New borders and smaller subset territories would be shared by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey and separate autonomous Alawite and Kurd states. U.S. SOF forces could air assault in to secure chemical sites with B-2/F-22 air cover to preclude counterattack while other U.S. forces remained in Jordan and Turkey protecting their borders/people and shooting down SCUDs and Syrian aircraft. Few if any U.S. ground forces would drive into Syria.
A long war due to a limited insufficient strike with Assad attacking Israel, Jordan, and/or Turkey and increasing use of chemical attacks against its own civilians. A long inadequate no-fly zone attempt with continued missile strikes by Assad. Genocide of Sunnis. A possible nuclear strike by Israel if Assad attacks there with chemical weapons because he is desperate and still can due to our limited attacks.
No drive-in ground forces in Syria. Air assaults and raids only. Ample U.S. ground forces in Jordan and Turkey to protect them. Ample dollars provided to coalition Arab/Turk armies to remain and stabilize along with agreed upon split up of the former Syria into new territories of the combatant coalition Arab/Turk nations.
First off I don’t know the answers to any of the questions, but I found Move Forward’s suggesting of enabling Arab and Turk armies with our air power interesting, especially allowing them to redraw the boundaries afterwards. I doubt that any Arab and Turk armies truly want to commit to this effort, but still an interesting proposition.
What is crucial to the US regarding Syria?
What does crucial mean? Some interests are directly and others are indirectly related to the situation in Syria, and depending upon our assessment of the projected second the third effects we may find the situation to be crucial to our interests in the region or globally. On the same side of the coin we determine that a military intervention may increase the risk to our crucial national interests.
What if we did nothing?
Al-Qaeda and Iranian surrogates would continue to kill each other, but a lot of innocent people will die also, and the conflict will likely expand beyond the borders of Syria (already is to some extent in Lebanon). Again our intervention may actually make worse, so while doing nothing may not be an attractive option, it may not be our worst option.
What are the potential consequences of each posited response by the US?
We simply don’t know, but the potential for bad is very high. If we conduct limited strikes, we’ll most likely experience a response on their time line and in their way. Perhaps the downing a civilian airline? An attack on Turkey or Israel? How many wars and conflicts will it take to learn that cruise missiles and air strikes seldom compel nations or non-state actors to bend to our will, but it certainly will increase their hate and anger towards us and in their minds justifying striking back. Back to the first question, how crucial is Syria to us? How much risk are we willing to assume to help out? Help who exactly? To what end? Assad goes away and then what?
Too late now, but what if we quietly helped Assad in the beginning, or at least didn’t make empty promises to the resistance so they didn’t believe the world would ride to their rescue? Would the resistance have lost its wind? Is Assad the bastard we know and to some extent can control better than the bastard we don’t know?
What are the consequences of failing to achieve any of the above?
Achieve what?
What lengths/limits are we willing to commit/accept to achieve our goals?
We better answer that one before anyone fires the first round.
More:
A Few More Questions Before We Start Bombing – Long War Journal
Questions Already Swirl About Endgame, Objectives – Associated Press
5 Questions to Ask Before Bombing Syria – The Diplomat
War in Syria Needs Long-Term Strategy – Brookings