Petraeus: We Must Be Coldly Realistic Over The Use Of Force
David Petraeus: We Must Be Coldly Realistic Over The Use Of Force – Many of the lessons we have learnt post-9/11 have been paid for and written in blood – The Telegraph.
Since leaving the US government, I have had an opportunity to think about some of the missions in which I was privileged to engage while in uniform and then as director of the CIA. Reflecting on what some term the “counter-insurgency era” – or occasionally even “the Petraeus era” – I want to argue that this era is far from over, for the simple reason that the era of insurgency is not over.
Insurgencies, or so-called small wars, are among the oldest forms of warfare, and remain the most prevalent. Whether they are triggered by domestic struggles for power and influence, ideology, ethno-sectarian differences or subversion from outside a country’s borders, their outcomes will shape the world in which we live – as the upheavals associated with the Arab Spring and the extremist challenges in Mali and the Maghreb remind us…
Some key elements/questions that I wish GEN Petraeus would have addressed/discussed:
1. In what general context will we, today and in the immediate future, be countering insurgencies and/or be supporting rebel groups seeking to topple oppressive regimes? (Or acting by, with and through others to achieve these goals?) Will we:
a. Most likely and in the first instance (countering insurgencies), be helping pro-modern governments put down and defeat anti-modern rebel groups?
b. In the second instance (toppling oppressive regimes), will we, most often, be assisting pro-modern rebel groups defeat and overthrow “oppressive” (anti-modern) regimes?
(The term “modern,” in this instance, meaning a way of life and way of governance somewhat similar to our own.)
2. When engaged in “stability operations,” does it make any sense — at this critical moment — to try to impose one’s own entwined political, economic and social system on a government and/or a population? Or have we learned that — by such an effort — we are far more likely to guarantee instability rather than stability? This suggesting that we should either:
a. Retain the term “stability operations” but discard the notion that stability can be achieved via the imposition of one’s own political, economic and social system. Or
b. Discard, from our lexicon, the term “stability operations” and substitute, therefore, a term (forced state and societal transformation) for the imposition of one’s way of life and way of governance on others. (The term “forced state and societal transformation” neither implying nor suggesting that stability is the goal/the priority nor that stability — via this initiative — can be readily achieved.)
From the headline of the article I was hoping for some honest reflection and maybe even a mea culpa a la McNamara in ‘In Retrospect.’ Not to be though. He’s still too close to the narrative he wanted to prove and still has got the COIN fantasy all neatly wrapped up and sprinkled with a good dose of ego to see it any differently yet. His last sentence lays the COINdinista party line bare: “And we should never forget that we don’t always get to choose the wars we fight.” Yes, general, yes we do….as far as Afghanistan and unnecessary wars like that…..at least when our policymakers get the right information to make the better choice from their supposedly unbiased military advisors….not steamrolled into a false promise that could never be achieved. If there’s anything that Afghanistan should teach us that we should be sure we retain is to stay out of other people’s civil wars, the military’s role is not foreign policy, statecraft, diplomacy, or outright nationbuilding for nationbuilding’s sake, and, most importantly, generals should do what they’re told by civilian leadership and not create policy on their own when it suits their agenda better.
Most of it is standard rhetoric by now, and for the most part I agree with his points. I would like to see some SWJ thoughts on the following quote from the article.
“we will have to place a greater emphasis on security assistance, to enable others to meet their own challenges. Along these lines, it would be wise to recognise that an ounce of prevention will often be worth a pound of cure. And that, in another observation from my days in Iraq, “money is ammunition” – something equally true at a strategic level.”
Many of our strategic and theater operational level documents address “prevention” as an objective/goal and offer various ways to prevent conflicts. If we wanted to develop and execute plans to prevent potential conflicts what role should the military play (beyond deterrence)? How does the small footprint approach outlined in our Defense Strategic Guidance prevent conflict? How does security assistance prevent conflict? Please use cause and effect logic, which means proposing a theory on why some nations may go to war with each other, or have internal conflicts with their population, and then how our actions could prevent it from happening.
It too often seems we throw these concepts out without explaining the underlying logic.
Looking at Bill C’s first comment and points ‘a’ and ‘b’. Transforming a society to a liberal western style democracy is a political project. Looking at the history of political development imposing democracy is easy, but a liberal democracy assumes a balance of powers between the interested constituents in the society. In societies that transition quickly to democracy before this status quo is achieved all that tends to happenis that a veneer of democracy is given but the fundamental power structure has not changed – Russia, Iraq and Afghanistan are all case in points.
My point is that COIN is one thing, FID is another and national restructuring another. In the latter the role of the military is (IMHO) extremely limited.
Let me attempt to address both:
a. Red Rat’s comment that the role of the military in these “national restructuring” projects (in our case, transforming outlier states and societies along modern western lines) is (IHHO) extremely limited. And
b. Bill M.’s challenge for us to try to put into context and make sense of GEN Petraeus’ statements re: ” … an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure … ” and ” … money is ammunition … ”
Admiral McRaven has noted that:
” … everyone in SOF understands that to build an enduring solution to violent extremism, you must use a whole of government approach centered around many of our SOF core competencies like foreign internal defense, SFA, military information support, civil affairs, as well as unconventional warfare and counter insurgency, when required.”
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2502/SW2502QAAdmiralWilliamMcRaven.html (Response to the third question from the top.)
” … to minimize the rise of radical extremism … [one must] … create conditions on the ground where people have good jobs, where there is the rule of law, where there is stability [and] where there is good governance … from a military standpoint, we can certainly help with the security that will be required to help begin to build that stability … ”
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=118560 (See the last few paragraphs of this article.)
For Bill M:
The focus of the Admiral on such things as the “whole of government” and “good jobs, the rule of law, good governance,” etc., would seem to clarify that “national restructuring” (as per Red Rat) and/or state and societal transformation (as per yours truly) is the job at hand. Thus, should we consider GEN Petraeus’ statements regarding “security assistance … an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” and “money is ammunition” from this “national restructuring”/”state and societal transformation” perspective also?
For Red Rat:
While the Admiral, in his statements above, would seem to clarify that these “national restructuring” and/or “state and societal transformation” projects are, indeed, (1) the job at hand and (2) the responsibility of “our” and “their” whole of government, could we agree that the Admiral does, indeed, seem to see the role of the military generally and our SOF specifically as being somewhat central to these endeavors?
Is this helpful?
(All of this seeming to clarify that [1] the prevention of war today is still seen through the lense of [2] the transformation of outlier states and societies. The Change 1 to this concept being that the military part of this endeavor will now be done mostly by SOF — rather than GPF — for reasons similar to those noted in my comment below.)
I think that the U.S. too often fails to tie strategy to the sources of terrorism and rebellion. If rebellion, and terrorism as a form of rebellion (read Michael Mazzar), is a result of discontent then why do U.S. strategies meant to counter this form of war primarily focus on the product of violence instead of the roots of violence. The roots of violence tend to be motivational (i.e. Gurr’s RD). Rebellion results when the discontented are mobilized and resourced. U.S. strategy is out of balance and needs more state department involvement where necessary and a bigger focus on the roots of violence instead of individual terrorists or cells. The case of Mali is informative in this instance. The U.S. has been militarily engaged in Mali since 2003. The focus has been FID, and yet AQIM was still able to expand aggressively (there is an argument to be made that we are focusing FID too kinetically as well). I suggest this failure is a result of not focusing on the roots of violence. Our kinetically focused strategy has seen the number of terrorist organizations grow post 9-11 compared to pre 9-11. One final note. Our ability to analyse the roots of violence and discontent tends to be too one dimensional. Discontent is not always about jobs and economics. Sometimes the sources of a collectivities discontent is much more complex…as in the case of Mali and the Tuareg. Not too many commanders want to hear about environmental scarcity, demographics, resource mobilization, or nationalist sentiment and devise an appropriate strategy. Then again the history of small wars suggests the ‘occupying force’ is rarely successful to begin with.
A pithy commentary ‘Sorry General, War is a Choice’ by Dr Patrick Porter, an Australian and Reader in War and International Security at Reading University (UK): http://offshorebalancer.wordpress.com/2013/06/14/sorry-general-war-is-a-choice/
From my civilian vantage point I do wonder at the apparent urge amongst politicians, generals and others to conduct ‘small wars’ when it is unclear what ‘national interest’ or strategic interest is involved. All too often the insurgent is advancing a rival ideology and leadership in opposition to our ostensible ‘ally’. For the reasons SWJ are familiar with there is no military answer, so force may gain time for the ‘ally’ to change – often not to a course of action you desire.