Top Military Commander in Afghanistan is Being Transferred
09.29.2012 at 12:41pm
Top Military Commander in Afghanistan is Being Transferred by David Cloud, Detroit Free Press.
The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan is being transferred and another Marine general will take over the war effort early next year as the U.S. and its allies shrink their combat role against the still-potent insurgency. The White House plans to nominate Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, to replace Marine Gen. John Allen, who has directed U.S. and other foreign forces in Afghanistan since mid-2011, officials said. Although Allen is not being forced out, "the president wants somebody who can take a fresh look at the effort in Afghanistan and isn't an architect of the current strategy,"…
For anyone with a sense of politics, presuming its accuracy, what do the contents of this article tell you about the administration’s view of how the war in Afghanistan is being conducted, the results being achieved or not being achieved, the administrations view of top level COIN oriented Army leadership — a member of whom proposed the current military doctrine being applied (perhaps in the administration’s view not so successfully) in Afghanistan.
Quoting “officials,” the article notes, “The White House plans to nominate Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, to replace Marine Gen. John Allen, who has directed U.S. and other foreign forces in Afghanistan since mid-201. The article then quotes David Barno, a retired Army general who headed the war in Afghanistan from 2003-05 and reported to be a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington think tank, noting Although Allen is not being forced out, “the president wants somebody who can take a fresh look at the effort in Afghanistan and isn’t an architect of the current strategy,”
Read between the lines, and presuming Barno is in communication with the White House or DOD upper command, you don’t make an early change in command this close to the end of operations in a theater and don’t call for a “fresh look at the strategy” if you are pleased with the results being achieved. The first question is, are they displeased with the results that the theater commander has achieved or are they displeased with the results being produced from applying the [Petraeus & Co.] COIN / nation building strategy to a long term occupation of a foreign land?
I suppose one could also question why are successive Marine Corps Generals being assigned to command this theater of war — one that most certainly is an Army operation with the Marine Corps units playing a numerically minor role in that effort? It is a long way from the sea to Afghanistan. Among all their brass, they couldn’t find an Army general to take command?
Perhaps this is an opportunity instead of a shortcoming. If the President wins the election, and Syria continues to deteriorate, we could see reaffirmation of the administration’s R2P talk turned into action. With General Allen as NATO Supreme Allied Commander, we foreseeably could see a leader capable of moving, if necessary, more U.S. forces into Turkey. The failure of Turkey to allow a U.S. ground force entry against Iraq could change in this situation where its own border has greater problems and Syria has already shot down their planes.
It would be a good kind of ironic if U.S. forces had a Turkey sanctuary and a friendly regime protecting it instead of past sanctuary problems with Syria and Iran aiding insurgents in Iraq and Pakistan helping some Taliban. Advantages of U.S. forces in Turkey could include a shorter 2013/2014 move out of Afghanistan. It would place us in position to support, perhaps, a Turkey/Saudi invasion of Syria. It would have us near Azerbaijan in the event that Iran makes problems there in the event of a spring 2013 Israeli attack. Wikipedia claims there may be Armenian/U.S. military exercises in 2013 which would set the stage for air overflight rights to Azerbaijan with promises of aid. Georgia could be an alternate path there if they remain friendly to us after upcoming elections.
The problem with just airpower in Syria is the downwind hazard of chemical weapons that could spread effects to endanger civilians. The problem with a no-fly zone is the Syrian air defenses and their potential siting near Syrian civilians. If air attacks proved too effective, chemical weapons could be used against Turkey air bases which would drag us into the war anyway. A small well-defended coastal area makes an amphibious or Naval assault less likely but a Marine General would be well-positioned to orchestrate such an intervention as necessary. If our Army is invited into Turkey to assist their invasion (leading from behind), perhaps with SOF to secure chemical sites and other light/Stryker/armored BCT U.S. forces crossing into Kurd-dominated areas to be received as friends.
If Turkey and the Saudis (with U.S. help) controlled most of Syria, it would solve many of our Hezbollah/Lebanon and Israel northern border problems. It would surround a potentially troublesome Iraq in the event they make problems for the Kurds or grow too close to Iran. It is only about 100 miles from Saudi territory through Jordan to reach Syria and some sort of monetary deal with Jordan could make that possible with promises of a future water and oil pipelines through their territory. Just as Alaska is separate from CONUS, the Saudis could have new territory in a redrawn Sunni-dominated former Syria. Saudi problems with lack of water could be assuaged by diverting some Syrian Euphrates river water to the south in a pipeline, to include perhaps to Yemen to make them more a friend, or cut them off should they continue to radicalize.
Finally, we may see some post-surge appreciation of General Allen’s and before that General Petraeus’ surge ideas. With a former 60 Marine sites in Garmsir now down to 3 due to too short of a surge, we will see if south Helmand stays peaceful under just ANA control. As we continue to withdraw, let’s hope we leave adequate airpower somewhere in Afghanistan to assist the ANA. I fear instead, that President Karzai may institute more control of air-to-ground attacks to leave the ANA ill-prepared to defend themselves.
Generals come and go, but the insurgency (more accurately, “insurgencies,”) continue to grow.
LTG Barno set the strategic conditions to grow the revolutionary insurgencies on his watch, and no subsequent general has done anything to recognize or address that framework.
What each has done, in some minor variation of tactics, is pour various forms of illegitimate energy into the Afghan populace so as to grow the massively widespread resistance insurgencies that threaten to drive us from the country.
We measure our tactical successes with tactical metrics. Yet we apply no strategic metrics to those same activities so as to guage our strategic progress (or lack thereof).
In a conventional fight the sum of tactics may well equal strategy, but not so much in this “non-war” type of conflict. We don’t need new generals, we need a new understanding and a new strategy.
Afghanistan: bombing yesterday kills 14, including three Coaliton troops and an interpreter, at the Khost City market. Probably the PRT.
Nice, since our PRT in 2010/2011 in Khost bought off the Afghans with 49 million in spending.
MAAWS-A and CERP are not working. Although spending authority at the 0-6 level went from $500,000 per iteration with no limit to $5,000 today and then only with 0-7 approval, we screwed the pooch.
Dollars as OER metrics are killing our poeple. And that means that our CDRs and others are killing our own soldiers.
Until DoS and USAID figure out that Hamlet Pacification (see ‘the 1970s’ doesn’t work without real committment (see CAPS/CORDS) we will continue to stumble our way out the door and back to WalMart.
Tom
This makes what-the 11th, 12th, 13th top American commander (sort of since he may not actually command all the Americans) in Afghanistan in 11 years? I don’t know, I’ve lost count. And this guy has no experience at all in the country. Rajiv Chandrasekaran concluded at the end of Little America that the US Gov is incompetent. He’s right.