COIN Center Interview
07.14.2012 at 02:41pm
The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center recently interviewed COL Chris Toner upon the return of his brigade from Afghanistan. COL Toner commanded 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division from June 2009 to June 2012.
3-1ID IBCT (Task Force Duke) deployed to Khost and Paktia Provinces, Afghanistan, in January 2011 and conducted combat operations until March 2012 as part of Regional Command – East, ISAF Joint Command. See the result of the interview and COL Toner's thoughts on "security" or "lethal" operations as part of a counterinsurgency campaign here.
When I first started reading this, I thought I was reading another politically correct officer espousing the goodness of the COIN FM. However, what he said in the last paragraph captured one of my main concerns which is that many officers (especially younger ones) don’t think COIN involves combat operations. As for the rest of the interview I generally disagree with the COL’s assessment, but professionals can disagree on key points. For example, I don’t think we can legitimize an illegimate government, and I don’t think helping the Afghans with agricultural development will stop the locals from supporting the insurgency (but it is still a human thing to do, so I’m not opposed to it, I simply don’t believe that in this case it addresses the so called root causes of the insurgency).
This is not an issue of integrity, it is an issue of doctrine, strategy, operational design and tactics – we treat symptoms rather than causes, and when we do it well those symptoms go away – for a time. Then we let up that pressure and the whole thing comes back to life.
Our COIN histories overflow with such “victories” and subsequent “new” insurgencies.