Coordinated Attacks Across Afghanistan
The Taliban launched a set of coordinated attacks across Afghanistan. The attacks were centered in Kabul where fighting appears to be still on-going, but also included a suicide attack against the Jalalabad airbase, and in Paktika and Logar Provinces. In Kabul, reports indicate that the Taliban occupied numerous buildings in order to target NATO headquarters, parliament, and multiple western embassies, as well as attacking the presidential palace.
These attacks will surely spawn narrative and counter-narrative: the boldest coordinated attack yet in the form of a mini-Tet Offensive, or a pathetic attempt by a few die-hards that reflects the incapacity of the insurgency. With U.S. public support for the war already at new lows, with only 30% of respondents in support, (a low not seen in polls on Vietnam until May 1972), one wonders if this attack can really shake that last third of die-hard supporters. More broadly, though, how will this shape the U.S. domestic political narrative during the coming months ramping up to the election and what effect, if any, will it have on perceptions inside Afghanistan?
My own take with response to the last question presented: Hardly any, if at all. This is part of a consistent “drip-drip” that has been going on for over a decade now. The post quite incisively notes that many peoples’ preferences have, at this point, solidified. Even for a person like myself, with some fixation with current events and foreign policy, the headlines make a small impression at most in terms of information, and probably none whatsoever, and change preferences not a whit. Other than a dramatic “game change” akin to the televised seizure of the Saigon Embassy, whatever its contemporary equivalent would happen to be, this really is ephemeral.
It was not solicited, but I will provide my forecast (although my track record is probably downright shameful): Obama will defeat Romney (handily) in the general election, and then potentially seize upon any opportunity to accelerate the timetable he already (in remarkably self-defeating fashion) announced in tandem with the “Surge.” Perhaps a new National Intelligence Estimate will be called for, and if it determines some degree of success, that will be cited as justification for reducing troop levels; conversely, a finding of failure will be cited as justification for reducing troop levels as a way to cut losses.
It is difficult to see this affecting facts in Washington, and what in fact would do so does not come particularly readily.
ADTS
This latest set of attacks has all of the hallmark characteristics of prior, well-coordinated attacks attributed of the Haqqani network. The QST’s claims of responsibility merit the usual degree of skepticism that one generally affords to such claims.
Carl:
Your comment raised for me the option the insurgent enjoys of “going to ground,” and the related observation that “the insurgent wins by not losing,” etc. It is perhaps appropriate to be reminded of those maxims* on a website that explicitly dedicates itself to exploring small wars, and my failure to recognize this is a feasible (and indeed perhaps desirable) course of action says nothing good about me. In sum: thanks!
*As well as the issue of transnational sanctuary and the complexity surrounding “the war” “in Afghanistan.”
Best
ADTS
[Whoops – Note to Editor: I failed to utilize the “Reply” feature as intended and place this as a response to Carl’s comment in particular; please move, and edit this comment, as needed]
There appears to be a good news story here that few are discussing and that is the Afghanistan security force response. While hard to assess from a few media reports, what I did see appeared to competent and effective. The insurgents on the other hand appeared to be incompetent tactically, but no denying the attack will have some, even if limited, strategic impact. The area of concern is the intelligence failure (both coalition and Afghanistan), and based on the scale of the attack (this has other implications), and the skill of this insurgent group to bypass the security mechanisms in Kabul and conduct a coordinated (even if unskilled in execution) attack.
The longer term question is, how does the ANSF remain capable after we depart and the billions of dollars worth of funding is curtailed? Does the force of 300K get re-sized to 100K, and if so can they still do the job?
Agree the attacks show a measure of failure at the tactical security level but more importantly a failure at the strategic security level. When you lose at the strategic security level the tactical security level is of little consequence.
If you didnt get enough commentary on the attacks here is a link to an interview I gave along with MAJGEN Jim Molan (Rtd) former COO in Iraq. I dont refer myself as a COIN consultant. That title mysteriously came from the ABC:
Radio National with Waleed Aly: http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/drive/panel-discussion3a-afghanistan/3953332
Thanks
Jason
The missing point here is that this attack fits the pattern of a previous attack, on iconic targets in Kabul, where the attackers have assembled stocks of ammunition and weapons within the ‘iron ring’. How they bypassed the security is unknown.
It is worth checking the reporting by FRI: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/
That is not an intelligence failure by NATO / ISAF or the Afghan state.
I am guessing Gawker is infrequently found on SWJ.
Also, I hope the fairly nasty and mean-spirited tone of the article does not render it “inadmissible” on SWJ. (Seriously.)
Still, the article does suggest something of the “game change” dynamic that I suspected would not be forthcoming.
http://gawker.com/5903725/winning-the-war-against-yesterday-mike-ohanlons-afghan-mad+libs?tag=america.s-screaming-conscience
Best
ADTS