How Could Vietnam Happen?
In a blast from the past, Kennedy and Johnson staffer turned Harvard professor James C. Thompson looks at how the tragedy that was the Vietnam War unfolded. This Atlantic article was originally published in April 1968. He opens with a straightforward inquiry. "One question that will certainly be asked: How did men of superior ability, sound training, and high ideals—American policy-makers of the 1960s—create such costly and divisive policy?" He goes into a lengthy and illuminating look at the institutional and historical factors that crippled the national security decision-making apparatus. This is a fascinating read in and of itself. But if you are to do nothing else, read the below excerpt with which he closed his essay and ask yourself if we will ever learn.
Long before I went into government, I was told a story about Henry L. Stimson that seemed to me pertinent during the years that I watched the Vietnam tragedy unfold—and participated in that tragedy. It seems to me more pertinent than ever as we move toward the election of 1968.
In his waning years Stimson was asked by an anxious questioner, "Mr. Secretary, how on earth can we ever bring peace to the world?" Stimson is said to have answered: "You begin by bringing to Washington a small handful of able men who believe that the achievement of peace is possible.
"You work them to the bone until they no longer believe that it is possible.
"And then you throw them out—and bring in a new bunch who believe that it is possible."
Good find. While the Stimson quote is interesting, I believe the important elements of Professor Thomson’s article are these two salient points:
That factor outweighs by far all the other quite valid if terribly flawed reasons he cited for the misadventure that was Viet Nam. Regrettably, the same characteristic applies to today’s small wars — as do most of the others. Means, I suppose the answer to your question is “No, we won’t learn. Because ‘WE’ are doing it instead of those earlier fools…” Egos will be the death of too many.
Almost equally at fault is this attitude:
When John Kennedy made his “…that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe…” speech, he was older, theoretically more experienced and better educated than I at the time I heard the words as he gave the speech. Yet, I thought then ‘This guys is dangerous. If he believes that, he’s an idiot.’ Not much including three later trips to the SE Asia Games has occurred to induce me to change my mind. He was indeed and he surrounded himself with those of his ilk. They’re still about, doing unspeakable harm in the name of doing good.
Indeed, I marvel that today there exist many people who failed to learn from his errors and allow their egos and a misplaced sense of rectitude to put troops to work on ‘missions’ wherein they cannot possibly succeed…
Kennedy also said the following in November 1961, but no one paid much attention:
“[W]e must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent or omniscient—that we are only 6 percent of the world’s population—that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent of mankind—that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity—and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.”
This was interesting, but let’s not forget the context of the early 60s that may have shaped intervention in Vietnam. First we had the Cuban missile crisis and close call with nuclear war and nearby communist nuclear weapons. Both Soviet and Chinese leader behavior was much more like the talk of those like Amadinejad, and there was no hint of Chinese or Russian capitalism or friendship. Was Kennedy also affected by his WWII experiences and medication for injuries incurred?
But given the draft and the hippie movement of the 60s, it was probably pretty hard for normal folks, administration officials, and Army officer professionals to admit that the druggie, idiot protesters might have a point. It’s far easier to identify with doubters today who act and appear far less radical, and do not give aid and comfort to the enemy. Given the extreme casualties, it’s amazing the Vietnam war lasted as long as it did. But it was equally obvious that a strictly enemy-centric approach did not work in that insurgency.
Let’s also acknowledge that both China and Russia actively aided North Vietnam which made it a proxy war against them to limit further expansion. We saw similar behavior in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with the U.S. actively aided the resistance. Today there is no such appearance of Russian or Chinese aid to the Taliban or al Qaeda. Perhaps Russia wants fewer drugs and Islamic extremism in their own world. China wants the contracts after we leave. We want to keep nukes out of the hands of extremists…a none too trivial cause given the potential consequences.
Move Forward:
Dare I say that there really are no other “options” for you for Iraq and Afghanistan other than once we are in to stay, stay, stay, and simply tweak around the edges what we are already doing. What Peter’s post is all about (and Ken’s excellent comments as well)is to suggest that in limited wars of choice there is always the option to do nothing, or something very limited, and then once these wars start, ending them with vital interests in mind might not mean staying for a long time with the idea of trying to move forward under the same broken strategy.
thanks
gian
As strange as it sounds—I think you can equate VN to Afghanistan at least at the tactical level announced today see below.
“U.S. Plans Shift to Elite Units as It Winds Down in Afghanistan”
There was an internal US/ISAF briefing in March 2011 which laid out exactly this above announcement which is built on the premise of three core SF experiences taken straight out of VN of the late 60s early 70s.
1. the CIDG proram equates straight to the VSO program with some modifications for the Afghan culture aspect
2. the SF VN program that we ran so effectively called MIKE Forces—mobile strike forces located in every region of VN and built around local SF trained strike forces that could respond anywhere—exactly what is being proposed in AFG
3. SF built multiple different strike and raid programs using local nationals in VN—equates to their building AFG SF and Commando units for raiding across the country
So while there may not be any comparisons politically between VN and AFG—Tactical Lessons Learned are in fact being cross used.
The board statement of there is no comparison needs to often be examined in far more detail than we normally give it—-
Move Forward—betting that alot of other Officers in both the Services in the junior range up to an including MAJs are getting out.
They cannot change the system as it exists today especially with the RIFs coming in both Services.
Saw the same thing happen in the Desert Storm RIFs. The best leave—only the yes men remain.
To understand Thompson’s commentary one should look at his own flip-flopping on recognition of China with JFK &LBJ. America’s response to Vietnam was TOTALLY in response to the invasion of South Vietnam AS PART OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, NOT FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION.
Merle Pribbenow, one of the ablest students of DRV war history documents Hanoi’s role in SOUTH AMERICA as its “INTERNATIONALIST DUTY.” Thompson was one of those guys who poo-pooed all that, until it threatened his careerist path. The “wise Men” around LBJ were not men of great accomplishment so neither their pro nor anti-war positions made sense. In the end, everything was a political tool. I despise Petraeus because he believed that Vietnam was lost because of PR and he would win in the Crusade Against Islam through PR manipulation. And look where we are now, AGAIN TOTALLY SELF DECEPTIVE!!!!
Why can’t generals be held accountable in the same way as you hold your personal physician?
Vietnam, like Afghanistan, both produced years of good and bad operational designs and tactical operations. Both also were not “lost” by the merits of those designs and actions, but rather were lost in flawed strategic level understanding of the issues that brought us to those places to begin with.
EVERY country in Asia was working to get out from under the controlling impacts of hundreds of years of Western colonialism, from China to Indonesia; from Vietnam to India. The people were restless and they wanted self-determination. Most looked to America as the example of a people who had succeeded in this task, made good, and proclaimed to stand for a principle that all people everywhere had this right to self-determine. But when China fell and the Cold War deepened into a much darker, uncertain place, there was a tremendous and reasonable fear that the Eurasian Landmass might soon become dominated by a vast coalition of nations joined by a common form of governance and ideology that was counter to that of America.
We lost a great deal of influence and credibility in the region when following the end of WWII we empowered and allowed European nations to scurry back out and reclaim their colonies. Strike one.
We then threw the principle of self-determination out the window altogether when we subscribed to the “domino theory” in south East Asia and dedicated ourselves to the prevention of the spread of communism and the preservation of Western-approved governments as a counterweight. We shifted from encouraging legitimacy of government to imposing illegitimacy of government. Strike two.
By the time Kennedy and Johnson stepped up to the plate we were already well down in the count. They made mistakes too, but those mistakes only changed the flavor of the loss, not what caused or could have prevented the loss.
We acted reasonably for the times we were in during Truman and Ike’s tenure, and perhaps those were the decisions necessary to prevail in the Cold War. Our big mistake was not simply recognizing the manipulations of governance in the Middle East, Latin America and across Asia as the necessary evils one sometimes must commit in war, but rather came to see them as normal, accepted, and reasonable practices of peacetime foreign policy. They weren’t, and they aren’t. We need to learn to let people make their own mistakes, and learn how to work with those “mistakes” when they happen. People will respect us more, and attack us less. And we’ll have a lot fewer GIs earning combat patches and purple hearts is odd little corners of the world that few at home could pinpoint on a map.