National Security Decision-Making and Small Wars
I enter the COIN argument to say that the debate is misplaced in an article at Foreign Policy's Af-Pak Channel.
Before arguing about counterinsurgency as a tactic or a strategy, we must first acknowledge a key point: America did not enter any of these wars (going back to Vietnam) as a counterinsurgent or a nation-builder. America entered these wars with ill-defined strategic goals, the result of lowest common denominator bureaucratic negotiations. These goals were not sufficiently thought out, clearly stated, or properly subscribed to by the government writ large, resulting in nearly immediate drift. This fact should point us toward the true roots of the problem.
Peter, you did a great job of describing the problem. But your solution appears less clear other than “think about it.” The “thinking” behind Iraq was probably less clear, but Afghanistan was going to happen due to 9/11. If our approach there had been resourced to a greater degree from the start, the Taliban resurgence may never have occurred.
You mention General Shinseki’s advice that we needed more troops initially, and that seemed to play out during the Iraq surge even if other factors were involved. The Afghanistan surge similarly overcame inadequacies created by the Brits and Canadians trying to do too much with too little for years in Kandahar and Helmand provinces.
How do you convince administrations (and allies) that a more decisive initial operation will be less costly in blood and treasure than a prolonged conflict with less assets. After all, 4 years at $100 billion annually and 400 lost lives each year is less costly than 8 years at $60 billion with 300 lost lives annually.
Given what happened in Libya, I’m afraid future administrations will learn the wrong lessons and assume that an air/sea campaign alone will be sufficient to deal with Iran and the South China Sea. When that band-aid just postpones the solution, we will have a series of Groundhog Day wars and threats by Iran and China that will drive up oil prices…hurting our economy far more than a 4 year war.
Paul Wolfowitz, Jan 30, 2011:
“We did not go into Iraq or Afghanistan to promote democracy, but rather to remove regimes that were dangerous to us and to the world.”
http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/6658758/coffee-house-interview-paul-wolfowitz.thtml