According to the FM 3-24 legitimacy is the “main objective” in a political insurgency. Whichever side is seen as being legitimate by the population, government or insurgent, has a distinct advantage in the conflict.  Legitimacy is not directly defined in the manual. Instead the manual simply says that “[g]overnments described as ‘legitimate’ rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as ‘illegitimate’ tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion”[1]. The manual further states that “[c]ommanders and staffs must continually diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean to the [host nation] population. The population’s expectations will influence all ensuing operations”[2]. Yet the manual spends less than a paragraph on the types of legitimacy and no time on how to identify which type the population accepts.  Instead the manual assumes that the population will accept the form of legitimacy offered by the COIN force, one provided via elections and essential services. This is a major flaw in the document and can lead to a COIN operation that is doomed to failure from its inception.

Political Legitimacy

Unfortunately, legitimacy is not easily defined. For simplicity I will conform to the objective description used in the FM; that political legitimacy manifests itself by a willingness of the population to acquiesce to the rule of the government. When looked at from this perspective legitimacy is a form of social contract between the rulers and the ruled. The rulers are granted their authority by the population. In democratic societies this grant is provided via the mechanism of elections. In non-democratic societies identity serves as the basis for legitimacy, either in the form of religion, ethnicity, or ideology[3].  In both cases the foundation of legitimacy is found in the norms and values of a society[4].  A government will be seen as illegitimately formed and the population will actively resist it if it does not conform to their accepted norms and values.

Democratic systems see the right to govern as granted by the people. The people are the source of a government’s legitimacy. The people create the government by the form of a social contract usually taking the form of a constitution. The constitution defines the rights of the individual citizen and those of the government. The citizens ultimate power rests in institution of suffrage; the right to vote to decide who shall govern.  This system can exist because it conforms to the social norm held by the majority of the population. This social norm is founded on an individualistic value system. The individual’s rights are superior to the rights of the government. It is reflected in ideas like it is better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict an innocent man.  This common ideal or social norm allows the group to agree on what type of leader they will follow as well as who they will resist. In societies that have an individualistic social norm the population will not accept a leader who simply declares himself their sovereign ruler without an election or some other traditionally accepted form of succession.

Non-democratic societies have a different set of social norms and values that they use to gain legitimacy. Their values are based on the community as a whole. Group survival and group identity are valued above individual identity. Personal identity within the group defines the obligations of the individual and those of the group. The five most common are religion, ethnicity, ideology, tradition, and the provision of benefits to the population[5]. The first three form a basis for legitimacy while the last two seem to support a specific regime. Religion is often cited as a basis for political legitimacy in non-democratic states. The FM 3-24 acknowledges religion as a potential basis for legitimacy citing medieval Europe, ancient China, and modern Iran as examples of states that used religion to legitimize their rule.  Many other Middle Eastern states use religion to help bolster their legitimacy, usually in the form of a connection between the Prophet Mohammed and the ruling family. For example, the kings of both Jordan and Morocco present themselves as direct descendants of the Prophet[6]. Ethnicity can also form the basis of legitimacy in a non-democratic system.  Being a member of the right clan, tribe, or ethnic group may be looked at as a prerequisite for leadership. Iraqi Kurds essentially run an independent country unwilling to accept the legitimacy of rule from the non-Kurdish Iraqi central government. Collectivist ideologies can be used by non-democratic governments as a basis of legitimacy. These will usually take the form of an extreme version of nationalism like fascism or communism. They can sometimes be hybrid regimes where the façade of elections support regime legitimacy. Often they are supported by a combination of a common identity and a charismatic personality. Examples would include Nazi Germany built on Hitler’s charisma and Arian identity or Nasser’s presidency in Egypt which was built on the combination of his personality and Arab nationalism.[7] Tradition has more to do with who has traditionally been the leader within the communal group when a new leader was required. Hereditary succession would be a form of tradition. Provision of benefits to the population is considered important in maintaining (or, is some cases gaining) legitimate leadership status. Tradition and provision of benefits to the population are also seen as important in individualistic/democratic societies.

Comparison with FM 3-24

The FM 3-24 offers no guidance on how to determine which value set the local population is using or which form of legitimacy they are likely to accept. The sole method of gaining legitimacy offered by the FM is the provision of benefits to the society. While not openly stating it the only form of legitimacy offered is constitutional governance appears to be via elections. I base this comment on the observation that the logical lines of operations for governance end in elections. It totally disregards any form of legitimacy normally associated with non-democratic governments.  This may well be a policy choice since the spread of democracy is a policy goal. However, there needs to be recognition of the other types of legitimacy and how to deal with them.

If the policy goal is the spread of democracy (as opposed to state stability via a non-democratic form of legitimacy) then the FM needs to include guidance on how to transition a society from one form of legitimacy to another. It needs to provide commanders guidance on how to change an entire society’s value system.  If no clear guidance is provided the operations are not going to succeed. Whichever host nation government we help support will only last as long as we are on the ground providing security and financial support. If the system created does not adhere to the historical form of legitimacy accepted by the population then it will probably fail. It will be replaced by a system more to the liking of the people.

Conclusion

The ideas presented in the FM 3-24 regarding fighting a counterinsurgency campaign are basically sound. However the lack of guidance regarding how to identify which form of legitimacy a population recognizes and what steps need to be taken to alter a population’s perceptions is a glaring problem.  If the stated goal of the operation is stability then recognizing which forms of stability are acceptable to the population in a historically non-democratic country is critical. If the stated goal is transition to democracy then the FM needs to include guidance on how to change the population’s value system. Future versions of the document should provide more information on legitimacy as well as how to either conform with the current form of legitimacy or to transition to the preferred form.