FM 3-24 and Legitimacy: A Failure of Concept
According to the FM 3-24 legitimacy is the “main objective” in a political insurgency. Whichever side is seen as being legitimate by the population, government or insurgent, has a distinct advantage in the conflict. Legitimacy is not directly defined in the manual. Instead the manual simply says that “[g]overnments described as ‘legitimate’ rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as ‘illegitimate’ tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion”[1]. The manual further states that “[c]ommanders and staffs must continually diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean to the [host nation] population. The population’s expectations will influence all ensuing operations”[2]. Yet the manual spends less than a paragraph on the types of legitimacy and no time on how to identify which type the population accepts. Instead the manual assumes that the population will accept the form of legitimacy offered by the COIN force, one provided via elections and essential services. This is a major flaw in the document and can lead to a COIN operation that is doomed to failure from its inception.
Political Legitimacy
Unfortunately, legitimacy is not easily defined. For simplicity I will conform to the objective description used in the FM; that political legitimacy manifests itself by a willingness of the population to acquiesce to the rule of the government. When looked at from this perspective legitimacy is a form of social contract between the rulers and the ruled. The rulers are granted their authority by the population. In democratic societies this grant is provided via the mechanism of elections. In non-democratic societies identity serves as the basis for legitimacy, either in the form of religion, ethnicity, or ideology[3]. In both cases the foundation of legitimacy is found in the norms and values of a society[4]. A government will be seen as illegitimately formed and the population will actively resist it if it does not conform to their accepted norms and values.
Democratic systems see the right to govern as granted by the people. The people are the source of a government’s legitimacy. The people create the government by the form of a social contract usually taking the form of a constitution. The constitution defines the rights of the individual citizen and those of the government. The citizens ultimate power rests in institution of suffrage; the right to vote to decide who shall govern. This system can exist because it conforms to the social norm held by the majority of the population. This social norm is founded on an individualistic value system. The individual’s rights are superior to the rights of the government. It is reflected in ideas like it is better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict an innocent man. This common ideal or social norm allows the group to agree on what type of leader they will follow as well as who they will resist. In societies that have an individualistic social norm the population will not accept a leader who simply declares himself their sovereign ruler without an election or some other traditionally accepted form of succession.
Non-democratic societies have a different set of social norms and values that they use to gain legitimacy. Their values are based on the community as a whole. Group survival and group identity are valued above individual identity. Personal identity within the group defines the obligations of the individual and those of the group. The five most common are religion, ethnicity, ideology, tradition, and the provision of benefits to the population[5]. The first three form a basis for legitimacy while the last two seem to support a specific regime. Religion is often cited as a basis for political legitimacy in non-democratic states. The FM 3-24 acknowledges religion as a potential basis for legitimacy citing medieval Europe, ancient China, and modern Iran as examples of states that used religion to legitimize their rule. Many other Middle Eastern states use religion to help bolster their legitimacy, usually in the form of a connection between the Prophet Mohammed and the ruling family. For example, the kings of both Jordan and Morocco present themselves as direct descendants of the Prophet[6]. Ethnicity can also form the basis of legitimacy in a non-democratic system. Being a member of the right clan, tribe, or ethnic group may be looked at as a prerequisite for leadership. Iraqi Kurds essentially run an independent country unwilling to accept the legitimacy of rule from the non-Kurdish Iraqi central government. Collectivist ideologies can be used by non-democratic governments as a basis of legitimacy. These will usually take the form of an extreme version of nationalism like fascism or communism. They can sometimes be hybrid regimes where the façade of elections support regime legitimacy. Often they are supported by a combination of a common identity and a charismatic personality. Examples would include Nazi Germany built on Hitler’s charisma and Arian identity or Nasser’s presidency in Egypt which was built on the combination of his personality and Arab nationalism.[7] Tradition has more to do with who has traditionally been the leader within the communal group when a new leader was required. Hereditary succession would be a form of tradition. Provision of benefits to the population is considered important in maintaining (or, is some cases gaining) legitimate leadership status. Tradition and provision of benefits to the population are also seen as important in individualistic/democratic societies.
Comparison with FM 3-24
The FM 3-24 offers no guidance on how to determine which value set the local population is using or which form of legitimacy they are likely to accept. The sole method of gaining legitimacy offered by the FM is the provision of benefits to the society. While not openly stating it the only form of legitimacy offered is constitutional governance appears to be via elections. I base this comment on the observation that the logical lines of operations for governance end in elections. It totally disregards any form of legitimacy normally associated with non-democratic governments. This may well be a policy choice since the spread of democracy is a policy goal. However, there needs to be recognition of the other types of legitimacy and how to deal with them.
If the policy goal is the spread of democracy (as opposed to state stability via a non-democratic form of legitimacy) then the FM needs to include guidance on how to transition a society from one form of legitimacy to another. It needs to provide commanders guidance on how to change an entire society’s value system. If no clear guidance is provided the operations are not going to succeed. Whichever host nation government we help support will only last as long as we are on the ground providing security and financial support. If the system created does not adhere to the historical form of legitimacy accepted by the population then it will probably fail. It will be replaced by a system more to the liking of the people.
Conclusion
The ideas presented in the FM 3-24 regarding fighting a counterinsurgency campaign are basically sound. However the lack of guidance regarding how to identify which form of legitimacy a population recognizes and what steps need to be taken to alter a population’s perceptions is a glaring problem. If the stated goal of the operation is stability then recognizing which forms of stability are acceptable to the population in a historically non-democratic country is critical. If the stated goal is transition to democracy then the FM needs to include guidance on how to change the population’s value system. Future versions of the document should provide more information on legitimacy as well as how to either conform with the current form of legitimacy or to transition to the preferred form.
[1]United States. Dept. of the Army. and United States. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (2006). Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24/Mcwp 3-33.5. Washington, D.C., Headquarters Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Dept. of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Schlumberger, O. (2010). "Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East." Middle East Critique 19(3): 233-250.
[4] Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, Inc.; Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York,, Free Press.; Wiechnik, S. (2011) Introduction to the Locus of Legitimacy and State Stability. Small Wars Journal Vol. 7, 13
[5] Ibid. 3
[6] Ibid. 3
[7] Cook, D. (2011). "The Arab Spring and Failed Political Legitimacy." Hedgehog Review 13(3): 37-46.; Schlumberger, O. (2010). "Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East." Middle East Critique 19(3): 233-250.
Stan,
This is a very important topic. The biggest problem Westerners have is that we tend to view the topic of legitimacy far too much through our lens. We overly focus on legal definitions of legitimacy (Diem as the “legitimate” leader of South Vietnam; Karzai as the “legitimate” leader of Afghanistan per official legal vehicles of Western recognition); Western forms of bestowing such legitimacy (get rid of those messy war lords who rise to power of their own actions or Shuras/councils applying some process incompressible to us but seen as inherently legitimate by the populace, and replace with a nice, official election that is seen as more inherently legitimate to us); and as importantly, not appreciating that Western processes can only work in an environment where the culture not only understands, but more importantly, trusts in the results.
As I look at this topic in my studies on insurgency I see Legitimacy as one of the 5 primary drivers of the conditions that insurgency springs from. The definition I have come to is one of “recognition in the eyes of the governed of the right of government to govern them.” But populaces are complex, and if only the populace served by the Northern Alliance recognizes the legitimacy of Mr. Karzai and his government one can reasonable expect the remainder of the populace to be ripe for insurgency.
No amount of increased military capacity sent out from the Northern Alliance to subdue the remainder will likely create such legitimacy (particularly when the suppressed fully appreciate that capacity to be an artificial creation of some external power and can continue to cling to the hope that once that artificial force is gone they will once again be able to achieve a true resolution of this debate.
No amount of ground cleared, night raids conducted, or development projects executed will create this legitimacy either. Again, all know that these are the acts of foreigners and not a reflection of the intent or capacity of the illegitimate power over them. They also see those within that illegitimate powersystem benefiting the most from all of the above. Growing in wealth, growing in power, and having traditional competitors eliminated for them by their foreign helpers.
Keep digging at this Stan, as our biased perspective on this topic must evolve if we are to become more effective, or at least more realistic, in what our intervening efforts might produce.
Cheers!
Bob
I really hope the Major does not honestly believe we can or should change the population’s value system I strongly agree that it is critical to understand the population (and the entire situation) but to think that the military (or any external entity) can conduct operations to change the population’s value system is truly a flight of fancy and I think one of our fundamentally false assumptions of the past 10 years.
I am hoping that the Major is really offering a cautionary note so that we draw the right conclusion from the fallacies of the arguments within the paper, e.g.,
“If the policy goal is the spread of democracy (as opposed to state stability via a non-democratic form of legitimacy) then the FM needs to include guidance on how to transition a society from one form of legitimacy to another. It needs to provide commanders guidance on how to change an entire society’s value system. If no clear guidance is provided the operations are not going to succeed. Whichever host nation government we help support will only last as long as we are on the ground providing security and financial support. If the system created does not adhere to the historical form of legitimacy accepted by the population then it will probably fail. It will be replaced by a system more to the liking of the people.”
At best we can help a host nation provide security and financial support but as the last sentence says a system will be put in place more to the liking of the people. This paper should be advocating against trying to change a population’s values and instead arguing that we should deal with them as they really are and not as we would wish them to be and allow them to govern themselves rather than impose what we think is best for them. Even based on our alleged (or perhaps self-delusional) ability to understand their historical forms of acceptable legitimacy – because despite our supposed understanding if we have the policy goal of spreading democracy we will end up trying to create a system in our image.
As the saying goes: “Stop the insanity” (e.g., attempts at nation building)
First, morally defined legitimacy matters little when the government lacks the capacity to provide security and services. We have a hard time understanding this.
Second, we in the military have no business trying “to change an entire society’s value system.” This sort of nonsense needs to be banished from our heads. While Stan likely does not overtly mean it, the level of arrogance behind this sort of thought is breathtaking and counterproductive. We are not the morality police and must have no role in changing a society’s value system. This is exactly why people around the world are rightly afraid of and hostile to our policies. We freak out about “social engineering” in the military, but then think we have the moral superiority to dictate what values systems others should use? I heard someone of rank recently refer to our efforts in Afghanistan as “God’s work.” Do we really think we are doing God’s work? Is that why we think it is ok for us to foist our morals on others?
Societal values change slowly, generally stemming from changes in socio-economic structures. Trying to change values and impose democracy before these structures have begun to change is an exercise in futility. We need to do less and let others do for themselves more.
Sadly, this line of thinking has be present in our operations since late 2001. I didn’t hear it much in the Balkans, but upon my arrival in Afghanistan in early 2002, I heard much about “legitimate” and “non-legitimate” forms of Afghan governance. The latter description applied most often to the shuras and elders that held sway over much of rural Afghanistan much as they had for a thousand years. I was taken aback that we were ready to sweep away traditions and standards developed over centuries because they didn’t meet our western standard of legitimacy.
The first briefing I received from a beleaguered CPA staff member in Baghdad upon arriving in Iraq in late 2003 suggested that we didn’t consider the local tribal leaders to have any “legitimate” authority. We later, after the insurgency was in full-swing, reversed this obviously misguided policy.
The arrogance we too often carry with us wherever we go which suggests our way of life is implantable if the people we wish to change would just adopt our values isn’t helping us win wars, and it’s leading us on the path to COIN becoming our strategy.
I think the failure is not so much FM3-24 as it is our failure to practice what we preach and allowing clients like Karzia to run his own show against all common sense and our own concept of right and wrong. In Afghanistan there exists a near perfect Greek style democracy at the village level yet, Afghans can’t vote for district or provincial governors. We let Karzia steel the election in 2009. Were is legitimacy in a system like that?
When did the objective of an insurgency become legitimacy? I always thought the objective of an insurgency was domination by political and military means. Sounds like the real issue here is a sub-optimizing military manual.
It’s seems that it is not just FM 3-24 that contains the flaw noted by the Major, but also, as noted in my comment further below, the “U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual” and, indeed, the document entitled “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.”
These items also seem to indicate that only Western-style governments are considered legitimate and, by implication, that only Western-style governments are to be considered “sovereign.”
Such a distinct, specific and extremely limited articulation of what constitutes legitimacy (and, by implication, what constitutes sovereignty) would seem to leave the U.S. military with no choice but to do “nation-building” before it could rightfully depart the scene of a conflict.
(Working with/leaving something other than a Western-type government — by our definition noted above — constitutes working with/leaving a country with an illegitimate/non-sovereign governing entity.)
Talk about painting oneself into a corner!
As per Datroy and using Afghanistan and Iraq as examples:
The distinction being that with COIN, in these instances, it is really still “our” — not “their” (our installed host-nation government’s) — fight?
To wit: (1) Our initiative (we invaded) and, thus, (2) our responsibility to see through to a proper end.
Thus, simply a follow-on phase to the state-on-state war that we entered into/began.
Obviously a puppet government established by the U.S. to replace a legitimate government can’t be legitimate, and just as obviously the citizens who resist that change are not insurgents, extremists or terrorists. The U.S, would have you think otherwise, of course.
So the whole “Host Nation” construct in FM 3-24, in the above scenario, is bogus, and therefore COIN is also bogus because according to 3-24 “The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.” You don’t do that by overthrowing the existing government.
Was the Vichy government legitimate? Was the French Resistance an insurgency? Of course not. Case closed.
Want some real insurgencies? Look at Libya, Egypt and Syria — where the U.S, supported the insurgents. So we need an FM 3-25 — Proinsurgency (POIN).
So Mike, if Don’s post represents the “revolution,” who, or what, is the establishment against which the revolution is rebelling?
thanks, happy new year bro
gian
in my mind the only thing worse than a foreign power occupying your country is a foreign power occupying your country and doing nothing to meet immediate requirements because it is wedded to high-minded ideals of having the host nation do it based on the perception of “legitimacy.”
I always cringe when people back up their arguments using their perspectives on why population groups do x or y. Unfortunately this type of thinking is killing us in Afghanistan- as we rarely question the assumptions that drive our actions. We assume the Afghans are just like us or the Malays or the Nicaraguans and then we blame Pakistan or the lack of troops or the the impatience of our leaders on a lack of progress.
BG Kelly busted a hole in this line of reasoning much better than I could have done here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/fighting-small-wars-in-the-new-century
BL: it sometimes makes no sense to protect the people from the insurgents if the people don’t want protection from them. That we think all Afghans do is, IME, an invalid and self-destructive assumption.
In terms of FID vs. COIN- COIN is a subset of FID and COIN can be undertaken without an “industrial” effort- in fact, why we think it has to be industrial is beyond me. THAT is the real takeaway- that we don’t have to do COIN with massive amounts of conventional troops. We should be more creative than that. I fault the campaign planning ability at our COCOMs and SOCs for that.