Beneficial War: The Conceit of American Counterinsurgency
Beneficial War: The Conceit of American Counterinsurgency
by Gian Gentile
Harvard International Review
War is, by its very nature, about death, destruction, and pain for both individuals and societies. Despite what proponents of counterinsurgency might argue, war cannot be recast as a foreign policy tool that is beneficial to societies. It is something to be avoided, and only used as a last resort in the pursuit of national security interests. Experts should not giddily pursue wars as a means of testing their new theories of warfare in the name of transforming warfare and the foreign societies that are placed in its path of destruction. All of this is a strategic fool’s errand. To presume that there is such a thing as “better” and “beneficial” war is to operate blindly on faith rather than drawing upon an understanding of history and clear strategic thinking toward current and future security problems.
Gian, Kate, or both,
Just so I get you right here, the change of strategy and infusion of extra troops had no effect whatsoever on the reduction in violence, in any place of Iraq at any time? Those troops, just pissing in the wind, were they?
Insurgency is primarily political. One must have the proper political framework in place if one hopes increased security efforts to have a positive effect. In Iraq the Sunni resistance was addressed at the political level, so the increased security did not exacerbate that problem and could focus on expanding stability and governnace.
In Afghanistan no such effort was made to address the similar concerns of the Non-Northern Alliance populace groups (Largely Pashtun), so the surge of troops against the resistance as made the resistance grow.
Not understanding insurgency, there was a broad assumption that it was the military efforts that created the change in Iraq; but it fact the key was the political.
Bad captures of lessons learned historically contribute to this. The much studied Malaya insurgency similarly turned the corner once the political drivers of the conflict were addressed. The Brits ended up losing control of the colony in this “victory,” but gained a parter and ally. Success is not measured through the situation of either the preservation or the defeat of some government. Success is when the conditions of governance improve with greater equity across the entire populace. Sometimes that happens when the government wins, some times when the insurgent wins; sometimes it doesn’t happen at all and we repeat the whole process all over again 15-20 years later.
An often ignored fact is that COIN is theory, not law. It focuses on the people and, as a result, is social science rather than hard science. Regardless of FM 3-24, COIN as a social science cannot be tested in a laboratory and proven like the laws of the hard sciences which were established in a controlled environment controlling for intervening variables. Ground forces may do everything right according to COIN theory and still may not be successful. Therefore, it is important to recognize that our current strategy is based on theory which is something that has not or cannot be proven and continue the debate regarding the steadfast aherence to such a tactic or strategy that many COIN proponents speak of as if it were indeed law.
Jed Medlin
Gian- Are you saying that disbanding the Iraqi Army and the Baath Party was not a mistake or not relevant?
Steve
I agree with Gian that CI as practiced by the U.S. is simply a violent form of societal transformation, and also with his characterization “The Conceit of American Counterinsurgency.” But part of the reason for that is due to these conflicts not really being counterinsurgencies, rather they involve combating the resistance to a brutal foreign military occupation.
FM 3-24
Legitimacy Is the Main Objective
1-113. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.
1-114. In Western liberal tradition, a government that derives its just powers from the people and responds to their desires while looking out for their welfare is accepted as legitimate.
1-120. Military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents. However, success in the form of a durable peace requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn, requires the use of all instruments of national power. A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting success without the HN [host nation] government achieving legitimacy.(end FM)
There was no “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict” — the DOD definition of insurgency — in Malaya, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Also there was (is) really no possibility of “HN [host nation] government achieving legitimacy.” Therefore there could be no counterinsurgency.
What there was in these countries, was a resistance to foreign occupation enforcing a foreign or foreign-established political administration. There was not, in each case, a “constituted government” or a “Host Nation” — there was instead a British (Malaya) and U.S. (the others) puppet government, one which replaced a constituted government. There have been others in this category, for example the Indian overthrow of the British and the French resistance against the Vichy government.
Host governments, in the FM 3-24 sense, are indigenous and not imposed, and they do experience insurgencies. FM 3-24 COIN is intended to eliminate these insurgencies, not to transform the societies involved. There have been true insurgencies, though not the ones mentioned. Recent examples have been Libya and Syria. (I didn’t see any rush by their rulers to purchase FM 3-24 for advice on countering these insurgencies.)
So my contention is that the societal transformation by force that so characterized these bogus “coin” exercises and made them all-out wars resulted precisely because they are not coin exercises, but rather neocolonial imperialist military aggression designed to support illegitimate governments, purple fingers notwithstanding.