COIN is Dead, Long Live the COIN
COIN is Dead, Long Live the COIN by Ryan Evans, Foreign Policy.
When the U.S. Army and Marine Corps released their Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 2006, key military leaders and civilian advisers promised a different kind of warfare. Written as Iraq crumbled, the manual institutionalized key tactical and operational methods that were geared to fighting against irregular armed foes, rather than the maneuver warfare most of the U.S. military had preferred. The new theory was based around several key principles, including proportionate and precise use of force to minimize civilian casualties, separating insurgent groups from local populations, protecting populations from the insurgents, the importance of intelligence-led operations, civil-military unity of effort, and security under the rule of law.
Some of these methods had already been practiced in Iraq by innovative commanders, but Gen. David Petraeus, who oversaw the process of writing FM 3-24 and later went on to command U.S. forces in the country, was key to their institutionalization and broad implementation in the context of an overall theater-level strategy.
As President Barack Obama decided to "surge" forces into Afghanistan in late 2009, former Joint Special Operations Command head Gen. Stanley McChrystal was tasked to follow the Petraeus playbook in Afghanistan. When he was relieved, Petraeus, the man many saw as having helped bring stability to Iraq, was called upon to do it again in Afghanistan. However, success has eluded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which has been unable to translate operational progress into strategic success. A number of triumphant obituaries for counterinsurgency have since emerged, as it becomes clear that the campaign in Afghanistan is failing to deliver on its promises…
Fairly good summation and call for a much needed discussion. One could quibble around the edges a bit. Here are two:
That was not a new theory, not at all — all those things had been ‘learned’ in Viet Nam. They were not terribly appropriate or effective there and have really been little if any more so in Afghanistan or Iraq. The major flaw was the adoption of Colonial power techniques to fight a war or wars in which we were not such a a power and indeed did not have the ability to govern or make unilateral decisions nominally lacking the assent of the host nation.
So called COIN theory is based on outmoded models. It also presumes, in theory, certain attributes of the COIN force that are never likely to be present over a course of years. METT-TC is a tactical tool that has wide applicability at the strategic level. The ‘Troops available’ item will not support COIN theory through multiple rotations for a variety of reasons. That said, we do need to maintain the skills to use in a worst case but the certainty is that General Purpose Force units will never do COIN at all well — nor should they.
It is not inconceivable that we will ever conduct another large scale campaign. That does not mean that it is inconceivable that we will not do so. Nor does it meant that such campaigns are inevitable. Given our record in such campaigns post 1945, it would seem wise to go to great lengths to avoid such commitments unless there is no other choice — and there usually will be other ways if we’re smart enough to take them.
We have not, do not and will not do such campaigns at all well. We lack the flexibility required, are too bureaucratic and too culturally insensitive. Our personnel system will not support them, the voters do not like them — and that can cause fickle domestic political machinations.
For the Mexican example, I refer the author to his own words; “Insurgency lives, and has proven itself throughout history as the best means by which to oppose established political and military power.” Thus it is decidedly to our advantage to not go there but rather to early employ “”small footprint” counterinsurgency that focuses on security force assistance, Special Operations, and/or foreign internal defense…” Given our current shenanigans and condescension towards Mexico, we have work to do…
Our problem has always been unwillingness to nip minor problems before they become traumatic.
While I agree that we should not discard the lessons of the last ten years, I strongly disagree that our choices must be structured in any way by our competitors. If they in fact are, it will most likely be due to a major error on our part. While we have foolishly allowed various opponents to do that since 1945, surely in 66 years we’ve learned that is terribly unwise — why engage in combats of a type that negate our strengths and amplify those of the opponents? Why should we play by an opponents rules on his terrain?
It is interesting that very little discussion relates to the identical nature of the element which drives the violence in the US/Mex and the Af/Pak regions. Many do not see the folly of using helicopters and fast jets in Afghanistan but even the most ideologically opposed protagonists on this topic agree that deploying these systems and the remaining nine yards of the Big Army into Mexico would be profoundly stupid.
The fact that it is well understood in US/Mex but not in Af/Pak strikes me as odd.
It is reminiscent of McNamara’s genuine failure to realise that the Vietnamese would be the last people on the planet to allow their ancient enemy, the Chinese, to use their country to mount the Domino Effect. At the Peace and Reconciliation meetings 20 years after the war ended the North Vietnamese delegates were profoundly shocked that a man as intelligent and widely read as MacNamara was ignorant to the historically bitter relations between the Vietnamese and the Chinese which had been reasonably well-document for centuries.
Beginning in the late 1960’s the Mafia targeted the Af/Pak region to take the place of the the Golden Triangle as the centre of world’s heroin production. The Mafia flooded the Pak law enforcement with huge amounts of cash in order to facilitate the growing and refining of opium. The Army came somewhat later into the industry and decided it would be prudent to get the ISI to run their side of the business.
The money involved is enormous. Heroin moves around the NWFP in ten-ton loads sometimes in convoys of trucks. It is a massive industry. The US knows better than anyone the acreage under cultivation in the region thru their satellite imagery and military operations.
One hears about the Pak’s desire in maintaining an influence if the Taliband come back, preventing a second Indian front (my favourite) the desire to preserve Islam (obviously never met any senior police or ISI officers) etc. Can you imagine the ridicule if you listed the Mexican cartels motivations for their violent acts as ‘preserving Catholicism ‘ and ‘maintaining a Latino influence’ in the southern US after Mexico regains the ‘homelands stolen by the yankees’.
It is all about the narco-dollar and even by US levels of organised crime the amounts are enormous. In a country where the annual per capita income is less than three thousand dollars you can imagine overwhelming influence the nacro economy has on every aspect of the region. It has been entrenched for so long now that no law enforcement or ISI officer would know any different. Their livelihood, career, pension, aspirations etc. would be totally integrated into the narcotics industry.
There are not many US government officials who understand the degree of penetration the Mafia has in the region but there are some who were there at the beginning. The US military needs to get them ‘de-spooked’ and get their input into the strategic, operational and tactical level as currently the military appears to have very little understanding of what genuinely motivates the ‘insurgent’.
regards,
RC