Karzai looks for leverage in Delhi. He should try Beijing, too.
According to the Washington Post and numerous other news outlets, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has given up on talking to the Taliban, which he now asserts is merely a proxy army controlled by the Pakistani government. Under this assumption, Karzai has concluded that he needs to negotiate with the Pakistani leadership in Islamabad, which according to Karzai, “has pursued a double game toward Afghanistan … using terrorism as a means.”
There is nothing new in Karzai’s description of the problem. However, the recent assassination of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had been heading up a negotiation effort with the Taliban, catalyzed Karzai’s decision to break off talks with the Taliban and to confront Islamabad instead. Karzai may have concluded that he needed to drop (at least for now) attempts at direct reconciliation with the Taliban and to harden his line against Pakistan, if only to avoid a revolt by the former Northern Alliance, non-Pashtun portions of his government.
Confronting Islamabad will be a waste of effort for Karzai without some leverage. This explains his quick trip this week to Delhi to sign a “strategic partnership agreement” with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an agreement that includes Indian training for Afghanistan’s police. Singh promised that India would “stand by Afghanistan” after Western troops depart in 2014.
This is a logical step for Karzai, but doesn’t promise to deliver much leverage against Pakistan. India and Afghanistan would have to take much stronger measures to persuade Pakistan to adopt a different policy regarding Afghanistan and its support for the Afghan Taliban. India has its reasons to maintain connections with Afghanistan. But it doesn’t have a good reason under current circumstances to run any significant risks for Karzai’s benefit, which will limit the amount of leverage Karzai is looking for. And until that happens, Pakistan is likely to see even more reason to maintain its current Afghan policy.
Where else might Karzai look for leverage? There is always self-help. If, as Karzai asserts, Afghanistan is under attack from a Pakistani proxy war, a traditional nation-state response would be some form of military retaliation against Pakistan in an attempt to persuade its leaders to change their policy. When it comes to defending its territory against foreign invaders, Afghanistan’s reputation for eventual success is legendary. But retaliation against Pakistan would call for cross-border offensive action. What is Afghanistan’s offensive military capacity? The Afghan battleground is a hothouse of irregular and hybrid warfare techniques. Whether there is any prospect of the Afghan government fashioning these forms of warfare into effective transnational offensive tools is an interesting and unanswered question.
Does Karzai see any role for the United States in his search for leverage? He must have concluded that the current U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan is irrelevant to his need for leverage over Pakistan – indeed, the larger the U.S. force in Afghanistan, the more leverage Pakistan has over the U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen’s eleventh-hour tirade against Pakistan, uttered just days before his retirement, was the clearest sign that the Obama administration finally sees the need to change its approach toward Islamabad. But Karzai can’t hold out much hope that the United States will do much to solve his leverage problem, since the U.S. seems intent on washing its hand of the situation after 2014.
As a last resort, Karzai may look to Beijing. Mineral-hungry China may be interested in Afghanistan’s resources and a shipment route into China that doesn’t have to transit waters controlled by the U.S. and Indian navies. But tapping Afghanistan’s mineral wealth will require good behavior by Pakistan and a settlement to Afghanistan’s civil war. As Pakistan’s last and most powerful friend, China may have the leverage to create these conditions. That such a scenario is long-shot only shows what a difficult spot Karzai is in.
Robert, if and when NATO pulls out of Afghanistan, the situation reverts to pre-9/11. Back then, the non-Pashtuns’ ally wasn’t India and it wasn’t China– it was the Islamic Republic of Iran.
For some reason, American analysts are fond of simply ignoring the very Persian nature of the non-Pashtun segments of Afghanistan.
True, Iran’s ally the Northern Alliance was on the ropes just before 9/11, but that was in no small part the result of the Pakistan/Saudi axis. Post-9/11 and post-NATO pullout (if it ever materializes), do you really expect this axis to be as effective as before? I don’t think so, given their results that enabled 9/11.
So Karzai is concerned with his neighbor and his eastern frontier, and is seeking leverage where it can be found. But keep in mind, his “back” at the western frontier is covered.
Like most governments faced with insurgency, Mr. Karzai ignores the primary sources of causation that radiate outward from his own government. How it rose to power, how it is organized to exclude non-northern alliance influence, how the Constitution centralizes all major patronage in him, and how he employs ISAF to secure and preserve this unsustainable model.
Blame Pakistan and the US for the insurgency? Of course he does. He’s wrong, but this is what governments (Politicians) do.
Iran and Pakistan both have powerful ties to the populace of Afhganistan and powerful interests in maintaining influence over the same. This will never change. Karzai can embrace it or fight it. He choses to fight only because he relies on leveraging others to do that fighting for him.
If India gains a major toehold in this mix it can only lead to major warfare between Pakistan and India initially, and perhaps reasonably expanding to suck in other regional powers (Iran, China) and/or distant powers who perceive vital interests in the region (Russia, US, Great Britain…).
We should not allow this to happen. But then we should have never gotten sucked into the mess we are in either. Clearly we do not see the issues of this region clearly. This is not good, and far more dangerous than any threat posed by AQ or the Taliban.
RCJ:
If the Taliban are fighting merely to achieve inclusion and representation, then yes, reconciliation and power sharing are a possible and reasonable solution. If, on the other hand, the Taliban are in it to win it and are not going to be satisfied with anything short of a win, efforts at reconciliation are pretty pointless.
I don’t personally think any coalition would endure for more than a very short time. Neither party is really interested in cooperation; they are after power, not stability. There’s way too much to fight over, especially when it comes to doling out patronage. There’s no trust between the parties and little basis for cooperation.
Possibly Mr Karzai has simply concluded, not unreasonably, that neither the Taliban not their Pakistani backers have any interest in a negotiated solution, except to the extent that it might be a step toward full control. If you conclude otherwise, you might tell us why.
Karzai’s in a tight place. The US wants him to negotiate a deal so we can call it a win, bail out quick, and leave him to the sharks. His own backers in the Northern Alliance, knowing who stands to be eaten by those sharks (Karxzai will go into comfy exile, they’ll go up against a wall), will rebel at any hint of a deal: they know very well that the Taliban aren’t going to be sharing. Of course Karzai will dodge, duck, dip, dive, and dodge to avoid whatever slings and arrows are headed his way at any given moment. What else can he do?
Poor Karzai, he’s not playing nice in the sandbox with Pakistan and a new military skirmish may take place in the near future. All is not lost as China and India are working on border initiative, hopefully more communication and military training. Karzai could benefit from this but he no longer has any backing and everyone knows that emperor of Kabul has no clothes on and he is completely exposed.
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A minor point first. Mark pre-9/11 my understanding is that India did support some elements of the Northern Alliance, with military aid and a small number of advisers, mainly technical and artillery. I don’t recall Iran being so committed, although Iran nearly went to war with the Taliban at one point after the offensive into the north.
Now back to looking forward, maybe just tomorrow as the sun rises over Afghanistan.
Our commitment to Afghanistan has obscured the fact that Pakistan is far more important to the West, even global security, than an obscure nation which is hostile to foreigners – yes, Afghanistan.
Ten years after 9/11 AQ and other enemies have found other places to hide in and plot. Many of them are far closer than South Asia. It is the message of AQ that is the danger, which so few have adopted actively.
For too long our policy and actions have failed to communicate to Pakistan’s policy elite there is a limit to our patience, tolerance and money. Nor have we assisted the civil sector, let alone carefully considered how to help counter the message of the extremists (AQ being a small, key part).