‘Top Secret America’
09.02.2011 at 09:35pm
‘Top Secret America’: A Look at the Military’s Joint Special Operations Command by Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Washington Post. BLUF:
This article, adapted from a chapter of the newly released “Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State,” by Washington Post reporters Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, chronicles JSOC’s spectacular rise, much of which has not been publicly disclosed before. Two presidents and three secretaries of defense routinely have asked JSOC to mount intelligence-gathering missions and lethal raids, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in countries with which the United States was not at war, including Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, the Philippines, Nigeria and Syria.
Surprised there are no comments on this article yet. Someone sure provided a lot of information to Priest and Arkin. But of course not all of it is right. Just this historical fact for one:
“JSOC’s first mission in 1980, Operation Eagle Claw, an attempted rescue of diplomats held hostage by Iranian students at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, ended in a helicopter collision in the desert and the death of eight team members.”
JSOC did not exist until after Eagle Claw and was established after the Holloway Commission report recommended it as a result of the mission failure.
And I have to take exception to this paragraph in regards to the Philippines. I think Priest and Arkin are mixing JSOC with other SOF:
“In Iraq and Afghanistan, lethal action against al-Qaeda was granted without additional approval. In the other countries — among them Algeria, Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia and Syria — JSOC forces needed the tacit approval from the country involved or at least a sign-off from higher up on the American chain of command. In the Philippines, for example, JSOC could undertake psychological operations to confuse or trap al-Qaeda operatives, but it needed approval from the White House for lethal action. To attack targets in Somalia required approval from at least the secretary of defense, while attacks in Pakistan and Syria needed presidential sign-off.”
I do not think that JSOC was undertaking PSYOP in the Philippines or conducting any significant operations there. Whomever is talking to these reporters is either spinning things or does not know what he/she is talking about at least in terms of this example.
And I am sure others can point out other errors or at least spin. How about the “National Capital task force” and “targeting” for ICE? That should generate some discussion.
Dana Priest is well known within professional military circles who frequently gets the story half-right. She is the reporter largely responsible for the Leahy Amendment, which has crippled our ability to help transform foreign security forces that were accused (rightly or wrongly) of human rights violations.
She quotes a couple of young, loud, arrogant SEALs who were naive enough to talk, but they only shared bar talk which again was only half right.
All America needs to understand is that both JSOC and the CIA are doing great work in the CT field, and for them to continue to be effective their methods need to remain effective. The biggest danger to their security are immature personalties who desire to bragg and former disgruntled operators. The press is doing their job, so I don’t blame Ms. Priest for trying, but I do wonder why she feels compelled to expose our government’s efforts to develop an effective means to conduct CT.
Some of our SOF brothers feel compelled to compete with each other and cheer any news that may bring their competition now a notch, but they should be concerned more concerned with national security and aware that the same type of reporting could just as seriously damage their efforts to develop a unique means for conducting warfare that is best left out of the media.
I don’t see what Dana Priest has done wrong. It’s pretty simple: Sources spill their guts when they’re not supposed to and she writes it down. That’s why these people are called reporters. Reporters aren’t bad people. They’re just doing their job. And they can’t do the job unless people with access help ’em out. I never knew a reporter with a security clearance.
Leahy Amendment? Well, good for Priest if she’s a prime mover behind this law. We have a long history of having dealt with various thugs that would’ve been in prison in our country. We shouldn’t be doing that, especially now, when there are no existential threats to the nation. I’m old enough to know about a lot of bad things that were done in the name of anti-Communism and I’d just as soon not see that repeated. It just isn’t worth compromising our nation’s ideals. Plus our field operators should not be asked to lie down with dogs. Besides, the Leahy Amendment seems pretty toothless anyway, especially when one considers that there are waiver provisions and that they’ve been used. I’d be real interested in learning of any instance where this amendment has harmed national security even a little bit.
“All America needs to understand is that both JSOC and the CIA are doing great work in the CT field, and for them to continue to be effective their methods need to remain effective.”
Well, actually, given the track record over the years, I’d say maybe America needs to know a little bit more than just that. Funny thing about our system: the people who pay the freight are kind of entitled to know what’s being done in their name. Now, I’m not unsympathetic to the argument for secrecy—after all, I come from that community—but in our system, it’s just not as simple as saying, “Screw you,” to the American people. A little finesse in this area goes a long way; IMO, limiting public releases to “all you need to know is we’re doing a great job” wouldn’t be the preferred approach. The American people know that the track record of most government agencies, particularly those that operate in the shadows, is decidedly mixed over the years; this, IMO, kind of argues against merely accepting bromides such as, “trust us.” I used to say that to people and I always dreaded the response: “Oh, that’s right, you’re from the government and you’re here to help.”
The idiotic comments from the anonymous SEALS at the beginning of the article were, well….idiotic.
I can’t intelligently comment on the need or lack thereof for secrecy when it comes to JSOC. Seems to me we hear enough. I will say this, however, perhaps more information needs to come out. Perhaps more information will trickle out to the conventional forces, such as:
1) Moving your headquarters away from the flagpole, as GEN McChrystal did…well, bravo General. Too often I see commanders and units doing all they can to get closer to the flagpole, whether it’s beefing up their VTC capabilities, increasing frequency of meetings, liaisons, etc. Hard to be an independent leg of a starfish when you’re shackled to the flagpole.
2) 17 5 2….now that’s outright blasphemy for the conventional forces. Where do they find time to produce the FRG newsletter, update the unit Facebook page, conduct SHARP training, check CIF records, generate a by-name roster of certifications, do carbon monoxide safety training, water safety training? You can’t tell me that such focus on the mission and self-sustainment leaves any time for the evils mandated by Big Army. How dare he adapt such a focus – conventional GOs would never allow such crimes to be committed.
3) I won’t say whether or not I believe GEN McChrystal’s idea of equating a SOF life with that of TE Lawrence and his cohort is accurate or not. However, it’s clear that he was on to something, whether he knew it or not. Relatively small groups with high unit cohesion, driven by common bonds (not by a hammer-like pounding that results from top-driven management) produce special circumstances, can often accomplish special missions, and are generally quite effective. This does not apply to 100% of the SOF community, but it does appear that the SOF community understands the power of small units, dispersed, manned by motivated and talented individuals that like chaos, challenge, excitement, and thrive on combined power of their group and the trust among the personnel. The conventional Army will probably never adapt such a mentality. They just don’t trust Soldiers to move out and accomplish a mission. And they certainly are not willing to accept the risk that comes when you step back and let a unit do its thing.
Concur with Dave’s comment, which presents another balancing act SOF strives to get right, and that is the balance between remaining quiet and presenting our story. The article on Village Stability TTPs was professional and intended to be helpful to the larger defense/security community. It doesn’t matter if you concur with the strategy, that is open to debate, but it hard to ignore the lessons observed by the real professionals doing this work on the tip of the spear. On the other hand comments about “we’re the dark matter” are simply child like boasts that mean absolutely nothing to anyone other than perhaps a high school kid who dreams of being Luke Skywalker one day. Fortunately 99% of our SOF is very professional and doing great work around the globe, unfortunately our 1% tend to the get bulk of the media coverage because comments like that are bright shinny things to reporters like Dana Priest who want quotes that will grab attention and entertain (read sell), versus accurately telling a story about the great work SOF is doing globally.