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Populations as Complex Adaptive Systems: A Case Study of Corruption in Afghanistan

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08.26.2011 at 01:56pm

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In August 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s International Security Assistance Force mission shifted from an enemy-centric, anti-insurgency campaign to a broader, population-centric counterinsurgency.   This strategy change immediately presented challenges to field of intelligence and its existing analytic methods as it struggled to cope with the complexity of population analysis.  However, a wave of innovation under the name of complexity theory is spreading through mathematics, computer science, biology, economics, and sociology that do cope with the challenges of analyzing entities as complex as populations.  The Emergent States Assessment  (ESA) is an analytic tool that attempts to exploit this wave to support decision makers in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations.  To demonstrate the potential power of viewing populations through the lens of complexity this article examines the phenomenon of corruption in Afghanistan through the ESA framework.

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Hubba Bubba

Forgive my tardiness on this one; I have enjoyed this article for a month now and got to apply some of it’s principles in some recent endeavors that relate to design and military planning.

It is interesting that even within the Intelligence community, there is in-fighting and folks at logger-heads over terminology, methodology, and what is “on-target with our assessment” and what is not. In fact, I used the ‘patron-client-non client’ model in one such engagement with another intelligence organization that wears Army uniforms, and they wrinkled their noses at any deviation from their beloved “criminal-patronage network” concept. Essentially, if it differs from the group think, it is not considered or discussed. This is tragic, because this article represents some of the very useful discussion that occurs on SWJ. Critical thinking, creative thinking, and the free discussion of ideas. It serves no purpose to simply recycle doctrine and existing ideas (or old ones) that function as an echo chamber for the organization that seeks to continue it’s merry existance, even at the expense of national objectives. This article is great because it challenges thinking- but the intelligence community may not be entirely receptive to this right now. Some are; many I encounter are not- in an almost openly hostile way. The world is what we want it to be, instead of what it really is…

I would venture that the patron-client phenomenon discussed here may follow a complex adaptive system process where feedback loops and swarming processes influence the evolution of the system…

I do disagree with page 8 where the authors contend that they might “break the patronage network over the long-term”- this has echoes of ‘Effects Based Operations” thinking that has long infested the intelligence community’s logic on interpreting the world. We cannot master a complex system, and reduce it down enought to “break” it. Breaking implies control- complex systems resist control; and presistent phenomenon like the patronage network are like narco-syndicates and criminal enterprises- they adapt and endure…you can wipe out an entire cartel or network, but you do not destroy the idea. It persists, and manifests in a new and likely more effective form. I would propose the authors consider “transforming the patronage network” or “influencing” it into a future state where the conditions are supportive towards our interests. Essentially, the mafia still functions, but may retreat into a penal system gang network and gambling enterprise instead of doing shake-downs along Main Street and bribing local cops.

P9 continues the dissillusion that one might “control” the complex system; the authors state that “emergent phenomena produced by these decisions will then ideally produce population behavior consistant with ISAF objectives.” That is, in a nut-shell, delusional. Complex systems are, as the title of this article states, ‘adaptive.’ This means you cannot train them like a dog. They are more like a zebra versus a horse. Nobody rides a zebra because they do not conform to that sort of controlled relationship. The intelligence community needs to stop trying to tame zebras and recognize that while a horse can be broken, sometimes you need to handle the zebra by moving it’s source of food, water, and predator relationship to influence it’s behavior.

regardless of my last few comments on complexity, this was overall a great article and worthy of being discussed in planning groups now. I did, and found it quite ‘value-added.’

Just blowing bubbles-

Hubba

G Martin

Interesting article. My initial impression was negative, since I cringe at anything analytic that has the potential to give our ORSAs and Intel folks a false sense of security when acting in complex environments. I would caveat using this as a tool (among others) to assist in attempting to falsify assumptions as opposed to developing plans with which many will become advocates for and lose all objectivity. As complexity theory grows and tools are experimented with, refined, thrown-out and new ones adapted- we should also seek to see where they may assist us, but become skeptical if anyone offers them as a “silver bullet”.

A few specific points:

– I think it is arguable that in 2009 ISAF went to a pop-centric strategy. I have talked to some who have started to study the operational record of McKiernan vice McChrystal/Petraeus and there are indications that we talked pop-centric more but in practice we actually were MORE enemy-centric post-McKiernan.

– There seem to be an awful lot of attempts to show causal linkages between factors. Some complexity theorists would have issue with attempting to draw that many conclusions about a complex system vice submitting them as possibilities. One example:

“…Afghanistan has no effective local tax collection, which means the provincial state has no dependency on the local population. Without a dependency on the local population, the national and provincial governments have little incentive to provide public services to the population…”

and later: “…Government officials are motivated to expand patronage networks to increase power.”

This shows a logical linkage between several factors- starting with Afghanistan not having an effective local tax collection and eventually concluding that Government officials are motivated to expand patronage networks- thus corruption is tied logically to a sufficient cause of lacking tax collection capability (unless I read that wrong). Although this may be true, as I understand complexity theory it is very problematic to state this logically AND prove this linkage. We currently have the same problems in Afghanistan: the logic behind our actions is tied to faulty sufficient causal linkage and conventional wisdom/groupthink. Again, instead of stating all of these logic linkages as facts- as opposed to assumptions that must be tested- we fall into the same logic trap we have already fallen into.

“…As the dominant feature of the fitness landscape is the patronage network, and this allows the patron-client agents to flourish it logically follows that the flow of goods, services, wealth and power in Afghanistan follows the patronage networks…”

again, as I understand complexity theory- complex environments rarely show things connecting through any kind of logic. Instead, complex environments are characterized by connections that are not logical, that are not easily identified, and change often.

The final conclusions:

1) “…Intelligence analysis should identify current interdependencies and their associated emergent phenomenon, and then the USG should conduct operations to either enhance or alter them. The emergent phenomena produced by these decisions will then ideally produce population behavior consistent with ISAF objectives. It is critical to identify the flow dynamics across the system, analyze how changes to the dynamic affect entities considered external to the objective system, and monitor internal and external attempts to alter the objective dynamics. Instead of building advanced governing institutions, the purpose is to establish simple and basic interdependencies that grow the desired institutions, which favor specific agent traits…”

This is a very positivist philosophy- similar to what we already have: identify key interdependencies (read: centers of gravity or key nodes, or whatever the latest systems thinking term is en vogue) and then act. As I understand complexity theory, assuming one can even identify these components is difficult in a complex environment, not to mention actually establishing basic interdependencies. And to think that whatever we do establish will be likely to grow desired institutions and favor specific traits, well…

On the practical side of things: I submit that this solution ignores that there is already an Afghan government with governing institutions- advanced or not- and attempting to coax behavior out of people that will further ISAF objectives assumes that the political objective of transition in 2014 is furthered by ISAF objectives. Many would argue that ISAF objectives are not in synch with the political mandates of transition in 2014 or Afghan objectives- both of which will be problematic if we are pursuing the wrong objectives (so, we may have found success in inserting the right interdependencies and great things are “emerging”, but when we transition all is for naught. This goes back to the primacy of strategy).

“…Instead of trying to build developed Afghan institutions regardless of the cultural and situational dynamics ISAF elements across the country should adjust local interdependencies based on local conditions. This change will alter the Afghan populace’s decision-making considerations causing them to favor choices compatible with U.S. objective and allowing the Afghans to develop their own governing institutions consistent with their unique and varying cultural dynamics…”

There are issues with applying local solutions everywhere in Afghanistan- not the least of which are that some European and most Afghan central government entities do not support them. But- again we seem to have a positivist prediction: if we do “x”, we will get massively complex change (i.e.: “altering Afghan populace’s decision-making considerations to be compatible with U.S. objectives”). Instead of seeing this as a viable alternative to what we currently have in Afghanistan- it seems to me to advocate using a different tool to get to the same problems!

“…Decision-makers who adopt a population-centric, complexity –based approach should be more effective in setting the conditions to create a stable and productive Afghanistan, which is intolerant of terrorist safe havens…”

I would caution strongly all who offer solutions to complex problems to be more humble in their statements about success. Every “silver bullet” idea I’ve seen for the last 10 years proclaims that it will “create a stable and productive Afghanistan intolerant of terrorist safe havens”. I would suggest caveating statements like these to be more modest and transparent about the impossibility of simple, step-by-step, if-then statements predicting success and more statements that propose a hypothetical and ways with which to attempt to falsify that hypothetical. Statements like these do tend to get “emergence”- but that emergence is in the form of stakeholders who place value in proving the hypothesis right.

“…analytic efforts and positive actions that can grow a new emergent state of Afghanistan, shaped by mutually supporting actions, across a complex country…

The idea that we can somehow control emergence- or even influence it- shape it- within a complex environment again to me smacks of hubris. It sounds like we are promising too much and that we’ve already drank the kool-aid. We must remain as objective as we can- not focused on proving our theories were right, but concentrating on coming up with the right theories.

Overall, I’d recommend coming across more modestly, being up-front about possible places we may be wrong, and structure our causal linkage statements to be more like hypotheses- and recommending ways in which we can test these hypotheses.

Thanks for the paper-