You Can’t Blame Me: Propaganda of the Deed (Updated)
You Can’t Blame Me: Propaganda of the Deed
It is Friday. You’re almost done with your boss’s checklist. You can almost leave work for the weekend, one filled with adventures to Home Depot and Bed, Bath, and Beyond to satisfy your wife’s desires. While you are there in one of our magical shopping centers, imagine that you observe four men conduct a raid to rob the store. In this case, the police are in the parking lot, but they refuse to intervene.
Do you still feel secure?
I imagine that over the next year, many folks will scramble to separate themselves from Iraq and Afghanistan regardless of the various pitch and chord they recorded over the last couple of years composing enlightened remedies of a better war. I heart their woes and empathize with their attempts to overcome human nature, an endeavor that intense thought and new ideas can transcend the natural order of things.
Unfortunately, there is no combination or bumper sticker approach that can overcome this specific law of human nature. In the fringe areas of modernity, perhaps it is time to reconsider more a Machiavellian or Hobbesian approach to those newly introduced to the democratic, capitalist approach found in our National Security Strategy.
Andrew Exum comes to mind. In his 2009 Op-Ed “On CT vs COIN,” he proclaimed, “the distinction between COIN and CT, however, is poorly understood. For one, there is no hard and fast dichotomy between the two.” During the same time period, while Andrew was conducting anonymous raids, I was having lunch with Iraqis near Abu Gharaib to ask Iraqis what they thought about life, the war, and their future.
Carl Prine, Crispin Burke, and I take issue with Exum’s thoughts in “Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform.” See point five.
“The dichotomy between “counter-terrorism” and “counter-insurgency” is a false distinction designed to force political choices. Too many scholars now have their reputations and careers staked on the efficacy and durability or failure of FM 3-24 and how it relates to the competing narratives about its use on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. While we embrace these debates because they are intellectually vital for a nation at war, ultimately we must move on and find new means of analyzing irregular conflicts America is likely to face. “COIN” is not the “graduate school of war” because all forms of modern war-making are complex and are guided by intellectual responses to complicated events and ideas.”
Bing West summarized this folly in the simplest form, “the new religion of benevolent counterinsurgency has been defined by the best writers. Especially in Big Army, attracting attention and prominence is helped enormously by an advanced degree and by the publication of theoretical papers on macro topics at the high level of warfare.”
For an historical accord, the Romans phrased it “Facta non Verba,” Deeds not Words.
Many moons ago, in the siege of Masada, deeds triumphed words. The Roman Empire forced a strategy of pacification to the outliers of its provinces, those who rejected control of the then supposed modernity. To quell the rebellion, Lucius Flavius Silva, governing the outlier states, dispatched thousands of the Legion to surround the mountaintop stronghold of Masada.
Deeds mean things.
For the Romans, they showed that they could project force any where in the world.
For the fundamentalist Jews, they showed that they would rather die than succumb to perceived tyranny.
What actions are we showing today and what do they mean?
UPDATE. Andrew Exum concurs with our critique. Now, I am confused considering that we contradicted him. I must consult the MISO for guidance.
UPDATE TWO. I’ve asked Dr. Exum to reply multiple times. He refused responding only, “What? Don’t confuse to me linking to an article with agreeing with everything it says.” So, with the tone of this post, measure his deeds. In 2009, he was a self-described counter-insurgency expert.
UPDATE THREE Andrew Exum states, “My primary criticism of the doctrine as it is currently written is the doctrine’s weakness with respect to waging counterinsurgency as a third party, something both Charlie “Erin” Simpson and Steve Biddle have written a lot about.” So, with the tone of this post, please explain why you, Erin Simpson, and Steve Biddle are experts in COIN..
