Less is Often More?
Less is Often More?
The Paradoxical Impact of Force and Resource Constraints
This is a post that I never would have written while practicing the art in Iraq. On the ground level, every commander wants more forces. In fact, one of the unstated prerequisites for command is that you must conduct at least one daily bitching session where you emphatically describe how much more effective you could be if you were given another platoon, company, battalion, etc…
– More forces equal more villages and more neighborhoods you can clear and occupy.
– More forces equal more visible power and control.
– More resources equal more money to bribe your enemies.
But, sometimes more is actually less:
– More forces mean that you can act unilaterally and just ignore the impotent host nation security forces.
– More forces mean that you can coerce and bully the corrupt political leaders.
– More resources mean that you may waste money building elaborate schools and medical clinics and digging canals rather than repairing the existing suitable structures.
Sometimes with more, we merely attack the symptoms creating short-term visible gains rather than attacking the root problems. Doctrinally, we would call this creating maneuver space on the human and physical terrain.
On the other hand, one of the strangest phenomena studying foreign intervention in small wars is to examine what happens when the intervention force is constrained by force size and resources. In this case, the commanders are forced to adapt, and the result is often a period of deep-reflection, ingenuity, and creativity.
The most notable modern successes are El Salvador, Colombia, and the Philippines. In these cases, Special Forces were forced to adopt a “by, with, and through” mentality. They had to work with the security forces and political leaders. They could not bypass. As some of the evidence in both Iraq and Afghanistan would suggest, left unconstrained, Special Forces would prefer to act unilaterally choosing direct action over advising; however, in these case studies, they were forced by the US Congress and the State Department to act indirectly.
In the long run, less appears to offer more. Are these lessons to be considered for Iraq and Afghanistan as we face drawdowns? Perhaps. I’ll let y’all decide.
