COIN Center Webcast

After reading the Gorka/Kilcullen paper I came away thinking that the authors had forgotten that they have played a monumental part in the US, and therefore its Allies, strategic approach to conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan: “No, no, did you think we meant that COIN, no, we meant counterinsurgency..you know countering insurgents” “If only you had gone back to other 385 conflicts….”

Personally I would like to see far more accountability of those who have such tremendous influence over our nations strategic direction in war. In a way SWJ is a forum of accountability. However, Generals, political leaders, heads of key federal agencies are all professionally and publically brought to account and succeed or are retired as a result. How do we as practitioners in the field hold the theorist accountable for the policies they put forward? There is a tinge of all care and no responsibility: may sound harsh and disrespectful but this is a serious business.

I also do not think it is helpful: “On the other side, we have experienced experts, such as Army Colonel Gian Gentile–who has made a name for himself by writing of the “cult of COIN”

While professional rivalry is healthy I do not infer from any of Col Gentiles writings that he is trying to make a name for himself by being inflammatory for the sack of it. Although I have not had the privilege of meeting Col. Gentile, I respect his principled focus on asking us all to question this current doctrine – which in the end will ensure our strategic thinking and practical implementation has gone through rigorous testing. I also do not believe this is a Left vs Right political issue. That is absolute nonsense and smacks of the whole climate change debate where if you even question the science you are labelled a heretic.

Thanks for posting the link to the article which I had not seen before. No doubt the lecture will be thought provoking.

Personally I would like to see far more accountability of those who have such tremendous influence over our nations strategic direction in war. In a way SWJ is a forum of accountability. However, Generals, political leaders, heads of key federal agencies are all professionally and publically brought to account and succeed or are retired as a result. How do we as practitioners in the field hold the theorist accountable for the policies they put forward? There is a tinge of all care and no responsibility: may sound harsh and disrespectful but this is a serious business. – Jason Thomas

But it is the decision makers who, well, decide who to listen to and what expertise to rely upon. Regarding Afghanistan, COIN, and my old “hobby horse” around here (the strangely toxic American-Pakistani relationship), I collected the following links (I have collected many others. I know as a civilian I’m going outside a strictly military discussion again, but here goes anyway):

Pakistan is the only country in the world given 2 exchange student slots at the Army War College at the request of the most senior leadership of the US Army – and several students and faculty members took the time, outside of seminar sessions, to make certain I heard countervailing POV regarding Pakistans value as an ally.

http://zenpundit.com/?paged=4

FROM WIKIPEDIA:
Ambassador Robin Raphel
“In 1997 she told Ahmad Shah Massoud he should surrender his forces and territory of the Northern Alliance to the Taliban, a move which would have resulted in unification of Afghanistan under Taliban rule with the assistance of Al Qaeda, a suggestion which Massoud unconditionally rejected. She then became Senior Vice President at Cassidy & Associates, a firm that works on consultancy in international relations.[2] She was responsible for the lobbying for Pakistan in the state department and the firm had a $1.2 million contract with the Govt of Pakistan.”

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/14/exeunt_pakistan_experts_pursued_by_bear

The Army Communications and Electronics Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground recently put out a notice signaling that it may need contractors to train members of the Pakistani military on how to use a new “Ground Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (GISR) system.”
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Developed by DRS Technologies, a high-tech military contractor based in New Jersey, the system intercepts and locates the sources of enemy communications and then permits continued monitoring of them. It also allows users to quickly analyze the collected data, including visual material, “to provide mission-critical intelligence to the warfighter.”

http://pundita.blogspot.com/2011/06/pak-military-cuts-off-food-and-water-to.html

South Waziristan, April 22, 2011: A delegation of senior United States Agency for International Development (USAID) officials joined the Water and Power Development Authority’s (WAPDA) Chairman, Shakil Durrani, on a visit to Gomal Zam on Thursday, April 21, for an update on construction progress. USAID is co-funding completion of the Gomal Zam Dam, which will add 17.4 mega-watts of power to the national grid. This amount is sufficient to supply electricity for 25,000 households.

http://www.usaid.gov/pk/

USAID is invested in Pakistan institutionally. So are others international organizations such as the IMF/World Bank.

Then there is the CIA mission and its station.

How do they all balance a need for institutional prominence and funding with, well, US security? People see what they want to see so I’m not being accusatory. It’s easy to confuse your institutional mission with overall American security needs.

And you all are not toy soldiers.

After 9-11, we moved on to “fixing” fragile states and old Cold War thinking (we must keep a strategically important ally in the fold, although that ally is already what we fear an Iran with nuclear weapons will be).

Perhaps that is all deeply unfair on my part. I get so confused from my vantage point as a civilian. Something doesn’t seem right, though, and it goes beyond “celebrity” Generals and think tanks such as CNAS. That’s just the tip of the iceberg, IMO.

Someone once warned about foreign entanglements….