Security Force Assistance: Just Do It
Security Force Assistance: Just Do It
Appendix to Accompany CRS Report 41817 “Building the Capacity of Partner States through Security Force Assistance”
by Thomas K “Doc” Livingston
Download the Full Article: Security Force Assistance: Just Do It
In February 2009, a sudden ice storm blanketed Washington D.C. and Andrews Air Force Base significantly complicating military and commercial traffic into and out of D.C. On the eve of the 4-star irregular warfare (IW) summit–the culmination of 6 months of effort from the cross-MAJCOM IW task force–Major General Stephen Mueller (now LTG) found himself fielding a call from one of the MAJCOM commanders who asked, “Why are we having this meeting? It is really even necessary?” The weather adequately reflected this commander’s frosty interest in the Air Force endeavor to “institutionalize” IW. Unfortunately, his candor represented a majority disinterest of the MAJCOM commanders and Air Staff leadership that attended the summit. Over two years later, the AF, while wholeheartedly supporting the ongoing counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan, has only marginally developed an enduring capability to prepare itself to counter irregular threats through the security force assistance (SFA). Getting the Air Force to embrace SFA as an enduring mission today is akin to the Navy shifting from the battleship as the lead in surface warfare circa 1940.
Download the Full Article: Security Force Assistance: Just Do It
Col Thomas K “Doc” Livingston recently completed the Air Force Fellowship program while serving as a Research Analyst for the Congressional Research Service. Prior to the fellowship, he served on the Air Staff as Division Chief in the Air Force Irregular Warfare Requirements office and has a career background in Air Force Special Operations.
This addendum accompanies the paper written for the Congressional Research Service to fulfill the academic requirements of the Air Force Fellows program for 2011. It is provided to include opinions and recommendations gleaned from the research associated with the CRS report. As a matter of policy and legislation, and in a fashion to ensure unbiased and non-partisan analysis, CRS reports are absent of recommendations and opinion. This appendix reflects the opinions of the author and is not representative of the Congressional Research Service, Air Force Research Institute, Air University, or the United States Air Force.
