From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War
From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War
by Tony Corn
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A decade after 9/11, the absurdity of the U.S. grand strategy in the Long War is never better illustrated than by the fact that Washington currently spends $ 100 billion dollars a year in Afghanistan chasing a grand total of 100 Al Qaeda fighters (one billion per terrorist). If there is only one reason to rediscover Liddell Hart today, it is because, as Sir Ernest Rutherford famously said in a different context: “We are running out of money, gentlemen. It’s time to start thinking.”
At any rate, the need to go beyond inter-service jointness and toward inter-agency jointness calls for an intellectual shift away from Clausewitz and toward Liddell Hart. For ultimately, the difference between the two is not just a matter of “direct vs. indirect” approach at the operational level. It is a difference between a theory that focuses on the intersection of strategy and tactics, and one that focuses on the intersection strategy and grand strategy.
In retrospect, the beginning of the end of the era of Clausewitzology in military circles may have started as early as 1989, with the adoption by the U.S. Marine Corps of a “maneuver” doctrine (FM-1) which self-consciously distinguished itself from the “attrition” doctrine associated with “Big Army.” While paying lip service to Clausewitz, this new doctrine was clearly closer to Liddell Hart in spirit.
Thanks to General Petraeus and his team, the French have also recently discovered David Galula (a French theorist of counter-insurgency they had never heard of), and la contre-insurrection is no longer the taboo subject it was in Paris when it was associated with the name of Roger Trinquier.
Download the Full Article: From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War
Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute in Washington DC. This article is a follow-up to two previous articles: From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats: The Coming Revolution in Civil-Military Relations and Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of State.
