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This Week at War: Waiting for the Intermission

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04.09.2011 at 12:09am

Who will win the Libyan stalemate?

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) How to play the stalemate in Libya

2) Afghan skeptics prepare to take over in Washington

How to play the stalemate in Libya

This week, Libya’s rebels attempted to storm Brega, the oil port about 200 kilometers south of Benghazi. The attack failed, making it even more clear that the conflict has now become a stalemate, a conclusion reached by Gen. Carter Ham who until recently was commander of the Libyan operation. The rebels, lacking military training, battlefield leadership, or many armored vehicles, are unable to advance along the coast road toward Tripoli. But neither can Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi’s troops emerge from the built-up areas where they are hiding from coalition air power. The question now, for both sides, is how best to play the resulting standoff.

Qaddafi’s field commanders must be pleased with how well they have managed to neutralize the advantage the coalition’s air supremacy previously afforded the rebels. Qaddafi’s forces have either abandoned their military vehicles or kept them in urban areas, protected from air strikes by human shields. Their use of pick-up trucks and other civilian vehicles has confused the coalition pilots attempting to provide air support for the rebels; an accidental NATO missile attack on a rebel convoy outside of Brega on April 7 killed 13 rebel fighters. It was the third such misguided air attack in the past week. NATO air commanders are now caught between increasingly strident rebel demands for air support and fears that either more errant strikes or civilian bombing deaths will cripple support for the air campaign. The result is likely to be a further wind-down in military operations by all sides.

With a large advantage in ground combat power, Qaddafi would seem to be the least interested in a de facto ceasefire. However, coalition air power prevents his forces from attempting a partly conventional military attack into open terrain. With the military situation frozen, Qaddafi will look for ways to extend his ability to hold out against international pressure. We should expect a media campaign explaining how the embargo against his regime is impoverishing the population in the western part of the country. A plea by Qaddafi to resume oil sales would follow.

A ceasefire might benefit the rebels the most. They desperately need a break from the fighting in order to conduct basic military training, select competent battlefield leaders, and expand their diplomatic outreach to the international community. A break will also allow rebel commanders to work out better procedures for coordinating coalition air power with rebel ground operations.

It is the Obama administration that might be most at risk from a prolonged stalemate in Libya. Even though the United States has pulled strike aircraft from duty over Libya, the impression remains that the U.S. is “at war” against Qaddafi. The Obama administration is being held responsible for the outcome of the conflict while contributing less and less to the shaping of that outcome. As Qaddafi continues to hold on in defiance of Obama’s stated goals, observers will question the administration’s strategy. Obama and his advisers believe that pulling back U.S. forces reduces the cost and risk to the United States. What remains to be seen is whether there will be a commensurate pullback in the responsibility assigned to the U.S. for how Libya turns out.

Afghan skeptics prepare to take over in Washington

A March 30th Washington Post article discussed the battle lines forming inside the Obama administration over the rate at which U.S. military forces will begin exiting Afghanistan. According to three senior administration officials, Obama made it clear at a recent monthly Afghanistan review meeting “that he wants a meaningful drawdown to start in July.” The options under preliminary discussion include a tiny symbolic withdrawal, the removal of some rear-echelon support troops, and a “heavy” option of three combat battalions — about 3,000 of the nearly 100,000 U.S. soldiers currently deployed — taken from several locations. Gen. David Petraeus, the commander in Afghanistan, has yet to submit his recommendations.

Obama should not be surprised if his military chain of command is resisting his desire for a more “meaningful drawdown.” As Bob Woodward made clear in Obama’s Wars, his chronicle of the 2009 Afghan surge decision, it was Petraeus, Defense Secretary Gates, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen who were the most vociferous supporters of a larger and longer military commitment in Afghanistan. According to Woodward, this “Afghan Surge Faction” prepared only one option for Obama in 2009. It should be no surprise if this group is similarly presenting only token reductions for this summer.

For Obama, 2011 will be dramatically different than 2009. This time, if Obama doesn’t like the military advice he is receiving, he is in a position to simply change the players in the military chain of command. Gates’s retirement is imminent, as is Mullen’s by September. Add to that the likelihood of rotating Petraeus out of Kabul and into another assignment.

Trial balloons are already floating. The most critical will be Gates’s replacement. Obama would logically make this selection first, so the prospective new Defense Secretary could weigh in on the choice for Mullen’s replacement as Joint Chiefs Chairman. According to the Washington Post, Leon Panetta, the current CIA director, may be the front runner. He has navigated two years at CIA without running aground. He is a veteran on Capitol Hill, a crucial quality for a Defense Secretary. Most importantly for Obama’s near-term purposes, Panetta shares the president’s skepticism about the mission in Afghanistan, according to Woodward’s account.

And who will replace Panetta at CIA? According to NPR, the leading candidate is Petraeus, who is said to be —to accept the job. For Obama, putting Petraeus at CIA would remove him from the military chain of command while also keeping him inside the government in a quiet position. Promoting Marine Gen. James Cartwright from Vice Chairman to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would place another Afghan surge skeptic into the top military office.

The first withdrawal this summer from Afghanistan may very well end up being largely symbolic. But dramatic changes are in store for Obama’s military team. All of the members of the “Afghan Surge Faction” will be gone by the autumn, almost certainly to be replaced by skeptics of the current policy. After a slow start, we should expect the withdrawal of combat units from Afghanistan to accelerate next winter — just in time for the 2012 presidential election campaign.

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