To Design or Not to Design (Part Two)

My appologies- on page 10 it should read ‘third article’ instead of ‘second article.’ My last-minute editing apparently did not catch all the glitches!

V/R
Ben

Concur that philosophical reflexivity is important to design while at the same time I am somewhat pessimistic that a doctrine-centric institution can (purposefully) reset its world view (which, at the risk of oversimplification, I would characterize as ontologically objective).

We have created organizational technologies (such as the JSJ7 and Army’s TRADOC) that cannot be easily disassembled. The structure of the military’s (particularly the US Army’s) “lifeworld” is so dependent on the structural functionalist world view that it is inconceivable for members to rebuild based in some alternative ontology.

Hence, what we have is an ideology (one could argue — this IS the definition of an institution). What Ben proposes in these first two essays is a challenge to that ideology. The institution is a very powerful entity and has a political (conservative?) stake in the reality it has created and lives in. To reveal the structure of a Foucaultian “psychic prison” is potentially very dangerous for those who have explored “outside the cave” (as Plato’s cave allegory about “ontology” points).

I think the Army (and JFCOM with its release of its handbook) made a mistake when linking design to military planning. Planning may be part of design, but design is not part of planning. Planning is a form of “soothsaying.” Design requires recognition that it is.

I also reject the very idea of “understanding” (that may apply in limited situations where the engineering sciences work). I think we should change our collective mind (social cognition) to the British theorist (Geoffrey Vickers) explanation of “appreciation.”

Understanding connotes a certain Greco-Western arrogance about knowledge. Appreciation requires a humbleness and admission that we may never understand.

If the institution were to change its view of planning and understanding, this may create conditions for design to become more relevant to practitioners.

I can appreciate Ben’s thoughts on the confusion caused by the use of certain words (which have certain understood meanings) in multiple contexts. As if we needed evidence, the confusion between “Design” and “Operational Design” started almost as soon as Design doctrine hit the streets in FM 5-0.

However, as Ben rightly points out, the use of a separate vocabulary for design work and/or conceptual planning is not the answer. The link between design and detailed planning is tenuous as it stands now. Design seemed to be conceptualized independent of MDMP, then twisted and molded to kinda-sorta fit with MDMP. MDMP, on the other hand, did not change significantly. Perhaps we should have looked harder at changing MDMP to fit with Design than the other way around? (Which begs the question: Has MDMP become a “sacred cow?”)

I’ll be interested to see Ben’s solution. He hints at one view in his response to Grant:

Suppose we gain deep understanding- so what? Can we convert that into a linear form so that detailed planning can actually use it? Or do we “go down the rabbit hole” so far that our discourse becomes jabberwocky and the detailed planners disregard design entirely? The most important figure in that tension is the military commander of the organization- he is the central figure in detailed and conceptual planning; he is responsible for both worldviews to engage in discourse and deliverable exchange while understanding the nature of both.

Interesting, but putting it all on the commander’s shoulders does not square with the article – that conceptual and detailed perspectives are, at present, incompatible. Given that Ben spent considerable time proving this point in the essay, it seems unreasonable to expect a commander to cognitively exist in both worlds simultaneously.

Perhaps the solution is forthcoming? Looking forward to the next one.

Thank you all for elucidating answers to my questions. This helped point me toward a better understanding.

It seems to me that that “Design” faces similar challenges to political philosophy–especially as it was practiced by the Greeks. “Design” seems to be asking questions starting with 1) “What is reflection?” and moving toward 2) “Who should reflect?” and then 3) “How does reflection become practicable in the ‘real’ world?” “Design” seems to share in common with Classical political philosophy the necessity of intentional reflection for the “good” of some greater whole (the City in philosophy’s case and the Command in the military’s case).

So what do the Classics have to say, in short?

Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides all point us toward the necessity of intentional reflection in politics because they see that such reflection can make individuals better people and, more importantly, keep the City from committing costly errors (such as the Sicilian Expedition).

Yet, that is not the whole story. For the Classics also realize that most people want SIMPLE. After all, Plato both proposes the rule of philosopher-kings in the “Republic” but reminds Glaucon that this is laughable because most people would never put up with philosophers being in charge. In other words, “Design” faces a similar challenge as does Classical political philosophy because “Design” seeks to promote an intentional reflexivity and awareness, which is hard for people to do when they have become accustomed to living in other ways. I take MAJ Zweibelson’s second argument to be addressing in large part this challenge, but at the level of the language people choose to use. This leaves me with the question — is it language use or the process of perceiving the world itself that should be addressed in order to help planners see the world ontologically?

Part of the intentional reflexivity of “Design” seems to be an inherent development of “self-knowledge.” The features of the environment are complex (and in a state of flux) in such a way, it seems that the only thing we can know is ourselves. This seems to be MAJ Zweibelson’s chess example. But I would like to take this one step further.

Perhaps we ourselves are also in a state of complex flux thus making the “self-knowledge” for which we search a moving target. Then what we need to find is not a particular fact but the intermediate factors that are working upon us. In the chess player terms, the real challenge (or obstacle) we face is not just realizing our performance is inhibited because our dog died, but naming the changing emotions that we feel because our dog died. In one moment we may be able to focus, while in another we may feel rage, and in another sadness. The change within ourselves is also disturbing to the design of our strategy because we are ourselves stationary, discrete individuals. Then the character of our planning must be about the very Worldview we plan at an ontological level and not just about the particular techniques we use to plan. We must clear our Worldview of conception entirely so that we can view the situation in front of us as it exists ontologically. In the chess game example, this requires us to take a deep breath, empty our mind, and focus on the game in front of us.

In military terms, is the method to get us to this point “Design”?

Thank you for expanding my thinking. I appreciate the opportunity to learn more about this way of seeing the world.

Regards,

Grant Allard

For Grant Martin-
I also am a bit disappointed when I re-read this article series; when I wrote these I was early on my design journey at SAMS. This body of work essentially beats up the Army in terms of doctrine and institutional bias on how design is an unwelcome visitor. Since then, I have moved onto different work that attempts to bridge this gap between conceptual and detailed planning but without the cumbersome ‘design’ words in the final product. It reminds me of a telling conversation I had a few months back with an 06 after I had chated him up about design, non-linear approaches, and swarming that could replace the traditional LOO/LOE products for a design deliverable. He replied with “this is great! I love it- but I need you to draw it for me on a LOE with an end-state.” So, right now I see the biggest challenge for design is that once a design team (or the CDR) achieve the ‘deep understanding’- what forms do they employ to convey that understanding to the rest of the force in a manner that ensures acceptance and cohesion? Vocab is one aspect, as are graphic depictions and conceptual structures (LOOs, PLOs, LOEs…) but what is the right balance between PROCESS and PROCEDURE?

I thought of another analogy to kick around on this- suppose the CDR wears some red sunglasses when applying the traditional linear reductionist perspective set in the detailed planning worldview- but they had to take those glasses off and don a pair of blue glasses to ‘see’ the operational level of the design onotological worldview- to acheive the deep understanding? One problem is that our military leadership do not want to take off their red glasses at all, and when they do, they say “wow, this is nice- but can you make it all look red for me?” To play with the metaphor further- we need to engineer some sort of ‘3D glasses’ that use red and blue lenses together in synergy as a transitional worldview when going from an ‘all red’ to an ‘all blue’ or vice-versa worldview. Commanders need to be open to taking off the red sunglasses, and desigers cannot expect the red world to implement everything blue without some distortion and transition in the process. Perhaps the 3D synergy of red-blue lens cooperation as a metaphor could evolve further- through inovative design doctrine, operational vocabulary, and educational reform in the military to facilitate design-specific requirements?

Just some thoughts. Also- I will try to hit you on AKO, but if you are at the same location you were when your articles published on SWJ earlier, I am slated to come your way right now…

Ben

Grant-
no rewording necessary; even if you did intend it as criticism, I am my own worst critic and what makes me cringe now when I re-look at this series is how often I struggle with balancing what I call ‘fancy foo-foo words’ with more tactical jargon that the majority of the force is more comfortable with. Perhaps the challenge is all about what Hayden White and Peter Novack talk about with content and form, objectivism and subjectivism, and recognizing the swirling interaction of interiorities and exteriorities (A Thousand Plateaus and Naveh)- bottom line is that while I attempt in this series to break through the barrier I see between conceptual and detailed planning worldviews, I think ultimately I only scratch the surface. There is a paradigm shift afoot, as Dr. Paparone mentioned earlier, and where this takes the military is yet to be figured out. I don’t know if the end state is going to be design-heavy and detailed proceduralism light, or some mix, or if design gets tossed to the graveyard…but it appears that the current generation of military planners and doers need to come to some conclusion on when, why, and how design (agreed- it is a terrible word; I liked Systemic Operational Design because each word meant something) is used.

Sorry the titles of the books by Schon are:

The Reflective Practitioner & Educating the Reflective Practitioner

(I guess my Freudian inclination was to insert “military” 🙂

GA: “The designer must be intentionally reflective when designing or else caveats of his Worldview that he does not expect may become Achilles’ heals in his construction.”

This is key, as you state, and something we struggle with mightily. Many, if not most, of our leaders IMO believe in one objective reality and Universal “Truth” (bound up in Christian theology and cultural hubris). Kind of hard to understand “your” Worldview and how it biases what you do and “blind spots” it may cause- if you don’t even believe in the concept.

Ben- I think it is less insidious than you suggest (or were you just using that as an easily-understood example?): to me the “sacred cows” today actually have to do with our view of how COIN should be fought and if what we are doing today is effective and sustainable.

For GM-

I agree about COIN. But from my perspective, the issue on how/why/where we do COIN as a military instrument of power reflects the tension in our organization on how the Army defines itself (Builder’s thesis in ‘Masks of War’)- do we train for full spectrum operations and emphasize high intensity (HIC) while implementing some lessons learned from OIF and OEF into our low intensity (LIC) doctrine and training procedures?

I look to our national training centers and the inevitable pendulum swing back from doing nothing but COIN for a decade back to the HIC/defense/LIC phases of old- the FSO rotation is back- but why?

Builder makes the claim that military branches reinvent themselves while staying true to old “golden era” perceptions of how they were the lead military IOP solving American conflicts- and that military branches often place their own desires for self-relevance and exclusive occupation of the “tip of the next conflict’s spear” above even the national interests of the country. For instance- if the Army still holds to conventional glory of pitched battle against large standing armies where physical lines of operation and operational depth (deep, close, rear)continue to embrace Clausewitz and Jomini with armor, infantry, and aviation (and artillery too)…then is not COIN once again isolated as the ‘whimpy kid’ during dodgeball selection on the playground of military thought?

COIN puts all of the goldern-era concepts and procedures at disadvantage: CAS works better with prop A/C in penny packets under ground force command (arguably- and the USAF is unlikely to ever support that position, because…) Our armor does not work in Afghanistan, and our linear campaign plans for infantry to close with the enemy doesnt work either. The big dogs in COIN are the same ones as UW- small decentralized SOF or para-military forces that work local security and isolate the fish from the pond without draining the entire pond in the process. COIN makes senior military leadership pull a gag reflex because on our long list of military victories in 200 years, COIN doesnt do so well. Sure, we did well in the Philippines in 1899-1901 (Linn’s book), and one could argue that the Great Plains Indian Wars after the Civil War were also successful- but I don’t consider those true COIN since we were displacing or openly slaughtering all villages we discovered. Vietnam was a strategic disaster with tactical success built on the model of WWII golden-era superior fire power, mass and maneuver, and a focus on destroying the enemy. “We had to destroy the village to save it.” But let me converge back to my point that design offers some truth about COIN and FSO.

Since COIN is the red-headed stepchild for military action because it reduces conventional strengths and often exploits institutional weaknesses; COIN is not what the military decision makers want to invest in or plan for. Now, of course we will add some more to FM 3-24 and perhaps introduce some coherent doctrine that does away with the silly nuances between FID and SFA someday (that is another rant I could go on); but as for hardware, training, force projection, modularity, professional education, and recruting- the Army is going to return to what it self-identifies as and embraces as it’s true calling: conventional forces engaged in total war. Throw some ‘hybrid’ aspects around the edges and you can call it FSO- but the lion’s share of cost, gear, training, capability, and capacity is oriented toward the war that is less likely to occur in the future. The Soviet Bear did not attack, and now that it is gone, there is no real rival. China is a giant, but not an offensive military one. India is an ally; and even if it wasn’t, those countries are not bent on some sort of eschatalogical war strategy like the way Moscow was framed for many decades (Anatol Rapoport). In essence, we will only fight small and annoying enemies that embrace lower spectrum conflicts- COIN is one excellent tool for them. Instead of re-aligning our military to perpare for this as our primary mission, we keep it as a side requirement and are on the journey back to a conventional FSO focused ‘total war’ military.

Probably alot of folks disagree, but that is my perspective from the foxhole right now.

Ben

Bill,
Good points. I have one minor quibble regarding this excerpt:

“however, for irregular warfare we should consider using other government agencies and Special Operations as the core organizations to organize around for these types of conflicts.”

I think we focus too much on units and organizations. I think we would all agree that we need to apply the right force/organization/unit/capability to the right mission at the right time. But what I would change to your sentence above is that we should use the National Strategy, Theater Cmapign Plans, and Country Team’s Mission Strategic Plans as the focal point or centerpiece around which we organize. If we get those three right then we will be able to apply the right force (or better yet -the right combination of forces) to support the strategy and execute the plans. I just think we get ahead of ourselves by talking first about what units should do what and which units we should organize around or whom should have lead. If we get the strategy and plans right the organization/unit/capabilities will flow from them.

Dave and Ben,
A quick response now, and hopefully more detail later.
In principle were pretty much in agreement, and admittedly I threw out the SOF core versus the GPF core argument to be provocative, because if we fail to present provocative arguments that challenge the accepted norms, then we avoid creating the necessary tension (cognitive dissonance) that in turns leads to new insights (and possibly paradigm shifts), or as you phrased it creative destruction. Ill present more on that argument later, but it ties into Sun Tzus guidance that we need to understand ourselves, not only our enemy.
COL Maxwell recommends organizing around our National Strategy, Theater Campaign Plans, and Country Team’s Mission Strategic Plans our focal points to organize around. Right or wrong I tend to default to the iconoclast position, which is that these documents in theory are exactly what we should be organizing around, but in reality theyre poorly developed documents that are not tied to achievable policy objectives, and for the most part are still born. When a theater campaign plan is organized around lines of operation it is my view it is a failed plan, and simply a document that justifies various forms of activities. If we applied a design like process to inform the development of these documents, which in turn requires these documents to be living documents to a large extent, then I agree we could organize around them, but today I think these plans simply support our status quo organizations, rather than forcing us to change to organize around them. It isnt black and white, and I could make arguments based on examples to counter my overall assumption, but in most cases I believe this is the case.
Ben wrote,
“the problem here is that the military is the only set of organizations that currently have the manpower, training, infrastructure, training, and budget to really implement design. I worked with the DoS numerous times, and they are just so small as an organization that they are really only planning short-term only. If they had the operational level of planning staffs that the Army had, they sure could do what we would like them to do- but unless some budget changes occur, they and their CIA and other bretheren are just not equipped to do this.”
Two concerns with argument. First it assumes that planning operations requires large staffs (UBL and his handful of followers unfortunately did a pretty good job of strategic to tactical level planning with a handful of men), and second it implies we have to default to the military because were the only ones with the manning to this, and yet we wonder why we default to a military solution?

p.s. in other words, planning is a veritable IDEOLOGY in Western military insitutions. Ideology is the lowest form of philosophy — no?

Chris-

Now we are getting deep into the philosophical side of design, so I am happy to digress into what I see as another tension between conceptual and detailed planning worldviews (designers versus planners)- but first I must return to Grant Martin’s earlier comment where he warned that the majority of design detractors exclaim, “this is too complicated! Just pass me some ammo and let me kill the bad guys…” That is a paraphrase- but he makes the right point here. When some previous SAMS graduates showed up to senior level staff last year and said, “Im a designer…”, they apparently got thrown in the dungeon under the secret tree from ‘The Princess Bride.’ This goes directly to the tension within the military institution over this article’s topic- vocabulary matters, and right now there essentially is only a tactical reductionist vocabulary that, in Naveh’s words, ‘tacticizes’ everything. The Marines’ planning doctrine uses the phrase ‘procedure over process’ and I adapt that into ‘proceduralize’ in a coming article on design education.
But allow me to diverge even further for a second…

Does it matter to extinct dinosaurs what we name them? And, isn’t it a bit ironic when paleontologists fight and even go to court over what official name gets assigned to a dinosaur based on the ‘first discovery’ law in paleontology. Let me return to this point in a bit…

‘A Thousand Plataeus’ goes heavy into post-modernism philosophy and is, in my humble opinion, a very tough read unless you are well read in post-modernism and design. That said, they really get into the design concepts of ‘interiority (what they call striated space)’ and ‘exteriority (smooth space)’ with a complex system. I apply this concept to vocabulary. When you say the word ‘designer’ or ‘reflective practicioner’- you are expressing a concept in your mind (a content, as Hayden White would offer in his ‘Content and the Form’) but you must apply it to a ‘form’ that we all must agree upon. I agree with your vocab choice because I agree with the design philosophy, and I also (being a heretic) think that design transends ‘operational’ or ‘conceptual planning’ as some proceduralized step before MDMP/JOPP/MCPP, and design actually occurs throughout all military action, weaving and swirling around it and enhancing every aspect of it with understanding and learning. But, the word ‘designer’ and ‘reflective practicioner’ do not exist in the tactical lexicon of the linear reductionist worldview of detailed planning and execution.

The word ‘planner’ has a tactical application and an entirely different content that we both likely agree upon. Naveh (his recent Booze Allen Hamiliton publication’s title escapes me for the moment, but I cited it in this series of articles a few times) nails this topic by charging that the military wants ‘planners’ who are really ‘shackled’ to carrying out the procedures of planning military operations and are not ‘designers.’ The Marines (in their Planning doctrine) also discuss this fallacy of falling into ‘lockstep linear procedures’ and missing the big picture. The Aussies even touch upon it in their ‘Adaptive Campaigning’ doctrine where they explain up-front that their ‘doctrine’ is really more of an overarching guidebook and not to be applied in a literal or dogmatic sense. What they are all inferring is what my article above attempts to nail down- tactical vocabulary that already employs a concept and form such as ‘planner’ cannot then be placed into a dual-role in the conceptual planning worldview where the term ‘designer’ or ‘reflective practicioner’ works better to convey the CONTENT through a new FORM. But…US Army Doctrine FM 5-0 uses ‘planner’- and we must follow our doctrine…or else our organization becomes confused. My fourth article coming up goes into that problem with linear and non-linear concepts.

The interiority mentioned earlier- that striated space is nested within the detailed planning worldview on the reductionist (or mechanistic) linear side; therefore the tactical vocabulary that uses terms such as ‘planner’ or ‘planning’ and ‘problem’, ‘end-state’, and ‘victory’ all reflect the interiority of a system- this is the known, the agreed upon, the bounded space. The exteriority where creativity and adaptation exists is unbounded and part of the conceptual planning worldview. Hence, when you insert (or cram) linquistic containers that are bounded interiority into applications that function in the vast exteriority where the cycles of creation and destruction ride the beast of problematization, those words fail. Design doctrine demands we call designers as planners…yet conceptual planners do not ‘plan’ when they design. I violently agree with you- yet our organization argues over what to call these conceptual ‘insert your word choice here’ folks that are seeking ‘deep understanding’ (or cognitive synergy-Naveh) of a complex system.

Returning to dinosaurs and finishing my long-winded point on operational vocabulary, dual-use vocabulary that triggers organizational confusion, and how interiority and exteriority plays a significant role in content and form selection- just as conceptual ‘insert lexicon’ folks are DOING design, outside of the exteriority, within the interiority of the reductionist worldview, our military organization argues endlessly about what to label these creatures. They are, in fact, debating what to call an extinct dinosaur- the dinosaurs died off 65 million years before humans lived or invented latin, so we really have no idea what they called themselves or if their own concepts of their identity were really not applicable in some FORM. They are in the exterior- and despite a linear timeline spanning 65 million years, it doesnt matter to them because they were DOING what dinosaurs did, regardless of us over in the interiority (human society) currently debating what name to hang on the exhibit with their fossilized remains. With this metaphor I am not implying that designers are extinct or large reptiles- although that just occured to me.

We need an operational vocabulary that functions in the exteriority- a lexicon that adapts, learns, and is in a endless process of creation and destruction; a great example is how wikipedia (the bane of academia) works. It constantly evolves and changes- and is largely a self-organizing and adaptive creation that swarms in directions that do not apply to linear constructs. This sort of vocabulary construct will have a hard time fitting into traditional doctrine- but my future articles address that. Essentially- we both agree that ‘planner’ is an inadequate word to explain what designers do- planner is a tactical word that works great in detailed planning. How do we expand an operational vocabulary that works independently of our tactial one? We cannot simply expand the tactical lexicon because we will confuse our force and overburden them with words and concepts that they will not use because the reductionist worldview does not function in the exteriority- they work only in the interiority of the system.

Long post- my appologies if I did not make a coherent point; currently recovering from a rough sinus infection.

Ben

Dave,

There is expertise in recognizing ancient ideas clothed in the latest socio-politico-military jargon… If we wish to learn something new… read something old 🙂

English is inherently a more difficult language in which to create truly “clear and precise” meanings to prevent misunderstanding… Its much easier in the German language to create operational clarity although it is not immune from jargon. If need be you hook a bunch of words with clear and precise meanings together… like Befehlstaktik, Auftragstaktik or Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaftskapitän, which in English becomes four words: Danube steamship company captain.

I submit that jargon is generational and the quest for a lexicon that adapts, learns, and is in a endless process of creation and destruction an expression of the changing of the generational guard.

The search for appropriate jargon and control over the uses of jargon are also discourses of power and expressions of restructuring, dominating and authority.

Finally, clear language (a templated world) isn’t enough… head, space and timing on the receiving end most important. Interactive processes are dynamic.

Clear, hold, build expresses operational clarity brilliantly… but execution is hard. Its in the execution stage where we get tripped up by our jargons to describe effects.

v/r
MAC

“Seemed to work really well in the 4th grade when I learned it, but somewhere we seemed to have fallin off a cliff….Folks trying to talk to each other with funny words.”

Slapout 9, let me recap a conversation I had with Shimon Naveh a while back. We talked about this issue, about how design uses words that are often confusing for detailed planners and those executing. He essentially said that when you design, you are exploring the unknown about a system. When doing this, you might come upon something that you immediately recognize as ‘the truth’, but it comes in a new form that you just cannot use current words to describe. Imagine how folks dealt with early cars driving on roads among horse-drawn carriages. They did not simply start calling them ‘cars’ or ‘automobiles’- there was a discourse and a bunch of words used in confusion; the ‘horseless carraige’ leaps to mind. Eventually, everyone agrees upon the right word for the new thing- and usually that word is in itself a ‘new’ word. Einstein coined the phrase ‘theory of relativity’ because the physics terms associated with Newton’s Laws were not only outdated, but misapplying them to something entirely different and new would be a travesty.

Design does use what you call’funny words’- but would those words seem funny if you took a look at why design theory avoids tactical words like ‘problem’, ‘end-state’, ‘objective’, ‘military termination criteria’, or ‘line of effort’? I believe there is a valid reason why tactical and detailed planning words do not work in design practice- for the same reason we had to name the automobile a new word instead of ‘magic non-horse moving device.’

The second implied tension here rests in HOW these design words get used, and where. I have the opinion that design vocabulary should function within a design team, but avoid getting tied into any design deliverables that go on to detailed planning efforts UNLESS that new word is significant for unit cohesion and execution. ‘Clear, Hold, Build’ reflects the introduction into the tactical lexicon of a new concept (each of those words already existed, but the series conveys a new concept for the military)- I would argue that ‘winning hearts and minds’ was another concept that had to be implemented at some point into the military where a conceptual void existed prior.

Design brings novel ideas, creative approaches, and innovation that may require new words, new processes, and new structures- if we struggle to wrap pre-existing terms around everything we discover, we will end up calling every new vehicle a horse-drawn carriage.

“we will end up calling every new vehicle a horse-drawn carriage.” by Ben Zweibelson

Ben, I mean no disrespect in my response but the conversation you brought up is exactly my point! Same 4th grade topic. while I was learning the General Systems Theory of Biological Systems(still remember the class called: why are Flamingos pink?) I was also learning about Space Systems Engineering, sometimes by the real Astronauts!(I grew up in Orlando,Fl. in the 50’s and 60’s) The term Vehicle is a key term in Systems Thinking. For instance NASA had transporter vehicles,launch vehicles,command and control vehicles, recovery vehicles,etc. Vehicle was a generic system term used for(as you pointed out) as yet uninvented Forms(vehicles) and Functions(system processes and outputs)which we new would happen as we began to explore space. The original language used in Systems Thinking would seem to work just fine and as far as that goes what is being called Design used to be called “Brain Storming” very popular in the 60’s. Could it be we haven’t really learned anything new since we stopped our continual and onetime massive Space exploration program?

Slapout- We might be in agreement in some respects; military design theory incorperates much of General System Theory (which is where I draw many of my citations from); I honestly would not care if we renamed ‘military design’ into ‘General System Theory’- but I would go back to the real first application of GST to military thought- Systemic Operational Design (SOD) developed in part by Shimon Naveh in the 1990s for the Israeli Defense Force. Many rival military organizations (including my own) distance themselves from SOD, but end up describing exactly what SOD stood for; they just change the name to ‘design’. Each word of SOD meant precisely what it did- it took GST and applied it to a military process instead of a strictly scientific one.

The point I try to make in this series of articles as well as my blog response to your comment is that design uses innovation and creativity- it creates new concepts as well as new words. I protest the intellectually dishonest and emotionally arrogant application of ‘five dollar words’ by folks that really just want to impress you but could use another easier word. I sometimes am guilty of that by saying ‘facilitate’ when I really should say ‘make.’ But aren’t we all a bit guilty of that in the military?

However, I dig my intellectual heels in when someone wants to employ tactical terms in a dual-use role for conceptual processes and vocab; the word ‘problem’ is a tactical term and has no real function in design other than to confuse an organization as they attempt to do design and MDMP and talk past eachother.

Mac-

If I implied that ‘clear hold build’ or ‘winning hearts and minds’ is something recent (especially something from the OEF/OIF generation, please let me re-address.

These concepts EXPLAIN to a military organization a concept that is either new to them, or was something they understood generations ago but was lost due to institutionalism and other internal trappings. For instance, the US Army excelled at both of these concepts from 1899-1901 (Linn’s book on the Philippines War outlines the COIN successes)- yet we lost that by the time we entered Vietnam (except for the Marines, as Nagl points out in ‘Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife’). To make the point another way, creativity is rarely about creating something really novel- it is often about connecting the dots between the work of previous pioneers that came up with new things, but didn’t combine them into the ‘big idea.’ Taleb makes this point in his book ‘The Black Swan’ when he uses Darwin, Einstein, and I think Edison as examples. Joshua and his army of ancient times understood those concepts, as I would argue Caesar during his Gaelic Campaigns, and Marcus Arileus of his ‘Meditations’ demonstrate as well; Macheavelli explores the flip-side of the same concepts in ‘The Prince.’ Yet our military often needs the dots connected and old lessons fused with new technology, new perspectives, and incorperated into modern American values (our JIB/JAB principles ala Weigley’s American Way of War)- design proposes a method of doing just that, if we all can figure out the best way to apply it without upsetting the apple cart of detailed planning.

Continued:As an example today we have Security Force Assistance created as a new post-9-11 term but we have all these other terms out there that exist or have also been “coined” since 9-11:

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
• Irregular Warfare (IW)
• Unconventional Warfare (UW)
• Counterinsurgency (COIN)
• Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA)
• Armed or Combat FID
• Stability, Security, Transition, Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)
• Stability Operations (STABOPS)
• Phase 0 Operations
• Post Conflict Operations
• Phase 4 Operations
• Nation Building
• Capacity building
• Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)
• Humanitarian and Civic Action (HCA)
• Civil Affairs (CA)
• Civil Military Operations (CMO)
• Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
• Military Information Support Operations (MISO)
• Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
• Transition Teams (TT)
• Human Terrain Teams
• Human Terrain System (HTS)
• Military Liaison Elements (MLE)
• Preparation of the Environment (PE)
• Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE)
• Theater Military Assistance Advisory Groups – Future (TMAAG-F)
• Marine Special Operations Advisory Groups (MSOAG)
• Military Groups (MILGRP)
• Joint US Military Assistance Groups (JUSMAG)
• Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC)
• Office of the Defense Representative (ODR)Security Assistance Office (SAO)
• Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
• Individual Military Education and Training (IMET)
• Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET)
• Military Training Team (MTT)
• Effects Based Operations (EBO)
• Systemic Operational Design
• Design

I provide all these terms with some tongue in cheek humor but I would like to make the point that since 9-11 there have been only two terms that have been specifically eliminated from the lexicon – EBO by GEN Mattis outlawed and PSYOP by ADM Olson.

The above list has so many redundant, overlapping, similar sounding, and sometimes just plain confusing terms. When we cannot even decide what to call conflicts and missions and operations within the military how are we supposed to communicate with coalition partners and our own government partners?

If a new word or concept is developed we need to decide to adopt (as long as it makes a significant contribution to improving strategy and campaign plans and communicating and describing operations. At the same time we adopt it we need to eliminate the redundant terms that it is replacing. We need some discipline so that we use the right terms to describe the right concepts and operations rather than use the one that is fashionable or that we like best.

All that said, I like the concept of design because it can help to bring some needed intellectual rigor to understanding problems that will lead to better strategy and campaign plans. But design itself will not do that. It takes people willing to embrace it, adopt it, use it, and make it work. It is all about the people and not the process. I would submit that enlightened, creative yet disciplined leaders could achieve the same effects without design but design can have a positive effect by putting everyone on the same intellectual sheet of paper and provide a common methodology and thought process. But I cannot emphasize enough that it is people who are the creative ones who will develop innovative new concepts and novel ideas with or without design.

Reference developing new terms. I am reminded of Martin Sheen in “Apocalypse Now” sitting in the BOQ hungover or still drunk saying words to the effect: “Sh*t, still in Saigon. Every day I sit here I grow weaker, while Charlie is in the bush eating balls of rice and getting harder.” Since post 9-11 it is like this “Sh*t. Another fancy new term or concept. Every day we sit here thinking up and arguing about giving new names to old concepts, AQ, insurgents, enemies of the US are out there thinking up creative ways to wreak havoc and accomplish their goals.”

Dave,

The phrase ‘Too many Chiefs and not enough Indians’ regularly comes to
mind when I watch and participate in our GWOT efforts. To continue with the analogy each ‘Tribe’ insists that only their Tribe knows the answer. Further complicating things is a mindset that equates rank within the Tribe with competence in all things in or outside the Tribe.

From an engineering standpoint, we are able to successfully design things by subjecting our team efforts to peer review (using standardized open source principles past and present). Efforts include calculations, cost estimates, schedules, and drawings. Systems theory (Civil Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, etc) is key. Drawings have layers for each of these systems and each layer is backed up by calcs, cost estimates, and schedules.

In GWOT we do not use peer reviewed designs which have DoD, DoS, OGA (etc) layers. Tribes and their myriad Chiefs insist that only their layer is truly necessary and calcs, cost estimates, and schedules are not necessarily prepared or shared.

Successful design teams are small, multidisciplined (Civil, Mech, Elec, etc) flat
organizations, held to cost and time constraints.

Mac,

Appreciate the history, German, usw

Steve

Chris,

Makes me look like I am responding to myself. You know what they say about people who hear voices – the real problem is when you start talking back to them!!

I would like to address this point:

“What the community is struggling with is how to build a language structure so that the novel situations we face can be “structured.”

First: Novel Situations. I am reminded of a colleague who likes to compare Irregular Warfare (the “novel” situation we find ourselves supposedly faced with since 9-11) with Christopher Columbus discovering the new world which left the Native Americans on the beach scratching their heads in wonder – wondering what is so “new” about this new world. Humorous, possibly, but it should illustrate that what we face today is really not so new – we have thought up new names or reworked old ones, but we have spent a lot of time reinventing the wheel and spending a lot of “coin” doing that!!

Second: New terms. I have a few simple criteria to determine if we need a new term and it is addressed in this question: How does this new term or concept help us to better develop and communicate strategy and campaign plans and how does it help commanders and staff, the interagency and coalition, inform the public, influence targets audiences, and most importantly how does it help the Soldier, Sailor, Airmen, and Marine and Coast Guardsman and other US government agency partner accomplish his or her mission more effectively?

We have to be careful about developing new terms and concepts that brief well at SAMS and that only SAMS planners can use to communicate with each other. (Please do not take this as SAMS bashing because truth in lending, I am a SAMS graduate). The strength of SAMS education (in addition to the work ethic commanders and senior officers demand of SAMS graduates) is that graduates should be able to deal with complex problems (or the new favorite that is in vogue – “wicked problems”) and understand them and then develop campaign plans that can be communicated in a clear and precise manner that can be tactically executed in order to achieve objectives that support the strategy. It is a testament to the good SAMS education when “you can be more than you appear” and people do listen to you because you bring the ability to understand problems and develop and communicate solutions without resorting to language that only fellow SAMS graduates know and understand.

If the terminology developed helps our Military and Government do its job better then lets adopt it. However, I feel like there has been a lot of terminology development based on people’s pet agendas their biases, and probably most the critical problem: the need to show change, adaptation and innovation. Unless there is a new term or concept we can’t say that we “get it” and demonstrate that we have adapted.

I am reminded of this quote about reorganizing which I think adapts to the idea that we just keep thinking up new terms to explain old problems:

“We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning
to form up into teams, we would be reorganized. I was to learn later
in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing;
and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress
while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.” (Falsely attributed to Gaius Petronius Arbiter. Quote is from Charlton Ogburn, Jr. (1911-1998), in Harper’s Magazine, “Merrill’s Marauders: The truth about an incredible adventure” (Jan 1957))

p.s. tried to make this argument almost 3 years ago: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/65-paparone.pdf

Chris,

I think we will have to agree to disagree. As I said I believe that design is useful and I have embraced it but it is not the end all or a silver bullet (and I would not characterize myself in any way as a design enthusiast). I don’t know whether I am a progressive or or post-positivist or post-modernist or any of the other “epistemologic paradigms” that are out there. I think I am a simple student of strategy and operational art who is strives to improve my knowledge and capabilities to develop strategy and campaign plans.

I ask myself about all the 75 dollar words we throw around and if they are helpful to our discipline and to Joe on the ground (or on the bridge or in the cockpit). If what we are talking about is only understood by a few who have been so anointed as the design enthusiasts then how are we truly ensuring we are developing strategy and campaign plans that can be executed by the myriad units and people at all levels?

I do not believe in embracing and defending new theories just because I thought of them or someone I respect and admire thought of them. If they are useful then we need to apply them but again, since 9-11 we have had people develop new theories (or repackage old ones) and we have spent more time defending this COIN or that CT “strategy” (in quotes because neither COIN nor CT should be called strategies in my opinion) that we have lost the forest for the trees. We are more worried about defending the theory than about developing, articulating, and executing clearly understood strategy and campaign plans.

What I do not believe in is chasing the shiny new thing; putting new terms on old concepts (which as I tried to argue we have done in great numbers since we have entered the post 9-11 period of conflict – how is that for a new construct?) We have design because it has been directed as the standard for the joint community per GEN Mattis’ directive and it is now in Army doctrine.

I do believe that history and its study is important. I do not buy all the humanities versus hard science of war stuff and reducing war and conflict in any form to purely scientific principles. If I were king for a day all PME institutions would focus on military history, military theory, military geography, operational art, and strategy as the foundation for study.

I most importantly believe in the quest for _coup d’oeil_ ; something we should all strive to develop within ourselves. I do not think design is a substitute for that but if properly used as a supporting tool can support problem understanding, problem solving, and decision making but in the end all of that takes place in the human mind by a person who must be able to synthesize all the available information (which can be right or wrong or in some combination) and make the right plan (and decision) among all the fog and friction in war, conflict, and complex human interactions.

Dave,

I would not claim “design philosophy” as a “silver bullet.” On the contrary, it may at best expose that there are no silver bullets (albeit, our community treats knowledge as if someday there will be one). The goal of design is emancipatory thinking (much like the goal of SWJ about “small wars”).

Design philosophy is more about freedom to explore new meanings (as we are with this exchange). As we dialogue in this blog, we are exercising a form of communicative rationality (or critical inquiry).

Also, I have not advocated military terms and concepts as you seem to apply. Rather, I am seeking to expose weaknesses in the logic of our knowledge (i.e. epistemological fallacies).

So some of the “$75 words” are linked to ancient Greek (ontology, epistemology, and so forth).

On your assertion: “…quest for coup d’oeil; something we should all strive to develop within ourselves.” I would argue the community is too oriented on the individual and rather romantic (Clausewitzian) view of the appointed “leader” (commander-centricity). The Army and JFCOM’s (and I believe DARPA) focus is on making better decision makers out of future commanders through advances in cognitive psychology and brain studies (they are wedded to the individual as a decision maker and the commander as the decision maker). Classical empiricism (and its little brother behaviorism) is the paradigm that arguably serves as a psychic and cultural “prison.”

We have paid scant attention to sociology and the institutional aspects of framing — relating to how the institution constructs its “professional,” “esoteric” body of knowledge. The idea behind design is not to provide a new utilitarian tool box for defining and solving problems — it is more oriented on exposing and criticizing the ontological and epistemological issues with institutional framing.

Your self effacing statement “I am a simple student of strategy and operational art who is strives to improve my knowledge and capabilities to develop strategy and campaign plans,” for example, may be deconstructed. The words “strategy” and “operational art” are part of the institutionally-constructed narrative (they are not self-evident phenomena). The very idea of a need for a “campaign plan” may be blinding us to other ways of conceiving of efficacious action (such as the Confucian model of efficacy which is ontologically very different).

Thanks for listening!