Second Land Armies and Excess Combatant Commands
Second Land Armies and Excess Combatant Commands
by Robert Jordan Prescott
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On August 12, 2010 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced he had ordered a thorough force structure review of the Marine Corps to determine what an expeditionary force in readiness should look like in the 21st century, echoing the intermittent characterization of the Marine Corps as a “second land army.” Three days prior, Gates announced U.S. Joint Forces Command, established to foster joint doctrine and conduct joint training and experimentation, would close, asserting the “U.S. military has largely embraced jointness as a matter of culture and practice” and the need for an entirely separate four star command no longer existed. Together, the two steps constitute major components of the secretary’s now well-publicized initiative to enhance efficiency across the Department of Defense. The secretary’s efforts are laudable, but exploring opportunities within legacy service and combatant command structures will achieve the minimum. Instead of prompting the world’s premier strike force to justify itself or closing a command tasked with cultivating a joint force, the secretary should be exploring how the American military can emulate the Marine Corps and become a truly global joint force.
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Read more by Robert Jordan Prescott at House of Marathon. He is private consultant to defense industry, formerly in the securities industry who switched to national security after September 11, 2001. He is grateful to have the opportunity to meet and work with individuals who fight and sacrifice on behalf of our country. House of Marathon is a blog featuring essays on American Politics, International Security, and Popular Culture.
