Does the CIA have Plan B for Afghanistan?

The United States strategy for succeeding in Afghanistan relies heavily on its ability to turn security responsibilities over to competent Afghan national security forces. An article in today’s Wall Street Journal (“Drug Use, Poor Discipline Afflict Afghanistan’s Army“- subscription required) repeats the well-known difficulties U.S. and ISAF trainers endure as they attempt to build an Afghan army and police force. According to the article, Afghan special forces units are doing very well. Older veteran Afghan soldiers in the regular army also show promise. But the new recruits continue to be trouble. Many are unable to take to discipline, are mired in drug abuse, and are abusive to the population when they get to the field. And that is the good news. The police continue to be a corrupt mess and the one of the Taliban’s best recruiting tools.

If it is not possible to establish effective national security forces in Afghanistan within a relevant period of time, does the U.S. have a Plan B for Afghanistan? Also in today’s Wall Street Journal (and also subscription only) is an op-ed by Jack Devine, a former deputy director of operations at the CIA and chief of the CIA Afghan task force in 1986-1987.

In his first paragraph, Devine dismisses any chance of victory under the current program. He unfavorably compares the current U.S. strategy to the Soviet campaign in the 1980s which he helped defeat. Devine recommends planning now for the worst case scenario. His solution is a large CIA covert action in support of the remnants of the Karzai regime, tribal leaders, and other warlords whose interests in the region overlap with the U.S. government’s.

Devine’s recommendation gives up on the idea of supporting Afghanistan as a functioning nation-state. He also discusses the requirements of an effective CIA covert action: a clear Presidential Finding (required by law), bipartisan congressional support, U.S. public support, competent indigenous partners, and sound policy objectives.

Could President Obama, the Congress, and the American public support a large CIA program that directed cash, weapons, and air support to anti-Taliban tribes and warlords? The result would be U.S. complicity in Afghanistan’s continuing chaos, a policy that would seem to be a political non-starter. A non-starter unless all other U.S. plans had failed, the Taliban and al Qaeda were again on the march, and the U.S. found its back against the wall.