Shaping the Information Environment in Afghanistan
Shaping the Information Environment in Afghanistan
Understanding and Addressing Counter-Insurgency Information Challenges through Bottom-up, Collaborative planning in the Future Operations Cross Functional Team, ISAF Joint Command
by CDR Ingrid Rader and Edward Ledford
Shaping the Information Environment in Afghanistan Afghanistan from the perspective of an International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) communicator or information professional: a multitude of languages, tribes and sub-tribes; a literacy rate of only about 35%, and a generally xenophobic population with a preference for face-to-face engagements with associates they trust. These characteristics significantly challenge coalition forces’ effective information and communication activities. Of course, as is usually the case with indigenous people, the Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) — which include Taliban fighters, insurgents, criminals and, in some cases corrupt officials — enjoy obvious advantages. They live among the people. They know the terrain. They understand the social dynamics. They communicate their messages quickly and effectively in a way that can resonate with the audiences they know intimately. These are advantages that ISAF communicators simply do not possess. In Afghanistan, western airborne television broadcasting capabilities, leaflet dissemination, or glossy media products may do more harm than good if they are not thoroughly planned and carefully tailored. Indeed, they might inadvertently serve as ammunition for the adaptable, flexible and responsive enemy propaganda machine.
That environment, the limitations it represents, and other myriad other factors demanded that the IJC FUOPS CFT information and communications planners re-evaluate and redefine more effective ways to approach information operations (Info Ops), psychological operations (PSYOPS) and public affairs (PA).
This essay attempts to share those lessons. It describes how the ISAF Joint Command Future Operations (FUOPS) Cross-Functional Team (CFT) integrates synchronized communications into planning and guidance in the complex Afghan environment. Additionally, in documenting the challenges the FUOPS CFT information communication planners initially struggled with, the essay, as well, aims to provide insight for IJC-bound Info Ops and communications planners and other interested professionals. Here, we will describe our methodology in planning synchronized communications in the 72 hour — 60 day horizon and discuss the factors that contributed to the positive achievements of the team.
The entire FUOPS Synchronized Communications
Team contributed to this article.
Lieutenant Colonel Tomasz Grudzinski,
Polish Army, (Info Ops Planner)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Gowan,
U.S. Army (PA Planner)
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Manos,
U.S. Army (Info Ops Planner)
Major Niels Vistisen, Danish Army
(PSYOPS Planner)
Commander Ingrid Rader, U.S. Navy
(Info Ops Team Lead)
Edited by LTC Ed Ledford
I saw this and immediately pulled it down to read, having just transitioned off of Active Duty and into the USAR and changed from 21 series to 30 series..I have attached my comments which I sent to my detachment commander for discussion and am curious to hear what the group thinks..
1) I agreed with their concept of a joint planning process and the fact that proximity directly correlates to information sharing, both formally and informally. My Battalion combined the S-2, S-9 (my cell which contained IO, PAO, CA, USACE, and a Cultural Advisor), as well as a finance officer and targeting. We found the planning and targeting (lethal and non lethal) process was optimized by the collaboration and proximity.
2) I enjoyed ISAF publicly stating that the intent was to find delivery mechanisms for the GIRoA to reach the population, but was concerned about the role they claimed IO played in propagating ISAF’s “long term commitment” to the Afghan people. I think this is a strictly PAO message, at best, and is a slippery slope given the fact that counter IO/propaganda will immediately de-legitimize the coalition due to the enemy’s ability to read domestic media outlets..I have personally been presented with questions from seemingly illiterate locals on headlines in major media outlets on the Afghan withdrawl and lack of commitment etc, and in 2006/07 was repeatedly questioned as to why the news was reporting the IZ was more important than AFG to the US…
3) I am very concerned about the blurred lines between IO and PSYOPS. I see the role of IO as a communication mechanism and an honest link between GIRoA and the population whereas PSYOPS should be attempting to influence and change viewpoints of people and involves shades of gray that could compromise the integrity of the IO campaign. I think the collaboration aspect was a plus, but the joint annex makes me a bit suspect.
This is my initial hack, and if you all feel I am off base, please suggest a new azimuth..
Cheers!
Tyler,
good obersvations, good you comment. I’ll try and reply to your comment ref. PSYOPS vs. IO.
Now, PSYOPS is a part of IO – doctrinally. If you purely view IO as informational, it should also discard EW and decveption. So, IO is in my mind (and doctrine) the whole influencing spectrum. Now, PA is something different, also in NATO and US doctrines.
The beauty and real effect of what we did at IJC was that we all coordinated. We all had one common goal, but different ways to support it. It was worth a lot, that I could talk, plan, discuss, with a hard core PAO expert, while it in no means meant that the line between outgoing PAO got blurred with PSOPS messages. We were professional enough for that not to happen.
Good PSYOPS is also honest, communicating a good, honest and positive message. That works best.
does this answer a few of your concerns?
Tyler,
A few points to add to Niels’ response. First, we definitely appreciate your comments. We do need, however, to clarify your interpretation regarding the role “…IO played in propagating ISAF’s “long term commitment” to the Afghan people.” This was a synchronized comms effort, most definitely involving PA, and a number of other efforts — not an IO effort as you depict, especially not a “counter IO/propaganda” effort. Finally, what we did by issuing a single Annex where it made sense is not unlike ANNEX Y to an Operational Plan (U.S. Joint Operational Planning Process).
Thanks, imr
Great essay! I am brand new to Army PAO and found this article to be very informative. I know this will prepar me for my future deployments.