The Saudi Fatwa
Saudis Act Aggressively to Denounce Terrorism – David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.
When terrorists in the Middle East attack innocent civilians, observers in the West often ask a pained question: Where’s the outrage in the Muslim world? Why don’t Islamic religious authorities speak out more forcefully against the terrorists and their wealthy financiers?
It remains a potent issue: Terrorism has damaged the Islamic world far more than the West, and too many Muslims have been cowed and silent. But a powerful and so far largely unreported denunciation of terrorism emerged last month from Saudi Arabia’s top religious leadership, known as the Council of Senior Ulema.
The Saudi fatwa is a tough condemnation of terror and of the underground network that finances it. It has impressed senior U.S. military commanders and intelligence officers, who were surprised when it came out. One sent me a translation of the fatwa, and Saudi officials provided some helpful background…
More at The Washington Post.
Tragic. Ignorant. Dangerous.
These are but few of the words that ran through my mind as I read this piece. Is it possible that over 8 years into this we have come so far, and yet in many ways have actually regressed in our understanding of the problem????
This Fatwa can only make Saudi Arabia less stable; and our support of the Saudis in the execution of this Fatwa can only lead to enhanced determination on the part of those Saudis who dare to challenge the despostism of their government to bring even greater acts of foreign terror to the shores and interests of the U.S. Sadly, I am neither “impressed” nor “surprised” that the author was able to find “senior US military commanders and intelligence officers” who were both impressed and surprised by this fatwa.
I ask thinking readers to perform the following three simple tasks, then to please add their comments. This is an issue and perspective that cuts to the heart of what the “War on Terrorism” is all about:
1. Read this article in whole.
2. Read the “Jones Insurgency Model” published here last month.
3. Read the article again, but with the following words replaced as follows:
Fatawa > Decree
Saudi > British
Terrorist > Rebel
Terrorism > Rebellion
Muslim > Christian
Middle East > American Colonies
Council > Parliment
Now read it from the perspective of if you are a loyalist in 1776.
This relationship, our understanding of this relationship, our ability to effectively evolve this relationship is without a doubt in my mind, the Decisive Point for what we call the War on Terrorism. The turning point for peace and stability in our time is when we both understand, and effectively act on that undersanding.
De Oppresso Liber
(Oh, and pause and think for a moment as to just who is oppressed in Saudi Arabia and many other Middle Eastern countries by governments who draw their legitimacy and ability to act with impunity toward their own populaces and often their neighbors from Western powers. We are tarnishing this fine motto with our dated foreign policy)
COL Jones:
In nations and societies in which:
a. Certain segments of the population support their government’s view that they must slowly and carefully transform their societies,
b. Certain segments of the population believe that this transformation and modernization process should occur immediately or at least much more rapidly,
c. And certain segments of the population, who feel threatened by even the slightest attempt at modernization/transformation, believe that transformation should occur, but only in the opposite direction (for example: backwards — as per Al Qaeda and/or the Taliban).
Each of these segments of the population perceive of “Good Governance” as efforts made by the government in their own individual behalf — and perceive of “Poor Governance” as government decisions made that do not support their own particular view.
In delicate circumstances such as these, which segment of the population does the government declare to be “the oppressed” or go to support? (Understanding, as it should, that whichever individual segment of the population it decides to support, the other two segments of the populace can perceive of this as “Poor Governance” and, therefore, may rebel.)
Or should a government make its decisions (for example the issuance of the fatwa) based on — not which segment(s) of the population might feel oppressed (two out of three regardless in my, arguably, representative case above) — but rather on what is perceived to be in the best interests of the nation and the society as a whole?
Bill
There are also certain governments that have no “governmental” interests, but merely the personal interests of a small ruling segment of that society.
The violent aspect of that populace is the mere tip of the iceberg of the larger dissention that cuts across their society.
If the Saudi’s choose to brutally suppress internal opposition to their reign, that’s on them. It will ultimately end poorly for them if they refuse to evolve.
If the US chooses to continue to support such regimes in such oppressive endeavors, then that’s on us; and similarly will not end well for us. It led to the attacks of 9/11 and is bleeding our national treasure and influence in a misguided war to attack the symptoms of the problem rather than address the cure. Those efforts are not working. It may be time to try a new approach.
The key to COIN is not to simply grant the desires of every opposition group that comes along, but rather to understand that those groups exist for a reason and to use their very presence as a metric that tells the government they need to adjust. If you want to label these groups “terrorists” and eradicate them, fine. That’s a technique. But if you want also to have stability you must also make adjustments to how you govern, for the sake of the whole, not just yourself or the opposition either one.
COL Jones:
For what reason do you believe that the insurgents in Saudi Arabia — and elsewhere in the Middle East/Muslim World — desire to overthrow the current regimes?
a. Is it because these regimes, with the assistance of the United States and others, ARE moving to transform and modernize their nations and societies? (The proclamations of Al Qaeda and others would seem to point in this direction.)
b. Or is it because (as you seem to imply) that these nations ARE NOT moving quickly enough to transform and modernize their societies and regimes (and are receiving US and other foreign assistance in this effort)?
In this regard, which entity (those that oppose transformation/modernization — or — those that wish this process to occur much more rapidly); which of these entities do you believe is being oppressed by their governments and the United States?
If the symptoms (the insurgencies, rebellions, etc) are rooted in, based on and caused by Item “a” above — rather than Item “b” — does this change how you believe that we, and the governments that we support, should proceed?
COL Jones writes:
“…
Fatawa > Decree
Saudi > British
Terrorist > Rebel
Terrorism > Rebellion
Muslim > Christian
Middle East > American Colonies
Council > Parliment
Now read it from the perspective of if you are a loyalist in 1776…”
I have to disagree with this analogy. Sacrilege! I say with regards to 1776. In the case of terrorism. There is a small band trying to replace an oppressive regime with an even more oppressive regime (this is the Camus model). Not only that, these terrorists would like the new oppressive regime to be based on a religion. That is quite the opposite of what 1776 was about.
Fatwa or not, KSA started taking severe anti-terrorist measures several years ago. The fatwa is late, but DOES give some internal legitimacy (at least in their eyes) to the “quiet” methods KSA has been employing to rid themselves of home-grown terrorists. I feel safer when on travel to KSA now than what I ever have been.
Meanwhile, we continue to let “our” terrorists lawyer-up. Explain to me please why KSM is still alive (?).
That was me posting at 1028 hrs. Not sure why the post went “Anonymous” even though I filled in the header.
Bill
I’m no Saudi “expert”, my focus is on the nature of insurgency and how to best address it in general. Each society is unique with unique pespectives, structures, issues, etc.
Like most insurgent movements there are some who want to overthrow the Saudis all together. The Saud family has been waging aggressive COIN since they consolidated their authority over this region, and would not argue that point. The majority of Saudis I suspect merely want reforms, and no, the Saudis are not moving quickly enough. I believe that Saudi Arabia will end up some day with a form of governance that looks much like what exists in Britain.
My advice to the King would be to skip the part where there is a violent insurgency and he ends up beheaded by a Saudi Oliver Cromwell, and profit instead from the experience of others, and leap several stages of evolution. To also sit down with a truly represntative cross-section of the country (to include those of the Shia faith) and map out just such a transformatin. In the end it will be significantly cheaper, less violent, and more effective than simply continuing to swat at the symptoms.
Some would call this apeasement. As I have stated before, a government cannot apease its own populace. Apeasement is when a government makes concessions against the interests of their populace in favor of the interests of the government of another. Meeting the true needs of the populace is a core task for government.
As to Miguel, I appreciate your post, and know that most Americans feel this way. We are so full of our own narrative and our own “rightness” that any who attack us must therefore be “wrong.” I would argue that their actions were wrong, but that when looked at objectively their cause is just and the actions understandable. We have far more incommon with the Saudi fighters that waged the attackes of 9/11 and streamed through Syria into Iraq, etc, than we do with the Saudi Royals. We have allowed our foreign policy to slip to where we have become the protector and the enabler of despots, and that is a role that has greater consequences in today’s globalized world than it had in centuries past. We must evolve in our apporaches, and get more in touch with our roots as a nation to shape a more effective foreign policy.
Currently we send the military around the globe to manage the products of friction of this obsolete family of foreign policy. Better we adjust the policy and reduce the friction so that we can get our military back to deterring major threats and preparing for waging war.
As to “sacrilege”, perhaps. But sometims you have to drop an F-Bomb in church to wake up the sacrimonious. Religion is merely a tool of ideology to rally the masses, it is used because it works. It is not an end to itself. Look at the debates todate between the Palins and Becks who argue “we are a christian nation” and the liberals who want to strip all religion from our government. We used a Christian line of ideology in our insurgency; but I believe the founding fathers would have held that while yes, they were men of christian faith, that they stood for the principle that no government should dictate what faith any man should have. In other words, our movement wasn’t about christianity, and the movements in the Middle East today are not about Islam. They are about politics and ending governmental oppression as perceived by the populace.
COL Jones stated: “…but that when looked at objectively their cause is just and the actions understandable. We have far more incommon with the Saudi fighters that waged the attackes of 9/11 and streamed through Syria into Iraq, etc, than we do with the Saudi Royals…”
I believe we have nothing in common with either.
1. The terrorists are not “freedom fighters.” They are not seeking to free their people in any nation that is involved in GWOT. They are simply wishing to become the new regime(s), and an even more repressive one at that, all under the facade of religion. As for the populace, most do not have a frame of reference to even take a side. A fish does not know it is all wet if it has never been out of water. What the populace does see however is a foreign invader. This is a frame of reference that even the most unsophisticated of populations can rally against. Hence one of my reasons why OIF and OEF should have been styled as severe punitive expeditions, followed by a quick exit of our forces, or the carving out of a redoubt where we could stand guard in case of further misbehavior (which I said from the very beginning as these war unfolded).
2. As for the Saudi royals, agreed, we have nothing in common with them either. Let’s keep history in mind here that prior to the discovery of oil by Americans like Steineke and DeGoyler, distinguishing between a royal Saud and your run-of-the-mill Bedouin was nothing, because there was no distinction. It is Western progressivism that allowed them to become enriched under some doctrine of “fairness” and the fear of being labeled colonialist/imperialist, and this is the same Western progressivism that wants to treat GWOT as a civic action, i.e., “hearts & minds” rather than an outright military action to eliminate an enemy. The nice guy approach always gets us in trouble results in failure. In any case, the dynamics in KSA are vastly different from Iraq or Afghanistan IMO.
Have to agree with Miguel here. Al Qaeda isn’t fighting for anyone’s freedom, least of all Saudi Arabia’s, and their effort to raise an insurgency in the KSA fell pretty flat. Saudis were happy to fund AQ when they were far away shooting at infidels, when they brought the jihad home it was a different story. They certainly don’t speak for the Saudi populace, and neither do we.
The notion that “reform” in a Saudi context needs to be political is a peculiarly American construct, and I’m not sure how much relevance it has to the Kingdom. I suspect that most Saudis are quite content to see the royal family stay in power as long as they bring home the… well, not bacon, but whatever. During the 90s oil glut the combination of economic stress and the continued US military presence generated substantial dissent. Since that time enormous quantities of money have flowed in, and the royals were smart enough to pour a great deal of it into the domestic economy. The impact on domestic dissent was immediate and very noticeable. Payoffs do work, and I suspect that they have a rather better handle on what the populace expects of them than we do.
In any event, we can think what we will of the Saudi royals, but there’s absolutely nothing we can do to change the situation. They aren’t threatened by any domestic insurgency; they don’t need our help to maintain control. They don’t need financial aid, far from it. We could stop selling them weapons, but there are lots of places to buy those. We could threaten not to help them in the unlikely event of an Iranian attack, but it’s a hollow threat and they know it: no matter what we think of the Saudi royals, we are not going to let Iran take over the oil. We just don’t have leverage. All we can reasonably do is deal with the government in power on a peer-to-peer basis, without getting too close and without generating pointless conflict. Absolutely nobody in the Kingdom wants us messing in domestic policy anyway, even those who want change. Any pressure we apply will be seen as self-interested meddling, and only strengthens our enemies.
Our problems in Iraq and Afghanistan are more than enough for now, last thing we need is to put more on our plate by trying to change anyone else.
Never one to argue for putting more on the plate, merely for putting the right thing on the plate.
Bin Laden is no insurgent. Yes he wants to take the Saudi Royals down a notch; yes he wants to purge the Middle East of over Western controls; but he is conducting his own UW campaign and has no populace. He does, however, have broad support across many demographics in many countries experiencing conditions of Poor Governance. And yes, this is particularly true in Saudi Arabia.
Iraq had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. Current COIN efforts in Afghanistan (not the original mission there) have very little to do with securing us from what led to the 9/11 attacks. We need to be waging less war as a whole in the Middle East and reshaping our critical political/policy relations there instead.
Iran is the most pro-American populace in the ME; we need to stop poking that nest. It’s not the enemey.
Arguably it is our relationships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen that are most probematic and overdue for reform. Change ourself, not others. Once we change ourself, those populaces will quit feeling like they have to change us themselves. Disempower Bin Laden by becoming the country we already see ourselves as, and not being the country that others see us as.
D. has a blind eye to the Saudi-US relation. Many do. Many more have a blind eye to the US-Israel relation. Both are damaging to us, and ironically, to those contries as well. We will help them more by helping them less; and in the process help ourself as well.
Perhaps you might enlighten the blind… what specific changes do you propose for the US-Saudi relationship?
Or perhaps a better question…
How specifically do you believe that we are helping the Saudis, and what help do you think we should reduce in order to “help them more by helping them less”?
Consider current international affairs through the lense of a conflict between:
A. Those nations (and population groups within nations) who — focusing on the BENEFITS associated with globalization/modernization — DO wish to see the world (and/or their society) transformed along these lines — and —
B. Those nations (and population groups within nations) who — reflecting on the LIABILITIES associated with globalization/modernization — DO NOT wish to see the world (and/or their society) transformed in this manner.
The conviction-level of both groups appears to be similar.
Both groups appear to be willing to “wage war” to achieve their ends.
In this endeavor, the vanguard of Group “A” has announced that the principal weapons it will use will be “Development,” “Diplomacy” and “Defense” (supposedly in that order).
The vanguard of Group “B” has indicated that its principal weapon will be “terrorism.”
When viewed from this perspective, how do we see the Saudi’s issuance of this Fatwa?
a. Does it ultimately serve the best interests of the pro-modernizers — or —
b. Does it best serve the interests of those who are opposed to modernization?
D.
To start with the US could simply begin with this 3-step process:
a. Recognize the US policy of the right and duty of populaces everywhere to rise up in insurgency when faced with what they perceive to be despotism. (As codified in our Declaration of Independence)
b. Recognize that such insurgency is not a failure of populaces, but rather a failure of their respective governances. (i.e., we won’t help you beat up on your own populace for daring to complain illegally when you have denied them any effective legal means to do so).
c. Withold any and all aid (training, funding, equipment, etc) to foreign powers that is likely to be employed domestically to counter such insurgent organizations under the guise of “counterterrorism.”
Then announce that all future US COIN aid will be designed to facilitate governmental reforms aimed at providing “Good” (not effective, we are not a charity) Governance; and that such aid will only be provided upon request, but that it is available to friend or foe alike. Also that we will accept petitions for such aid from populace groups orgainized within certain parameters and recognized by the UN; as well as from standing governments.
Col Jones,
Are you suggesting that we should have supported Osama Bin Laden in the 1990’s in his desire to revolt against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
My point is who are we to determine who is just- the populace or government. In most cases, we do not have enough information to make a deliberate decision.
Using the same logic, should the Russians have assisted the civil rights movement in the US back in the 1960’s? We were certainly not practicing good governance during that time.
This could be a slippery slope.
Robert C. Jones:
Who determines whether the government provided (to be provided ?) is “Good?”
While many Americans will have no problem with providing assistance to nominal foes for the betterment of mankind — if that is your goal — I suspect many more will object…
Mike,
I doubt that Mr Bin Laden’s organization could have met the requirements of the UN process I propose. Also, his organization is not Saudi, so would have no standing in that country. Two strikes is one too many.
However, if an organization within Saudi Arabia could meet (these yet to be defined) standards, then yes.
I do not promote or encourage terrorism or violent insurgency; nor to I promote the employment of US resources to suppress the insurgencies of others in a manner that increases the liklihood of terrorist acts being brought against the United States, our citizens, or our interests.
CT-based programs attack symptoms in a manner that makes the problems worse, and increases the threat to the US, IMO.
Ken,
If this were easy we wouldn’t be in this mess. Dayuhan asked for how we could improve our situation with the Saudis by changing ourselves rathar than them, and I gave him a proposal. To continue business as usual is the only model that we know for a fact to be tested and failed.
Any approach will have critcs. Certainly the approaches born of the Cold War are gaining less and less favor every day, yet the good Cold Warriors cling to them dogmatically.
As to “who decides”, as I have said repeatedly, the populaces of said countries decide. If a large, orgainized popular movement meets these (yet to be defined) criteria to petition the UN for support, then the only perspective that matters has spoken. Such a program targets the “hope” criteria of my model, and by providing a legal vehicle for such populaces may prevent many of them from developing into violent insurgecies, which is there only option today.
COL Jones:
How should (1) the local government and (2) the United States proceed when confronted with instances in which the population is clearly divided along traditional versus modern lines; for example, when one group is pro-slavery (the traditional way of life) and another group is anti-slavery (a modern concept)?
(Attempts at reconciliation having failed and both sides of the population now willing to go to war to preserve/achieve their ends.)
In instances such as these; wherein, the continuation of long-held beliefs, customs and ways of life (for example: slavery) are now, in the eyes of the government — and in the eyes of a significant portion of the overall population — deemed not to be in the best interests of the nation and society as a whole, how does the local government (and the United States) proceed?
Realizing that, should the local government and the United States move toward supporting the anti-slavery/pro-modern group, then the pro-slavery/traditional group could honestly cry despotism, could honorably rebel and could send “terrorism” in both directions (toward the local government and toward its supporter, the United States).
Addendum to my comment immediately above:
Likewise, should the local government and the United States go in the opposite direction, and move toward supporting the pro-slavery/traditional society group, then the anti-slavery/pro-modern group could also honestly cry despotism, could honorably rebel and could send “terrorism” toward both our camps (that of the local government and that of the United States).
Robert C. Jones:
You have more faith in the UN taking any action potentially inimical to a de facto government than I. You also said:
The possible objectors to whom I referred were citizens and voters plus those they elect, not policy or military types. I doubt Cold Warriors will be your problem; most Americans today have little real recollection of the era (witness all the myths about it…) and even a number of us elderly types never really bought into much of that.
The “yet to be defined” issue is an area of significant concern. Recall the old saw, the devil is in the details.
As always, I applaud your idealism and was per usual merely suggesting factors for which I believed you failed to account. Er, possibly still fail to account…
Col Jones,
I asked for specifics and got generalities; I’m not at all sure the generalities apply to Saudi Arabia.
Possibly is is the “right and duty of populaces everywhere to rise up in insurgency when faced with what they perceive to be despotism”, but the Saudi populace isn’t rising up in insurgency, which renders points a and b sort of meaningless.
I don’t see where point c gets us, because as far as I know we don’t provide aid to Saudi Arabia. Whatever they get from us is paid for: that’s not aid, it’s business. If we ceased to provide it they’d buy it elsewhere. If they did AQ would not hate us any less. If being in bed with dictators was the driving force behind the fury of terrorists, France would have been leveled by terrorist bombs years ago.
We’ve been over this enough times, perhaps we ought to settle it. What specific changes in Saudi domestic policy do you want to produce, and what specific adjustments in US policy toward Saudi Arabia do you think would produce those changes?
When you say this:
[i]we will accept petitions for such aid from populace groups orgainized within certain parameters and recognized by the UN; as well as from standing governments.[/i]
Do you really think the UN would sanction that kind of interference in domestic affairs? I doubt it.
I’m no expert on international law (would be go to hear from someone who is) but isn’t encouraging or assisting rebellion in a foreign sovereign state something approaching an act of war? Not that it isn’t done, but doing it openly and proclaiming it as policy might generate an unintended consequence or two.
I’m also not convinced that lecturing or trying to change foreign governments will win us any points with oppressed populaces. In my observation even citizens who loathe their own government tend to resent lectures or attempts at influence from abroad, especially from the US. It’s not seen as standing up for the populace, it’s seen as disrespect for leader, nation, people, even religion. One of the fastest ways to rally popular support behind a bad government is for the US to criticize it. Nationalism works in mysterious ways.
Gotta call BS on this:
“but the Saudi populace isn’t rising up in insurgency, which renders points a and b sort of meaningless.”
You really need to do a little research with an open mind. The populace of the Saudi Pen. has been in a constant state of insurgency ever since the label “Saudi” was slapped on them. The Saudis keep the grass mown pretty short, but its never stopped growing…
No, not KW, that was me. 🙂
“Constant state of insurgency…” by what definition of insurgency?
If the Saudis have successfully suppressed insurgency “since the label “Saudi” was slapped on them”, maybe we should be taking lessons from them. That would have been 1744 or so, a long time. Seems to me that if dissent were widespread and intense enough to be characterized as insurgency, suppression should only exacerbate it, as it has elsewhere. Is it not a central tenet of COIN theory that pure suppression doesn’t work?
If the Saud family has successfully suppressed insurgency for 250 years, either they have developed some utterly unique and superhuman power of suppression or the “insurgency” has lacked the popular support necessary to make it effective.
In any event, the question remains:
What specific changes in Saudi domestic policy do you want to produce, and what specific adjustments in US policy toward Saudi Arabia do you think would produce those changes?
COL Jones,
“Iran is the most pro-American populace in the ME; we need to stop poking that nest. It’s not the enemy.”
I just watched the documentary “For Neda.” She is considered a martyr of the Green Revolution having been killed during the post election protest in Iran.
I’d recommend watching the video. My question is- Is this the type of non-violent movements that you’d wish for the UN to support?
Whose interest does this Fatwa against terrorism (and terrorists financing) serve?
For example:
Does it serve the interests of the people of Saudi Arabia re: the King’s efforts and initiative to carefully modernize and reform the society?
In this regard, does the Fatwa also serve the interests of the United States re: its foreign policy objective — to transform and modernize (via “Development, Diplomancy and Defense”) certain regions of the world?
Stated another way, in what context should we see contemporary “terrorism?”
a. Does contemporary terrorism stem from individuals and groups who feel threatend by and who are opposed to progress and reform (modernity, globalization, democracy)?
Or (if I am reading COL Jones correctly):
b. Does contemporary terrorism originate in the ideas and actions of individuals and groups who desire to see this type of progress and reform proceed much more quickly?
If “b” above is correct, and we just do not realize this yet, then should we not agree with COL Jones’ position and argument?
COL Jones,
I have to agree with Dayuhan on this one. What specific experience do you have in Saudi Arabia that leads you to believe that the population is in constant insurrection or ripe for one?
Mike,
Iran is a great case. A government we don’t like (largely because it both threw us out and refuses to kowtow to what the US orders them to think and do); and a popualce that is very pro-American (ie, what we stand for, they don’t want to subjugate themselves to us). The popualce does not terrorize the United States but is Insurgent. They reject the legitimacy of the government, but they do not blame the US for the existiance of that same government. (This is a critical point, by the way, for most terrorism that the US worries about today comes from the populaces of our allies).
What I am suggesting is that there is an alternative to the current three options:
a. Do nothing.
b. Conduct FID/SFA/capacity building with the Iranian government to help them better suppress the popular movement emerging to challenge their growing failures of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope; or
c. Conduct UW to assist the people of Iran succeed in an insurgency against their government.
The 4th option I suggested above is that a trusted and certain vehicle be created in some international organization, such as a reformed and updated UN, where both Governments and/or populace-based groups that meet certain criteria can petition for support in addressing these causal perceptions short of violent conflict. Clearly an organization such as AQ or the Taliban would be “burned” by their violent histories, an ineligible; however this would lead to the defeat of these same groups as the populaces that support them turn to the new groups that would emerge to lead them to more peaceful and legal change.
MAG – I’m clearly on record as not expert on Saudi Arabia. Sure, I lived there for 7 months, I study, I read, I pay attention, but I am no expert. My primary focus area is insurgency, its causation and cures.
I list merely one cite that popped up on the first of hundreds of pages when one googles terrorism and Saudi Arabia. Believe what you wish. In the end what you believe, or what I believe either one has no impact on what the reality is.
As to being “trapped” you are welcome to your opinion, but perhaps your own box causes you to rationalize that it is I that must be in one. I have come to where I am though a great deal of study, work, thought and analysis; I may be wrong, but my thinking is my own and I am ok with that. I make similar points often because I am the only one making them. There should be room for alternative perspectives; particularly when the conventional wisdom is failling so dramatcially.
As to being branded a “Wilsonian” there are worse names to be sure. The suppression of his input at Versaille accelerated the path to WWII.
If you are waiting for news of tanks in the streets of Riyadh to assess the presence of insurgency, then you are in good company. The best COIN is accomplished long before things get that bad. I give the Saudi’s there due. They are damn good at suppressing insurgency. They should be, they’ve been doing it since the 1700s.
COL Jones:
I am still waiting to hear what your specific experience is in KSA whereby you arrive at the opinion that it is ripe for insurrection. An Amnesty International report I would find to be not only insufficient, but highly suspect.
I have looked at your writings, and I believe you are trapped in the Wilsonian Paradox, that is preach peace, non-intervention, and that all foreign policy is wrong, except for your own version which in fact would result in more intervention and more bad foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson, the most interventionist president the US has ever had, and whose conceptual legacy is the illness known as the United Nations.
Col Jones,
I do not claim any expertise on Iran. From the few persians that I’ve met, I’ve found them to be a very proud people that would refuse any type of direct intervention.
One of the takeaways from “For Neda” was the indirect support from external actors. In this case, the Green Revolution gained support from 30 year old computer geeks in the US NOT a state or military intervention. Using sophisticated programing skills, they managed to keep the internet open for the people to tell their story. It’s similar to what Google is attempting in China.
One interpretation is that it’s an ad-hoc version of the old USIA for the information age. It will be interesting to watch and see if the non-violent approach translates to political action over time.
Lots of Governments threw us out and refuse to kowtow to us, in fact nobody much seems to kowtow to us… most of them we manage to get along with. Our persistent problem with Iran may be partly of our own making, but by no means entirely.
It’s true that Iranians don’t blame the US for the existence of their government, but neither do Saudis for the most part. Hard not to mention, as well, that in previous posts you appear to recommend that we force the Saudis to kowtow to us, by trying to pressure them to adopt domestic policies that we think they should adopt.
I think the mechanism you propose for the UN might be useful, but I see no chance at all that the UN will adopt it: too many of the member governments see it as something that could be used against them. It’s very unlikely that the UN or any multilateral body will accept any mechanism perceived as legitimizing external interference in domestic affairs in anything but the most extreme conditions.
The question re Saudi Arabia remains open…
Dayuhan stated: “…that in previous posts you appear to recommend that we force the Saudis to kowtow to us, by trying to pressure them to adopt domestic policies that we think they should adopt…”
I tend to agree with this observation. It’s the Wilsonian Paradox – that is preaching “peace” while being the most interventionist President ever.
Dayuhan, Brother, you asked for an example of a COA for how we approach this by changing our own behavior rather than demanding changes of others and I gave it above. Asked and answered.
The globe is system, interconnected and interrelated in ways we don’t fully appreciate. An acion in one place has effects in others. The US tends to view itself in the pursuit of its policies as benign, distilled water poured into the system. Yet US foreign policy is thinly tolerated by our best of friends, and resisted in varying degrees by everyone else. We need to wake up to this. We can not help but step on toes, but to do so so heavily, often and without regard of the effect on those stepped upon cannot persist.
But we must act to preserve our interests or fade into the history books. My point is that we need to act with greater awareness of the impact of our actions, and to also recognize and adjust to the shifting balance of power between Governments and Populaces everywhere. We are now the champions of Despots, while Bin Laden is the Champion of the oppressed. I find that upsetting. We are better than that, and can do better than that.
To applaud this Saudi Fatwa of suppression is ignorant and obscene; and it puts our nation and our people at greater risk for no gain other than to ensure that current oil contracts stay in place for a handful of corporations, and that a particular family also benefit from those same contracts. I like to think we are better than that.
Robert C. Jones:
I’m unsure you did in fact answer Dayuhan’s query about the Saudis as insurgents. I presume your response was:
That may be true with respect to some Saudis but it unlikely to be true with respect to all — acknowledging that you seem to see insurgencies where many of us see mild unrest.
You later say that to applaud this Saudi Fatwa of suppression is ignorant and obscene. I certainly agree you’re entitled to make such a judgment call but others may not share your intensity. Regardless, the political comment at the end of your post is your prerogative but it does bring much of your philosophy into question…
Even if I just took the 5% of the Saudi pop that is Shia it is enough. But it goees well beyond the Shia and is wide spread in the Sunni populace that nourishes AQ and other such organizations.
This report last year in Amnesty International but one that Dayuhan could pull up himself if he were willing to spend 5 minutes doing research.
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/saudi-arabia-countering-terrorism-repression-20090911
It may look like “mild unrest” when the government can, and does, go into any home and and arrest anyone, for any reason, at any time, without any due process or probable cause. And then deport, detain or execute the same as they chose without any opportunity to challenge the charges against them. The grass never gets very tall in Saudi Arabia, so you need to quit looking for the forest and look at the roots.
You may applaud such “justice” Ken; heck, you may find the “respect” the Saudis laud upon the Shia as admirable; you may even think that such governance is expected and appreciated by the citizens of Saudi Arabia.
Perhaps you really can’t see the causal links between Saudi oppression and the terrorism they face domestically; or our support for sustaining the current Saudi government and the attacks by Saudis against the US.
I can only lead you to water; the rest is up to you.
Robert C. Jones:
Amnesty International? Careful whom you cite lest you become a laughing stock as well…
I see many of the things you mention, I just interpret them differently. You seem to continue attempting to apply a western construct to the Middle East — forgetting that they do not think as do we.
Your ability to impute thoughts to me that I do not hold is noted and rejected. Again.
Actually, I’d prefer you not try to lead me to water. Like most people, I’m quite capable of finding my own and think that’s a better idea than drinking someone else’s political Kool Aid. Rather, I suggest, you might wish to ponder deeply the assessment of Miguel Angel Guardia.
I’m not a fan of political activism or public political discussion. Much of what I read seems politically, not militarily, oriented.
War is politics. You can’t escape that bit of CvC. I also don’t believe there is a miliary solution to the political problems we are pitting the military against today.
To argue military tactics and strategies in the face of a mission that is not suitable, acceptable, or feasible for the military to accomplish is folly.
The military knows duty. One aspect of that duty is to understand one’s craft, and to go back to the boss with good advice when tasked with a mission. Instead the military it ripping itself apart as it attempts the infeasible; giving rise to the Gian Gentiles who plead for a return to the good old days of focusing on peacetime deterrence and wartime maneuver; or the John Nagls, preaching that the way of the future is perpetual meddling in the insurgencies of others. There are other options than those two extremes.
Mine is just one such option. Adjust our foregin policy to be less supportive of despotic leaders, be more attuned to the effects of good and poor governance and shift our interventions to be more about fixing governments than suppressing populaces (when we feel compelled by our interests to intervene). This allows us to right size and right-mission our military for a primary focus such as prescribed by the Gentiles; with a small, supporting capability prepared to do the type of work suggested by the Nagls.
So far all that Mr. Guardia has offered is that he disagrees with me. Noted.
COL Jones,
Agreed on the independent thought processes, though I opine yours to be incorrect. Rather I agree with Ken White’s view that “You seem to continue attempting to apply a western construct to the Middle East — forgetting that they do not think as do we.”
In other words, applying Western standards to others is what has gotten us into the current Charlie-Foxtrots.
You wrote, “As to being branded a “Wilsonian” there are worse names to be sure. The suppression of his input at Versailles accelerated the path to WWII.”
I think that to be incorrect. Wilson’s input at Versailles DID accelerate the path to WWII. Not only that, WW1 could have ended earlier if Wilson would have accepted some of the overtures that were being made by Germany. Let’s not forget this was really Austria’s war thanks to Conrad. In addition, Wilson’s fiasco in dealing with Mexico, 1910-1917, is one of U.S. History’s most neglected bungles.
Unfortunately, Wilson’s legacy has infected both the Democrat and Republican parties on how they deal with the world today. Almost every school that teaches international affairs, almost every military FAO and State Department diplomat is infected with the Wilsonian Paradox.
Robert C. Jones:
We agree on all that. We seem to disagree markedly on the solution to that problem…
Miguel Angel Guardia mentioned that it seemed to him that you believed all foreign policy is wrong, except for your own version which in fact would result in more intervention and more bad foreign policy. I’m unsure of the truth of that last bit but the first portion certainly resonates.
As you said:
Having belief in ones conclusions is admirable but one should always remember that they may not be the only solution to a particular problem. Everyone else is not necessarily idiotic or deluded.
I do not believe you’re the only one stating many of your positions but I’ll certainly acknowledge that you state them more repetitively than most.
It’s also worth remembering that prior to WW 1 (and during it as well) Wilson was very interventionist, sending troops into both Mexico and Central America with what could be considered total abandon (especially when compared to his predecessors) and for what might be considered almost purely ideological reasons. People focus too much on what Wilson did during WW 1 and all too often forget about his actions in other places prior to the war.
Here is a perfect example of the Wilsonian Paradox as reflected in COL Jones’ own writings:
“…or the John Nagls, preaching that the way of the future is perpetual meddling in the insurgencies of others…”
Note in the above COL Jones does NOT favor the meddling/intervention.
This then gets answered by his next set of words:
“Adjust our foreign policy to be…more attuned to the effects of good and poor governance and shift our interventions to be more about fixing governments than suppressing populaces (when we feel compelled by our interests to intervene).”
In the first set of quotes he cries foul on the interventions, yet in the second set of quotes he champions the intervention/meddling. This is classic Wilson. It is further compounded by seeking to bypass the foreign government so as to “help the people” directly. Again classic Wilson. The Wilsonian psychosis is also used here in that we ourselves (the USA) are “suppressing the people” by having anything to do with the foreign government/regime.
The next step in the Wilson model is that a more acceptable government must come into place, unless of course that government proves to be resistant to Wilson’s puppeteering. If it does become a Wilson puppet, then the next great Wilsonian in next or later US administration will repeat the cycle by again saying we are supporting a despotic government brought in by the last Wilsonian, or the Wilsonian before that. Hence the cycle repeats itself as a continuing tragicomedy.
In the event that new foreign government does not become a Wilson puppet, then Wilson (or the Wilsonian) will again seek to intervene. It’s the Mexican Revolution of 1910 all over again where all of the above scenarios happened.
Well, it appears I’ve poked the good Cold Warriors right in the proverbial hornet’s nest.
OK, as I have stated, as the dominant world power with national interests to service, we will indeed intervene, meddle, exert our will, etc; or fade away. What I have also stated is that currently we are focused on what I see as a fading model of proping up Dictators by helping them suppress their insurgent populaces; and that I believe a healthier model to be one that is more open-minded and that takes into account the reasonable concers of the suppressed populace in question. That helping Dictators suppress insurgents in the name of CT is major contributor to what we call the “War On Terrorism.” We are, I believe, making the causation that AQ feeds upon stronger by our CT focus. That intervention should instead be focused on fixing governments rather than fixing populaces.
As to why so many are blind to the Saudis; I know they spend Millions lobbying in the US. Many voices are bought and paid for, others just buy into their message of their own free will.
In 1774 the First Continental Congress formed in response to the “Intolerable Acts” and prepared and sent a petition to the King in recognition of his sovereignty and to request his help righting the wrongs that Parliment was placing on the Colonies.
In 1991 a similar assemblage of Saudi’s petitioned their King as well:
“This conservative opposition secretly prepared a twelve-point Letter of Demands, signed by hundreds of prominent religious scholars, intellectuals and others. The letter was presented to King Fahd in April 1991, and then circulated more widely throughout the kingdom and provided to the international media, which angered the authorities. The short document urged a broad program of reform, including review of the kingdom’s laws to ensure conformity with Islamic law; judicial independence; formation of an independent consultative council charged with decision-making in domestic and foreign affairs; Arigorous accountability for all officials without exception; removal of corrupt or incompetent officials; overhauling the media to Aserve Islam; distribution of public wealth Afairly among all classes and groups; and foreign policies that Achampion Muslim causes and eschew Aillegitimate alliances. The country’s top religious and judicial bodies denounced the letter, particularly because it was made public.
In July 1992, 109 religious scholars and intellectuals circulated a longer document, known as the Memorandum of Advice, that elaborated on the Letter of Demands. It advocated freedom of expression for independent clerics, accountability for government officials, and greater consultation between government policymakers and religious scholars in order to avoid “separation between politics and religion, which defeats the very purpose of the establishment of the Islamic state.” The memorandum also called for an end to arbitrary arrest and torture. The government media and the official clerical establishment condemned this document as well. Some of the signatories were questioned and threatened; other oppositionists were banned from public speaking and suspended from their government jobs. ”
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/saudi/
My point is simply that we help the King more by meddling in how he governs than we do by meddling in how he suppresses his populace. By so doing we advance our own interests as well, and reduce the liklihood of acts of terror by Saudi citizens against the US, our people, and our interests.
Robert C. Jones:
I suspect I had moved well past the Cold War before you were a Second Lieutenant if not before you started High School. My denouement on that futility (a ‘war’ that was never what you seem to think it was) occurred in mid Fall 1966 as I recall… 😉
Yes, you often say that. What you equally often fail to acknowledge is that others see the same facts you see but arrive at significantly different conclusions. It is not your positions but your tendency to be dismissive of the conclusions of others that stirs up those Yellow Jackets.
Here’s an example:
That’s condescending dismissal and that attitude and approach does you no favors in the sense of having your more sensible ideas accepted — and acted upon.
OTOH, one could ask if we are helping the King, or if we wish to help the King or ask if we should help the King. Reasonable people can also believe we can do nothing and thus even better aid the Saudi populace. There are obviously numerous permutations and your response to those being raised is typically to just restate your position without any attempt at refuting the alternatives. One could suspect you do not even consider alternatives.
Not to mention one could really question whether any of those actions or the lack of them is likely to reduce the likelihood of acts of terror by Saudis.
COL Jones,
Sir, I love you to death. I listen when you speak, but I think that you provoked this confrontation :). This ones on you. You challenged Brother Ken,
“I can only lead you to water; the rest is up to you.”
God/Allah/Yawhae have mercy on your soul.
Don’t discount the wise men. He’s not writing to destroy you’re theory. He gives critique for you to consider to better your thoughts. I’d advise to listen.
COL Jones,
Sir, I love you to death. I listen when you speak, but I think that you provoked this confrontation :). This ones on you. You challenged Brother Ken,
“I can only lead you to water; the rest is up to you.”
God/Allah/Yawhae have mercy on your soul.
Don’t discount the wise men. He’s not writing to destroy you’re theory. He gives critique for you to consider to better your thoughts. I’d advise to listen.
At this point I almost feel constrained to point out that just because Ken is as old as God, that doesn’t mean that he is God…:-)
That said, I can’t honestly say that I have a dog in this particular fight. It’s interesting to note that in a way we have (in a very generalized way) the two consistent strains of US foreign policy (idealistic pan-national interventionism versus idealistic/cynical pseudo-isolationism) going head-to-head.
Might be worth making popcorn for… 🙂
“At this point I almost feel constrained to point out that just because Ken is as old as God, that doesn’t mean that he is God…:-)”
I’m not saying that Ken is always right. Oh , but so often he is so right. Experience is prudence and often overcomes academic rigor and the competing strife.
I merge Ken’s voice into the measure of the song. It continues to flow as art tempered with the facts discovered after the fact.
A song in its own verse.
I hope that he continues to sing.
The last was my own as it were.