It’s the Tribes? That’s Stupid.
It’s the Tribes? That’s Stupid. – Lieutenant Colonel John Malevich, Canadian Army — U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, Combined Arms Center Blog.
When you are a stranger in a strange land, you need to be aware of, and hold on to, and be proud of your culture. In my experience you can become susceptible to myth and unfounded fears of a super warrior that you have not yet engaged. I was chatting with a young Afghan who, full of Pashtun bravado said to me “westerners were from a feminine culture,” because we spent the majority of our economic activity on goods and services and not on weapons of war and the military. Being one half Irish and one half Yugoslavian culturally speaking, I am not inclined to walk away from a fight and “them sounded like fighting words to me.” I asked my Pashtun buddy to show me how westerners greet each other. He extended his hand in a wave. I pointed out the open hand and said, “do you know why we do that? The open hand shows the other westerner that ‘I have no weapons;’ so, I won’t try to kill you, this time.” It seems we are not such an effete culture after all, my Pashtun friend!
In our ninth year of insurgency in Afghanistan it seems that we are turning to romantic notions and silver bullets to extricate ourselves from what seems like an unending conflict. The latest great hope is the tribes. The idea being that if only we could mobilize them, we would be halfway to a solution to this insurgency.
I think that this approach smacks too much of military orientalism. We seem to be looking for the Jean Jacque Rousseau “noble savage.” Or in modern terms, I would call it the “Avatar Effect” or “Last Samurai last hope.” In the search to find a way out we are pinning our hopes on the weakest link in the Afghan conflict chain.
I will not look at this problem from an anthropological point of view but rather from a strictly military point of view. There are limitations to the tribal style of warfare that have always limited their effectiveness and always will.
Tribes fight within the limitations of a complicated honor code that requires the respect of both sides to work. Pashtun culture sees the fight as being a matter of honor, worth fighting only if it is an affair between men taking equal risk i.e. it has to be a fair fight. The targeting of women and non-combatants to gain an advantage is out of the question. Once you do that, the Pashtun leaves the fight. Historically, this has been a very effective method of defeating them. British Aerial Policing did this, Taraki’s bombing of revolting villages did this, and the Taliban fanatics are not above targeting non-combatants either.
The Pashtun fight for booty or land not ideals. This limits their zeal because once the objective is taken, the spoils are distributed and the fighting stops. After that comes the squabbling between tribes as to who gets what from the spoils. So, motivating them to expel the Taliban from their midst is really a non-starter because there is no money in it.
Real soldiers know that it is all about logistics. Start running out of ammo in a firefight and you know what I mean. Afghan tribal fighting style and honour code demand that Pashtuns should all fight all the time. That is a great line for Star Ship Troopers, but not militarily practical for the Pashtuns. Because they will not take less honourable duties like logistics, their style of fighting is best suited to the advance where they can live off the land like armies of old. They cannot support themselves outside their immediate area, or Kehl.
Getting tribes and clans and different communities to fight side by side is problematic. Disputes over spoils or disputes over perceived slights can quickly turn allies against one another. King Ammanullah was able to use the mullahs as interlocuters between the tribes and as logisticians in order to keep them fighting the enemy not each other. This time, the enemy is the mullah. Who will keep the tribes on side? P.S. This week, two Shinwari sub-tribes took up arms to fight each other over an ancient land dispute, leaving at least 13 people dead. This is the same tribe who were supposed to work with Coalition forces for a cool million.
Tribes cannot call jihad, thus their dead cannot be shaheed (martyrs). This limits their enthusiasm for the fight. We want them, in fact, to fight against those that have called for jihad. How do we cross that bridge?
Jirga/Tribal structure makes planning too slow. It is easily infiltrated and the supporters are too easily identified and targeted with night letters and murder, and of course their plans can be communicated to the enemy quite easily.
Tribal war is all about the survival of the tribe and the protection of the status and possessions of the elders who are reluctant combatants because they have the most to lose. The elders that we put our faith in are the least —to fight because they take the greatest risk. They have land, women and houses that are not easy to walk away from. It is the young who have the most zeal because they have the least to lose. The tribes are most likely to join you only when you are winning and the can get in on the booty.
They are first to quit. In fact, the Taliban never took all of Afghanistan. They merely built up a head of steam and the tribes/warlords flipped over on their backs like submissive dogs in order to preserve their status. After 911, they flipped back against the Taliban, because momentum was with us and we would preserve their status. The mistake we make is that in our culture, changing sides is seen as the worst kind of evil, but in Pashtun culture it is seen merely as clever because it is all about survival of the tribe.
Let’s look at the recent history of the tribes. The tribes tell us they hate the Taliban, the Taliban are trumped up school teachers who have stepped above their station in life, the tribes are full of mighty warriors, and it is the Elders who should be in power. If this were the case, the Taliban would have been chased out a long time ago. It seems to me, the tribes are either not capable or not —to take on the Taliban and are content to maintain the status-quo and their position within it.
Which is it?
LCol JJ Malevich, Canadian Exchange Officer, COIN Branch Chief, US Army/ USMC Counter Insurgency Center. This statement is my own and does not constitute an endorsement by or opinion of the Department of Defense.
Reference: “They think that the Pashtun are all tribal, or that Afghanistan is all tribal, or that, oh, when you really think about it, the whole WORLD is tribal!”
Brother. Are you sure that “THEY” actually believe that all of Afghanistan or the rest of the whole WORLD is tribal? Really? Who is “they” that see only Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan? You are obviously frustrated but smacking the decision-makers or insinuating that “they” are idiots doesn’t get you a seat at the adult table. Trust me, I tried this tactic and failed miserably.
Could it be that the folks use the tribal label to describe what are in actuality solidarity groups? Maybe the term is better understood by the layman instead of having to explain every time what it means to be a solidarity group. It is one thing to be an anthropologist and in the know and another to be a casual reader of USA Today. Like it or not, you have to simplify the narrative so that the great unwashed masses might share in the experience.
Brother Ian, I actually believe that the folks working the crowd (like Major Jim Gant for example)actually understand the difference between tribes and s-groups but sometimes it is just easier to run with the tribal label in places where solidarity groups reign supreme. It might help your cause if the media would change the imagery but I’d venture to say that this won’t happen anytime soon. Imagine the following article in USA Today: “Special Forces rally Solidarity Groups, Clear Village of Taliban” What???? I submit that in the near term the image of the tribal fighter will remain the imagery of choice in popular culture. No such image of s-groupies exist unless you are comfortable with outing, embracing and mainstreaming s-group leaders as warlords or strongmen. It actually doesn’t matter what we think, perception management requires that we not admit this likely fact. It is what it is; the good, the bad and the ugly.
Enough of my suck Brother, keep up the good fight and don’t let the bastards get you down.
v/r
MAC
“Lets look at the recent history of the tribes. The tribes tell us they hate the Taliban, the Taliban are trumped up school teachers who have stepped above their station in life, the tribes are full of mighty warriors, and it is the Elders who should be in power. If this were the case, the Taliban would have been chased out a long time ago. It seems to me, the tribes are either not capable or not willing to take on the Taliban and are content to maintain the status-quo and their position within it.
Which is it?”
Well…I’d suggest that Pakistan having armed and supported the Taliban for years, might account for some of the reluctance of the tribes to pick a fight with folks backed by the ISI when they are backed by nothing but their own resources.
How far would the Taliban have gotten in the 1990’s without the handholding by the Pakistani Army?
LTC Malevich joins the growing ranks of critics of this tribal approach. It has failed throughout history in numerous locations. It is an expedient bandaid being pushed by so called UW experts. European powers engaged the Indian tribes in N. America as a force multiplier to achieve short term objectives, but the arrangements always fell apart over time for multiple reasons. As our Canadian brother in arms points out the tribe is the weak link in this fight, and that is exactly why the Taliban emerged as the power to be in Afghanistan. Let us not forget there are other state and non-state actors engaging the tribes in Afghanistan also for their own purposes, and the tribes will wheel and deal as “they” see fit based on “their” perceptions of their interests. When the Soviets pulled out several thousand Afghans were killed in inter-tribal warfare (again until the Taliban suppressed it, a welcome force for those seeking peace, at least until they took their mask off). So we know tribal engagement led to mass killing before, and we’re proposing what?
Joe:
Have you ever heard of the Special Forces VN program “Civilian Irregular Defense Group” CIDG?
It was actually a very successful program–read about it and then compare it to the Tribal Engagement model being discussed—and no the Soviets did not try it.
Let’s let the tribal engagement model get going instead of debating it to death.
“We are known by what we do, not by what we say we are going to do.”
An old Special Forces saying.
On the face of it, it appears a tribal approach seems to achieve a negative aim of preventing Taliban victory. However, it does not clearly lead to our own posiitve aim of establishing Afghan governance across the whole country. Maybe this is the best we can hope for: a constant management of tribes whose only common denominator is opposition to the Taliban. This may require constant attention over the course of years to ensure that the level of instability stays at a relatively constant level and that the tribes, or whatever alternative local governing mechanisms that emerge, maintain the capability and will to band together in defeating the Taliban when necessary and that they prevent AQ from finding safe haven in any one area.
This sounds like how the British managed their Afghanistan and northwestern frontier challenges. In a sense, this is a defensive strategy: focusing on keeping Taliban out as a central government, vice putting any other group specifically in charge.
In this regard CIDG is a good model. It focused on defeating the NVA and VC in relatively remote areas. How those groups would have been integrated into any functioning South Vietnamese government is another matter.
We have evolved into a one-trick pony. Every discussion we have on the tribal matter is predicated on the premise that tribal engagement is the ONLY strategy available to us. Is this the case? Is tribal engagement the only strategy available to us? How about we engage tribal leaders in areas where tribes are a social center of gravity; solidarity group leaders in areas where tribal leaders are not. God forbid we might have to figure out the social structure in each village and valley so as to engage the appropriate centers of social power or worse tailor our operational campaigns to reflect ground truth and not some theory of social organization.
After nine years of adventure learning Id think that we would have embraced the fact that Afghanistan requires more than just one truth, one approach, one technique, and one way of attracting allies or killing bad guys…or are we too comfortable with being a one-trick pony?
This either-or approach to irregular warfare and on-going turf war over which approach is the one true faith is killing me… and lots of our kids along the frontier!!!
So now the Taliban are of equal importance to AQ?
This strategy is focused on anything but AQ. Instead of pursuing a srong central government (relative) that at least has a chance of denying safe haven to AQ we are pursuing tribal empowerment, which will create seams that AQ can exloit.
Lieutenant Colonel John Malevich has missed the boat on this discussion. His understanding of the tribal engagement is lacking detail and understanding and does not reflect the views of the Special Operations Community because he is not SOF and never has been and does not have the experience or knowledge to talk the SOF approach which is the tribal approach. He also missed the point of assisting the tribes and villages; we are not arming or paying them, we are assisting in their survival by offering what the Taliban currently do, security. Will every tribe participate? No, but those that do will benefit from numerous outreach programs. We have tried the top down only approach and that is only satisfying those that work at that level; what about the villages and tribes THE PEOPLE? The Afghan Gov’t cannot provide ANYTHING for the tribes and expect them conform, yeah right. Tribal engagement is proving the missing link from the villages to the district which is currently where the Afghan Gov’t support stops. I recommend we do not begin casting stones at a program that the conventional forces cannot understand. Let’s TRY!! Silver bullet or not, we have try something that reached out the villages or we will be fighting and dying here for a long time. History is our knowledge and reading military COIN manuals is a one sided approach, studying the history of the tribes of Afghanistan provides the insight everyone needs to BEGIN understanding. If someone “knows it all” then that person cannot be very intelligent; based on the writings of Plato. We should never stop learning and maintain the humility needed to endure this mission for a lifetime. Oh by the way, it is working and has taken the country by storm!! The success is so overwhelming that everyone (US and AF) are jumping on the wagon. Lieutenant Colonel John Malevich should come on over and take a look. Thanks for the all of the input on this.
GBJW
Jason,
I have decades of SF and SOF experience and find your comments about proffesionals outside of SOF not being capable of understanding way off track and unprofessional, but since you threw the first punch (a weak jab), perhaps those who have an agenda to push are the ones incapable of understanding legitimate criticism.
Your argument that we have to try something sounds desparate, not exactly the type of logic that should be the basis of a strategy.
Actually we have been doing what you suggested for years, and at best it leads to temporary local success, but more importantly it further divides the tribes, thus laying the ground work for more violence later.
As with the debate on population-centric and enemy-centric COIN, I think this disagreement with top down versus bottom up approaches is irrelevant and minimizes our chances of finding solutions.
If the SF boys are having success with the tribes, then let them do their thing- provide encouragement, support, and resources as needed. Over-time, send out the political advisors to determine how to integrate this success into the central gov’t political and military apparatuses.
Eventually, as with the nature of many social problems, lasting answers are found in the middle not the fringes. We don’t have to make every problem a zero-sum game.
Mike
Joe,
Again, the point of my reply was missed and you took it personal. My point is to take every approach that renders success and support it. Thoughts on paper have been ineffective and the proof is evident in the success of a program that is ongoing. Too many organizations spend way too much on the plan and lack the capability to implement maybe in part due to risk aversion, as I saw personally over the past few years that I have spent in these villages. Lieutenant Colonel John Malevich’s views are the reason I replied, not yours or anyone elses. My personal agenda is to not get killed while you debate this topic; the debate is over, we’re executing. Come on in for the big one or sit quietly in the corner and watch. Sorry for the jab but you chimed in. Oh, if you want to know why it will work just re-look Maslows Hierarchy of Needs.
GBJW
What role, if any, do the Community Development Councils have when working through tribes. My understanding is that about 30,000 or so CDCs have been used to channel funds from the MRPP to villages for small projects and that, due to the success of the program, that we’re now going to augment it with CERP funds.
Is “tribal engagement” duplicating the efforts of CDCs, complimenting them, neither, something else?
Although my experience was just a snapshot, limited to one particular place at one particular time, my take on Community Development Councils as well as District Development Assemblies was that they are basically Western bureaucratic concepts that have neither true Afghan buy-in nor a host nation capability to staff these entities. I think they will likely dry up and blow away once the aid runs out.
I have to agree with the critics that Afghanistan is too complex to be generally amenable to a silver bullet such as tribal engagement. “Working with the tribes” may have utility in some valleys in eastern Afghanistan but it is not really viable in southern Afghanistan where tribal structures as envisioned in this approach do not really exist. To cite one example, I understand that a significant generator of conflict in Helmand Province is a long-standing rivalry between three prominent subtribes within the Alizai tribe. And, in many districts in southern Afghanistan, the supposed tribal leader is actually a strongman-cum-warlord who gained his power through drug trafficking resources or mujahideen military prowess.
Schmedlap,
Great question and without details I will say it is not a duplication of effort but will compliment. The local defense initiative is designed to assist in providing security in order for civil assistance programs to provide basic survival necessities to the local populace and eventually improving the overall quality of life. If the security is not in place, the unsupported villages will do what it takes to survive and the civil assistance programs/CDCs cannot assist. There are multiple programs that are currently in progress that will assist in LDI and unfortunately I can’t discuss them here. Numerous organizations across the spectrum will be incorporated , one team, one fight approach. Culture and tribal considerations were at the top of the priority list throughout planning and will be throughout the development. I hope this provides you with the answer you were looking for. Thanks for the question.
Could we please, please stop using Maslow when talking about tribes?? That particular theory was developed to model individual needs and decision-making. There is no current scholarship that has effectively shown that it can be applied to groups of individuals. Or, you know: tribes.
Jason doesn’t speak for all of us in SF, and I apologize for statement that it isn’t possible for you to understand because you are not SF. The reality is anyone who studies unconventional warfare can understand it, but SF soldiers are “supposed” to study it as it is reportedly the core of their existence. However, the best practicioners of UW have never had any SF training. I for one SF guy found your comments thoughtful and unfortunately correct.
We are proposing empowering the weakest link which will not only fail over time, but lead once again to major tribal warfare, which will create opportunities for those we are really concerned about.
I am all for tribal and populace engagement if it is truly based on a sound strategy (instead of just trying something).
Sounds like the Marines are already trying this, but I still don’t see an end game that is in our interest.
Are we going to encourage tribal economies also? A divided Afghanistan will be a weak Afghanistan that is surrounded by wolves.
This makes sense:
However, as one who proudly owns a Green Beanie and who was playing with various Tribes two or three wars ago, I think this might bear further reflection:
Contradictory, too…
Been my observation that neither a tribal or an armchair psychologist approach is guaranteed. No ‘one size fits all’ seems to work well in war. METT-TC sorta rules and not all tribespeople are that into their tribes; each area or region in a large nation can have quite different demographic proclivities.
That is likely to be a causative factor in the seeming lack of ‘conventional force’ understanding; it may not be a lack of understanding, it may be they are not able to implement it in their locale. That or the locals may not have read Maslow…
It also helps if one has an operational goal in mind before one subscribes to a particular set of tactics that may work in one area and not in another.
Given some facets of performance to date and the conmingling of ‘SOF’ and SF with excessive DA emphasis — to the detriment of SF IMO — I’m inclined to believe that not being or ever having been SOF isn’t nearly as bad an insult as some might think.
Wow, Great comments. I did not know this debate was going on here. You are right, I am not special forces, although, my mom always did tell me I was special. Neither was, Ord Windgate or T.E. Lawrence. On the other hand, I have lived outside the wire in Afghanistan, for two years. Traveled the country and dressed in civvies armed only with a 9mm and a smile, worked with Afghans every single day in the Government of Afghanistan. But, really that is nothing special. Many UN types just do that as a matter of course.
I have studied this topic, “tribal warfare” extensively; not only that, but I have used the tribal warfare card “Arbakia” on some of my ops. Unfortunately, I come to the same conclusion, we just can’t depend on the tribes and the tribes are just not national players. Their style of warfare is too limited, stylized and ritualistic to be effective.
We in the west, are all or nothing people that fight wars in the Greek style to the point of annihilation. If you drop bombs on London, it just makes us madder, but if you drop bombs on Jallabad, or Kabul as the British did in 1919 after Amanullah Khan invaded Pakistan in order to gain back Pashutistan, they will quit.
Take a listen to the URL that I posted. It is a lecture that I gave by Webcast last Thurs which goes a long way to explaining this.
The Pashtuns are not the Mohawks or the Apache. We cannot treat them the same way.
If we cut out the GIRoA, we shoot ourselves in the foot, because we cannot keep AQ out, until we bring government to the ungoverned spaces and the tribes won’t/can’t govern those spaces. The GIRoA might, if we teach them, force them and give them a chance. We don’t want to drain the swamps of insurgents we want to treat the water. The GIRoA is the chlorine.
We need to connect the GIRoA to the people. Thant means District elections, with District Governors connected to Elected Provincial Governors, who preside over provincial parliaments that have political parties, agendas and revenue raising capabilities. But, that is all much more boring than the romatic route of raising a Tribal revolt against the Taliban. I have done the man-jamas, pakule, AK 47U thing too and my conclusion is that the GIRoA is the best card we have. When you got lemons, ….
Its been nine years and I am still waiting tribes to revolt, flex that warrior sinew and come into the light of peace, democracy and good governance, but I am still waiting.
Oh yah, final note: Who do you think is protecting Bin Laden? And, I am sure it ain’t for free.
Check out my brief.
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/events.asp
LColMalevich,
I am impressed with how you conducted all your ops in Afghanistan. Great job. Many of us did that. My team and I had great success with “tribal engagement” in opposed to “tribal involvement”…to say it won’t won’t work when we haven’t done in it on a large scale, coordinated basis is very short-sighted. Your fascination with the GIRoA is amusing. Your talk of elections, parliments, parties, etc…is amusing also.
It’s the tribes. That’s stupid. Really?
I have studied this “tribal enagament” topic extensively as well. My team and I did it(have I said that more than once?). I could not disagree more with your assessment and conclusions. I think you are flat out wrong.
You put your life with the GIRoA, the ANA and the ANP. I’ll put mine with the tribes.
The good part is we will see. Time will tell.
I do know it isn’t a debate right now for many an ODA and many a marine. Thay are doing it, as we speak.
Do you know how many Pashtun tribes there are in the east and the south of Afghanistan? How many people are in those tribes? How many Pashtum tribes are in the FATA and the NWFP? How many people are in those tribes?
Do you believe there is success at the end of the rainbow with out the support of the Pashtun tribes?
Any strategy that we take that does not involve the Pashtun tribes, as the base, will ultimately fail.
I don’t need to read papers and watch briefs. My team and I did it (have I said that?). And could do it again.
I’ve been waiting nine years too. Where is the GIRoA?
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
SWJ Editor’s Note: Anonymous (or otherwise) character or personal attacks are not welcome here and are deleted – as this one has. Please keep this discussion professional and on the issues at hand. Thanks.
Dave D.
I’ve commented very critically about the tribal engagement idea elsewhere on this blog, but I don’t endorse the kind of character assassination that “anonymous,” just above, thinks is clever.
What I do endorse is Macallister’s statement “God forbid we might have to figure out the social structure in each village and valley so as to engage the appropriate centers of social power or worse tailor our operational campaigns to reflect ground truth and not some theory of social organization.” I’m very glad Mac has come to this idea; I remember him debating from the other side on another blog not that long ago.
I would have to concur with Ian, especially when it comes to Mac McCallister! He is probably one of the smartest men on tribal structures and dynamics. When he talks, I listen!
Firstly, I was standing right next to MAJ Gant (two separate occassions) when two of 4 Battalion Commanders from 3rd Group asked him to command one of their companies. I don’t know for a fact who anonymous is but as an observer of the aftermath of MAJ Gant’s paper, I have an inkling as to who it may be. If I am correct, anonymous isn’t even in 3rd Group nor has he ever been and he’s just another staff officer sitting behind a desk. One of the major problems with SF today is that everyone is so busy attacking each other that they’ve lost sight of the objective. SF is being dismantled before my very eyes by its own. They say Military Intelligence people eat their own. I think that SF has, unfortunately, become moreso cannibalistic. Secondly, the tribal engagement strategy is a bottom up approach to get the tribes to work with the central government. MAJ Gant fully supports Gen McChrystal and his staff as he has said numerous times on these blogs. He has also said that he’s a small unit expert who can get the people involved in their own government starting at the tribal level. He’s very aware of the people currently do tribal engagement as he’s in contact with several of them and he’s extrememly proud and supportive of them. MAJ Gant never said he was the only guy who could do it; he just said he was willing to do it alone. MAJ Gant fully understands his role in supporting US foreign policy in Afghanistan. He’s not stupid.
Seems like we should remember this:
“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.” President Roosevelt
Dave Maxwell- I could not have picked a better quote or a better man to quote. Thank you. Let’s hope these words resonate in the heart of all who read them.
Jim,
some good points. There are a lot of Pashtuns and tribes and I don’t envy the task the guy who takes it upon himself to heard them together in the same direction.
Good point on the the book lern’n and briefs. And, in that spirit, I am off to the shooting range with my son. His mosin is shooting way too high at 100m; we gotta raise that front post. Now, that is problem I can solve. Maybe.
Cheers.
Dave Maxwell’s famous quote could not have come at a better time, I hope it brings the discussion back to professional interest and away from the internecine flames we’ve seen.
After 6 months on the bench, I’m going back into the arena (tonight) to build on my 50 months of Afg experience. Having traveled 32 of the provinces, crossing 1/2 the country with an ANP patrol, briefed the NSC, broke bread with carpet sellers, warlords and governors, I think I can offer my relevant opinion.
In short, the tribes are a vehicle of convenience in the the accomplishment of our goals. This relationship cuts both ways.
The Prime Directive; the objective that our political leaders have given us is to install and support a democratic Afg government and train/support ANSF so it can, one day, protect the GIRoA.
I believe that strong government and strong tribes are mutually exclusive. The earliest form of “governments” were clans/tribes but the complexities of governing large spaces, populations and economies means something bigger than tribe is required. I find that we are trying to advance on both axis (GIRoA and Tribes)and generating self-inflicted friction. I’ll repeat the last sentence of LCOL Malevich’s “Which is it?”. I haven’t heard any Western administration say: “…and we want you to strengthen the tribes”. Have you?
Putting your faith in the tribes as the saviors of Afg is wishful thinking. Putting your trust in them to protect you through their valley is a different matter.
“Motivating [the tribes] to expel the Taliban is really a non-starter because there is no money in it [for them].” I disagree, PLENTY of money has been spent on wishy-washy arbakai and “tribal solutions”. This is the tribe’s modern version of caravan raiding – and we’re the cash caravan. We are just sending money where the noise is; and the tribes can make plenty of noise.
Our financing and support of the tribes, whose traditions/codes are heavily eroded in all but the SE, has skewed the field in favor of the few. Many tribal leaders/warlords have grown all out of proportion to their neighbors and we are to blame. Too late for the tribal/clan mapping by PhDs in the human terrain teams.
LCOL Malevich alludes to the “Mad Mullah” who motivates muslims, for better or worse, in a way that is impossible for us foreigners. Ways must be found to side line the ones who don’t share vision of the Prime Directive.
Personally, I think we’ve achieved everything that we were tasked with in 2004/5 and should have left once the foundation of stability had set; let the GIRoA, donors and NGOs work on the rest of the puzzle. But now we are in the 9th year, groping for silver bullets, supporting a Frankenstein democracy, with no clear path to “victory”…if there ever was one.
Brother Ian, Ive always intuitively accepted the need to study the existing social system and structure whether village or valley before prosecuting an irregular warfare campaign. Be warned: the template is simple, its execution difficult. “Study, accept and describe the social system and structure as it is and not as we wish it to be. Identify and target the social systems relevant population i.e. the population best suited to support achieving our objectives. Gain influence among and support of the relevant population. Follow up by exploiting the credibility, legitimacy and prestige of the existing political and marital authority to shape, manage or control the relevant population. If no such political and martial authority exists, create and establish one.” I am not telling you anything new, since we have been following this methodology ever since Joshua was ordered by Moses to cross the Jordan, seize Jericho, on order secure Ai, and be prepared to clear Gibeon.
I am as comfortable discussing the existence of tribes and the need for an effective and extensive tribal engagement strategy as I am discussing the existence of solidarity groups and the need for a comprehensive strategy to exploit this reality. My sole dog in this fight is that we should not cubby hole ourselves into one or another irregular warfare approach. The professional soldier shouldnt have one favorite weapon system. He should be well versed in a number of systems and techniques. Major Gant has much to teach us all. Instead of trying to discredit the man and his approach, listen and learn. You never know when a tribal engagement methodology is just what the doctor ordered and if not in the whole of Afghanistan, how about parts of Africa? On the other hand, listen and learn from the solidarity group people since vast tracts of Afghan territory are populated by non-tribally based alliance networks. Id personally rather be well versed in a number of different approaches and be ridiculed or damned for it than fight for the privilege of being a one-trick pony.
Riddle me this: Is it even possible anymore in this day and age to develop a hybrid campaign plan that incorporates both tribal engagements in areas where appropriate and solidarity group engagements where appropriate with a C2 mechanism to integrate, regulate and coordinate the different approaches IOT achieve a glorious end-state? Maybe this is too much to ask for…
It appears that after nine years of adventure learning in Afghanistan, we still refuse to accept the fact that irregular warfare along the frontier requires more than just one truth, one methodology, one technique, and one way of attracting allies or killing bad guys.
v/r
MAC
To build off Mac’s words…
“When you and your opponent are engaged in combat which is dragging on with no end in sight, it is crucial that you should come up with a completely different technique. By refreshing your mind and techniques as you continue to fight your opponent, you will find an appropriate rhythm-timing with which to defeat him. Whenever you and your opponent become stagnant, you must immediately employ a different method of dealing with him in order to overcome him.”
-Miyamoto Musashi, The Book of Five Rings
v/r
Mike
Thanks Brother,
Master Musashi also explains that “the true value of a craft cannot be seen nor recognized within the confines of technique” and “it is important in strategy to know the enemy’s sword and not be distracted by insignificant movements.”
For what it is worth; to be an effective ally, whether tribal or solidarity group, each must own its own safe area which it knows well and controls; it must be well organized with a natural hierarchy that can be converted into military use; it must have a history of fighting which has made it a cohesive group; and it must have a grievance. If a grievance does not exist, one must be manufactured. Ideology, whether secular or sectarian, is far less important as a motivating factor than a good grievance.
Good hunting!
v/r
MAC
While no expert on Afghanistan, I can see the merits to the pro and con arguments for the tribal engagement approach. Both sides need to stop bumping chests and really listen to what the other one is saying. IMO the critics have some strong points that have not been answered by the supporters. The responses are too defensive in nature, and I know my SF brothers can do better than that. Mac’s response above seems logical when he states that the tribal engagement is one element of a multiple elements of the overall strategy. It is applicable where it is applicable, and not elsewhere. As long as the strong vocal advocates concur with this assessment, then I’m not sure where the disagreement is. Maybe we’re all just talking past one another.
Jason added an interesting comment about how we plan too much (I think he implied the planning paralyzes us, I tend to agree). A recent publication on lessons learned about interagency operations, pointed out the State Department focuses on the process and Defense focuses on the plan. Engagement with the tribes is more about the process than the plan, as the engagement will unfold over time based on relationships. We can’t ask ODAs to develop a phased plan on powerpoint where we unrealistically expect them to brief where they’ll be at on day 20. Higher needs to give the ODAs clear objectives and the needed resources, and then let the ODAs work through the ambiguity the best that they can. There will still be a natural friction between the guy on the ground and higher as the process unfolds as both are blind to what the other sees.
From this discussion/debate, you can get the impression that tribal engagement is a new concept, yet we have been engaging the tribes to various degrees prior to 9/11, so tribal engagement isn’t new. The approach may be, and the endstate may be since we no longer seemed to be focused solely on AQ, but more on stability.
The population focused operations IMO is where Special Forces should be focused, and should have been focused all along. They are uniquely qualified, and it isn’t about being better, but more about their unique training for this type of mission, their task organization and their organizational cultural. None of the above guaruntees success, but it increases the probability of it. It is also incredibly dangerous work, much more so than most direct action missions, so all my best to those on point working through the fog who are in the kill zone 24/7.
Only one word of advise/caution, and that is cultures are not static. People and societies change based on outside stimuli. One need only to look at Japan as an example. The point is that we shouldn’t blindly assume that the tribal construct will rule for ever. I know another location where we do ops that is also somewhat tribal based, but the youth are beginning to reject the tribal ways and want the benefits of a modern state. The take away is don’t assume, talk to the people and really listen to what they’re telling you. Some of it will be lies, but overtime you’ll sort it out.
De Oppresso Liber
Again to build off Mac and Bill Moore as they seem to type my thoughts…We have to strive past theory towards practice; we must force art over science. RC East will be as different to RC South as Anbar is to Diyala. With every influx of troops over time, change is made as cultural norms, values, and beliefs are challenged with new ideas.
Again, as I stated in my first post on this thread, if the SF boys are having success with the tribes in RC-East, then let them do their thing- provide support, resources, and encouragement as necessary. As success build, we should figure out how to merge the tribes into the central gov’t.
Only one critique for the SF crowd. We can and already did free the oppressed, but it is their responsibility to help themselves. In the end, one can lead a horse to water; we cannot make them drink.
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Mike
And finally some words that we should all reflect on while we consider the mission, our own motivations. and the people of A’stan.
“When dealing with people, let us remember we are not dealing with creatures of logic. We are dealing with creatures of emotion, creatures bristling with prejudices and motivated by pride and vanity.”
-Dale Carnegie
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Mike
“Id personally rather be well versed in a number of different approaches and be ridiculed or damned for it than fight for the privilege of being a one-trick pony.”
Ekh, but Mac, that’s exactly my whole beef with the “tribe-and-only-tribe” pamphleteers. They think that the Pashtuns are all tribal, or that Afghanistan is all tribal, or that, oh, when you really think about it, the whole WORLD is tribal!
Whereas what the solidarity group people (I am one, so I will listen to myself and others I guess) are saying, is: groups have solidarity for a lot of different reasons, so check on that before you go in with guns and cash, asking for who the “tribal elder” is…
You guys raise some great points. But, first to all, this is not personal. It is my job to put out the fruits of my research WRT COIN and the current fight. If it causes one person out there to check another source or to think, than I have done my job. And hey, I spent two years there, not all of it was at Green Beans, we all gotta leave theater some time.
I think we need a nuanced approach.
Ian raised some great points. What is the tribe of the kid, now elder that grew up in the refugee camp, what is the tribe of the Talib, Kabuli, Kandahari or Herati? What are the aspirations of the family who lives in Assadabad, but who’s father or brother works in Dubai, London or Toronto? What of the youth, who is not a landowner who has no chance of social mobility in the tribe, but lots with the Taliban; are we to close that other possible door with the GIRoA?
There was no GIRoA before Abdul Rhaman Khan (the Iron Emir). He carved Afghanistan out of the tribes, he gave Afghans education, administration, an Army and a chance for social mobility through the Government in all its facets. I don’t think we should go back to the Kingdom of Kabul. In the FATA, the approach was/is “tribes only” and our response in the 1950’s was US tanks and is now UAVs because, there is no governance there.
I would like to learn more about these “solidarity groups.” Ian or Mac, throw me a link.
Great Discussion.
LCol Malevich–I know you’ve seen it already, but the “My Cousin’s Enemy” paper summarizes solidarity group formation very briefly.
Other interesting work:
Noah Coburn on the potters’ solidarity group of Istalif: http://www.bu.edu/aias/coburn.pdf
The first 40 pages or so of Whitney Azoy’s “Buzkashi” book is as good as anything out there, but not everyone has a copy close at hand.
And of course, the always clear and concise Christian Bleuer: http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2007/05/06/afghanistan-and-the-qawm-an-important-yet-unknown-concept/
Anyway, my point is that tribes are one kind of solidarity group, but definitely not the only kind in Afghanistan. And the only way to know what you’re dealing with in a given area is to go put eyes on it, rather than decide before you arrive.
Mac, by “they” I mean Jim Gant, other pro-tribal authors on SWJ, and the godfather of the tribal argument (heavily quoted by Gant BTW), David Ronfeldt: http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR433/
Let me explain to you what happens when the “tribe-and-only-tribe” idea becomes influential: uncreative MI analysts decide that the must draw big maps, and charts of how different tribes are related to one another in a hierarchical fashion, and how the behavior of individuals from each tribe can be predicted on the basis of their tribal identity. We pay leaders of big groups of people to be our friends, and those big groups are always tribes. Because tribe is the be-all-and-end-all in Afghanistan, doncha know.
Unfortunately, then, commanders get seriously incorrect intel, and, well, I don’t have to tell you what happens when mistakes are made in a war zone. So–far from being academic–this tribal argument is causing real problems for the US/NATO mission to stabilize Afghanistan and eliminate al-Qaeda. But you’re right; let’s worry about perception management, that’s much more important.
Reality in Afghanistan is that tribes only matter in a small number of places. Tribes are only one kind of political affiliation among many there.
And actually, my problem is less with policymakers and generals (Petraeus and McChrystal clearly understand this stuff, but it doesn’t penetrate to the lower ranks, who have heard that “tribes are the key” etc.)
To all–just a side bar.
The SF CIDG program was probably one of the most successful SF programs in their history as they trained/armed, and led 40,000 plus “tribesmen” and then transitioned them in the 1970 drawdown to the SVN Army Ranger program so there is a history of transtioning “tribesmen” to government controls as and when it is necessary.
This theory of using CIDG was in fact supported by actual big Army lesson learned studies conducted on the SF activities in VN during the period 61-71 maybe some should go back and read that study as it is still available on the internet.
In some aspects MAJ Gant is building on that SF tradition and adapting it to the environment of the area he is working in which is it not the way all ground up processes are to work?
What concerns me more is big Armys’total lack of understanding true UW–as I am of the opinion that the two current COIN FMs are not addressing the actual on the ground living, breathing, communicating, and fighting skill sets of the Taliban/AQ related group TTPs.
Just how many Army soldiers and for that matter officers can immediately when engaged recognize the type of ambush and instigate immediate countermeasures? How many even know the term “swarm” attack? How many understand the new theory of UW that has been around since 2004 and by research released in Dec 2009 that in fact validated “open source warfare” which would allow Army ground combat personnel to fully understand the insurgency they are facing.
Outlaw7,
I’ll only comment on your CIDG reference. I agree, based on what I read it was successful while implemented for achieving tactical/operational successes. However, I think an argument could be made it wasn’t sustainable (you can argue that was proven), and ultimately our efforts in Vietnam failed.
Just like tribal or solidarity group engagement, it will work for a short while (months), but eventually it must tie into something bigger (a strategy). Jim Gant sort of addresses this in his paper, but a lot of us just aren’t convinced, but like others we’re willing to see.
Ian,
Ill caveat my arguments thus: I have a dog in this fight because the current argument does nothing to drive home the point that the irregular warrior must be familiar with all types of social behavior. While I wholeheartedly support simplifying the narrative so that the casual reader of USA Today might share in the experience, we cannot afford to do the same for the warfighter, especially in an irregular warfare scenario along the frontier.
This discussion has evolved into a lose-lose situation for all. The s-groupies are as guilty as the tribal crowd when it comes to simplifying the narrative. Basically: I am right and you are wrong.
Ive been accused of expecting our warfighters to think too much. I was told that the reason our warfighters cant ponder the complexities of life is because hey have no time and I should therefore focus my efforts on developing simple templates to guide their actions. Fine, as long as we remember that much research and hard thinking has gone into developing one of these templates and that they serve as a framework to structure the analysis only. The warfighter and analyst is still responsible for asking the appropriate question and that the situation on the ground will determine how to act and not some damn template.
I told you before; I am very comfortable discussing both s-groups and tribes and how to exploit their behavior. I can explain to you the decision-making process in a shame/honor, segmentation, patronage and territorial universe and this universe includes both the tribe and the s-group. I can describe to you how an event will play itself out from a tribal or s-group perspective. It makes no difference to me whether we discuss tribes in Iraq or solidarity groups in Afghanistan because both universes exhibit similar patterns of behavior. Please note that I said “similar patterns” of behavior and not same patterns of behavior.
I am met with a deafening silence when I ask s-groupies to explain how best to exploit the fact that s-groups exist. I very much agree that s-groups exist but if its proponents are unable to describe how to best exploit this knowledge what good are they? Knowledge for knowledge sake does the warfighter no good. The tribal crowd on the other hand appears to provide the warfighter with an actionable approach to achieving mission objectives; the s-groupies dont. All the warfighter hears is that the tribal crowd is full of crap.
Ill go out on a limb and will provide a description for how s-groups compete. S-groups when engaged in power politics tend to follow a similar pattern of behavior. They will seek to “weaken” a strong rival, “isolate” this rival from his allies, “attract” his rivals rival, and after defeating or co-opting his principal rival will attempt to “integrate” him into an alliance network. If the template is appropriate, how can we exploit this behavior for our own ends? Discuss amongst yourself.
v/r
MAC
To Anonymous:
You are right—VN was a loss, but a political loss as the NVN focused their war efforts on weakening the home front politics as a replacement for their loses suffered on the battlefield.
One of Mao’s documented tactics in a Phase 3 guerilla war if I recall.
If you can get a number of tribesmen into defense groups at say a total of 3-5K in total strenght 1) it has to be matched by an equal number of Taliban/AQ, 2) it is one less BCT on the ground at a time when BCT assets are limited, and 3) it lessens the US population’s perception of potentially high US losses (remember the war of perception as a guerilla focus).
IT still does not distact from the fact that the CIDG program was in fact successful and it had a transition to government component that many have mentioned here and it was also tied to “tribes” if one ties minority populations to the term “tribe”.
I still maintain one of the major reasons we are faltering right now is the total lack of an understanding of what a true UW war looks like and believe me Afghanistan is a true UW war–there is no comparison to the Iraqi urban environment. BUT check the DEC 2009 article in Nature magazine titled “Ecology of Human Warfare” and they argue there is in fact 14 insurgency ecology charatericstics that are identical in Iraq as well as Afghanistan.
Now if you tie tribal based defense units to intel driven off of open source warfare and the ecology of insurgents you start to control large areas of land thus denying them to the insurgents–remember the Mao concept of fish swimming in the ocean that he wrote about?
Ian:
The J2 for Afghanistan Gen. Flynn has already stated that the intel piece is broken.
It goes to say that intelligence is broken as it never really understood true UW and the JIEDDO theories of Attack the Network have been the intel focus for over seven years—it is nearly impossible to turn the battleship around and now point it against the UW concept of “open source warfare” (OSW) which is where the fight has been since 2004. By the way the term AtN is killing the system as no one seems to be able to define Attack the Network, Defeat the Network or CIED at a time that all insurgents seem fully capable of handling our CIED efforts and even match us on the evolution of technology cycle.
Unless the BCTS and big Army get their acts together and understands the drivers of an open source war and what the true ecological makeup of the insurgents are all is doomed as far as I see it.
hello ian —
much as i appreciate your reference to my paper, as well as your other inputs here, and much as i’m interested in the tribal form and its dynamics, id like to clarify quickly that i have never advocated just a “‘tribe-and-only-tribe idea” (and neither, to my reading, has gant). if you want to take a further look into this, i left earlier comments in the following places:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/11/going-tribal-in-afghanistan/#comment-5888
http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2010/02/incidentals-1st-of-5-apropos.html
onward. — david
Outlaw7,
We share many ideas in common on political or psych warfare and the damage that the attack the network mentality Ttaken to the extreme) has done to our intell community (and plans). I will follow up with you on in the counsel area so we don’t distract from this excellent discussion on an important topic. Due to business travel it may be a few weeks.
PS: in ref to the article how much does it cost? Bill
Bill: Actually both topics are interrelated.
Articles on the Ecology of War are free:
http://blog.ted.com/2009/12/ted_fellow_sean.php
http://seangourley.com/
Articles on open source warfare are free:
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/09
/bazaar_dynamics.html
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/09
/bazaar_dynamics.html
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/03
/what_is_the_opt.html
Mac, why do you go out on a limb when there is ample evidence to make a reasoned argument that goes beyond just a theory? This is my major problem here, I guess, and it probably won’t go away anytime soon. I like evidence. There is a ton of it lying around with regard to Afghanistan, but the second anyone picks it up and examines it, this is derogated as “book lernin” that takes away from target practice time. What I am absolutely confident about is that “tribal engagement” will continue, will continue to crumble a la the Shinwari case, and officers will continue to be promoted regardless. Eventually the defense budget allocations won’t bear it any longer and we’ll fold up the tents and head home, unsure of why we were ever there in the first place.
Take care and stay safe, all.
Three thing leap out of this thread.
“MAC” McCallister said:
That’s for sure — all are also saying that there is merit to the other position, just not much of it. The truth is that METT-TC is the guide, pure and simple. A further truth is that there is no panacea or silver bullet in any war.
He also said:
I had the same problem a long time ago. That generally was said by someone who really meant “I do not want them to think, I want them to do precisely what I say, no less and no more…”
There is little doubt that the desire for simple templates is most often heard from people who themselves do not want to think (I would never say are incapable of thought…) and believe others must want the same things. Egos get in the way of reality. The terrible thing is that we designed an Army training system that supports the idea that warfighters cannot and should not think. That’s huge part of the reason we are where we are.
We did all this FID/SFA before and we did it fairly well. There was no need to go to Think Tanks and the Academy to develop TTP; the information was available in the DoD system. The problem lies far above the TTP level, however. Egos and the personnel system say one must be innovative and accomplish something, ergo, one cannot learn from past mistakes, one must commit new boo-boos…
Fortunately, the kids will generally do what works even (or especially) without guidance from above.
An anomymouse soul above said the CIDG effort in Viet Nam may have worked but arguably ultimately failed — not true but the lack of a strategy made that effort all for naught. He or she goes on to lambaste a lack of strategy in current operations, a quite valid complaint. That problem is one reason for the disagreements on this thread — there is no strategy or, more correctly, an operational goal that is publicly available or known, thus all are free to provide their own version…
Another reason for the disconnect is, as someone above said, poor intel and Outlaw 7 mentioned that the 2 in the ‘Stan has said as much. It’s probably noteworthy that the same thing was true in Viet Nam and finally got fixed only because MG Davidson was kept in the job and told to fix it. Korea also had some abject and very damaging intel failures. I think there’s a message in that. There certainly appears to be a pattern…
Any competent strategy relies upon decent intelligence for its underlayment thus the intel problem has far reaching implications. The lack of an announced strategy by national policymakers creates a vacuum, no question, so everyone rushes to fill that void with their version and the failure of inadequate training and military education due to the dumbing down of the system in the late 1970s creates a service that is risk averse and not inclined to think through difficult problems while someone searches for metrics that apply.
Further, that service doesn’t do the basics well; Outlaw 7 asked:
Better to avoid being ambushed which you can do if you’re well trained and do things right but anyone can have a bad day — and when it happens, one has to know what has happened and what to do. That applies at all levels from Joe to the NCA. I’m sure good units don’t have a problem with Outlaw 7’s question. I suspect not all units qualify as good…
In broad measure, we are not doing that know what happened and what to do thing at most levels at all well as nearly as I can see…
Just a side comment—for the Engagement teams to be successful there needs to be a new form of an intel support process in order for them to be capable of holding their own with a specific tribe in a particular AO. The intel needs to structured in such way as to provide 24X7 360 degree coverage especially if they are nested in one tribe and another TET is a couple of valleys over with another tribe.
Currently do not see that happening—anything else is totally relying on the tribe for intelligence, but that takes time to build especially via the respect and rapport routes.
Some will say—hey the Human Terrain can help with their reachback but after recently seeing one of their products:
“Please explain the differences between and the history of the Haqqani Network and Hezb-i
Islami, in doctrine, composition, strategy, and tactics, particularly in the P2K area.”
Absolutely nothing on battle tactics, how they communicate internally and externally, their local support community/providers, how they have used media in the past/future uses, how have they evolved since 2007, what are their motivators, if any group member has left the group in recent months what were the reasons for leaving, etc.
The requested information read like a MA thesis taken from multiple quoted text books written in the last three/four years—
Is this the best that can be provided? Most TETs after six months with a tribe could have answered the questions listed above in depth as their survival depends on it.
But again the concept of TETs actually challenges current COIN thinking maybe that is why this discussion has broken out in the way it has.
Since you can never beat a dead horse enough, Ill respond one last time to this thread and promise to lay down my stick and bother you no more. “Book lernin” is good; applied “book lernin” even better.
Please riddle me how to apply the book learning. If tribal engagement doesnt work because tribes dont exist, then describe to me how we should engage solidarity groups. You could structure your description in the following manner so that your target audience will understand: Here is whats going on (situation); Here is what we need to do (mission); Here is how we are going to do it (concept of operation-execution); Here are the materials or funds we need to do it (service support), and Here is who should be the lead and how we communicate among ourselves (command and signal).
Here is some unsolicited info to get the s-groupers started. This is irregular warfare. As stressed by Outlaw 7, our smart folks need to understand the target village social structure, centers of social and martial power in the area of operation, key communicators and leaders, village motivations, ambitious individuals and groups, rivalries, stylized forms of fighting and peacemaking, internal and external communications, methods of mobilization, local and regional alliances, economic and trade relationships, and the social dynamics in play that makes it all work the way it does.
Our operational focus is on the relevant population (we determine relevancy). Our purpose is to gain the relevant populations support. Our objective is to exploit the legitimacy of a political or martial authority in order to influence or control the relevant population.
We might apply our understanding of the shame/honor, segmentation, patronage and territory cultural operating codes and the “what have you done for me lately, what are you going to do for me tomorrow” and “no stability without us” coordinating messages to manipulate and shape the social dynamics in play.
After we have identified the relevant population and its legitimate political authority (and yes, some type of hierarchy exists, even in an acephalous, headless, hydra Pashtun community) we can define our general engagement strategy. There are a number of different strategies from which to choose such as “pick a side and hold your nose”, “blood in the water”, “engage all sides equally” or a “combination of all three” (I am more than happy to explain the differences in strategies off-line). Our tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) might be to weaken, isolate, attract or integrate specific solidarity groups in support of one or other strategy mentioned above.
In closing: I am at a loss to explain this debate. Maybe this debate is really about the fact that some are uncomfortable that the social sciences are being exploited to kill people and break things; or that we must impose our will upon the underdog. Maybe its true that the concept of tribe is indeed a product of contact with a more complex society and particularly with the state and tribes really dont exist except in our imagination. Maybe it is something else all together. I dont know and frankly, I dont care. All I ask that S-groupers stop telling me what the problem is (most everyone knows what the problem is) and start providing me with alternative TTP. I actually believe that once s-groupers start doing so, we might find that the TTP to engage s-groups may be very similar to those advocated by the tribal crowd. Wouldnt that just be a kick in the pants.
Thanks for the rant.
v/r
MAC -Out