‘JihadJane’ case shows weaknesses in the decentralized terror model
The case of Colleen R. LaRose, a.k.a. “JihadJane,” shows significant weaknesses in the decentralized model of terror organization. Ever since Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri went into isolation, the fear in the West has been that terror conspirators would use a decentralized, bottom-up model to organize their actions. According to this theory, it is useless, and even counterproductive, to expend resources focusing on bin Laden and “al Qaeda Central.” Dispersed, decentralized, and self-radicalizing cells, with no connection to al Qaeda Central, would continue the fight. The fearful assumption was that there would be no way for law enforcement authorities to monitor and prevent such dispersed bottom-up terror cell formation before attacks occurred.
LaRose thought that a blonde-haired, blue-eyed, United States passport holder (which she is) could be a highly useful counter-surveillance asset to a jihadist terror cell. Where she and her co-conspirators erred badly was in their use of the internet to communicate. As the U.S. District Court’s indictment of LaRose makes clear, the U.S. government, along with allied governments around the world, is very effectively using electronic surveillance to uncover terror conspiracies. The cases of Major Hasan and Umar Abdulmutallab are not exceptions; electronic surveillance and other intelligence gave advance warnings, which authorities discarded due to bureaucratic failings.
The decentralized terror model results in poor tradecraft, poor training, easy electronic monitoring, little internal security, and easy police penetration. Organizations typically address such weaknesses through institutional measures such as appointing quality leaders, establishing and enforcing higher standards, instituting training programs, removing incompetent personnel, etc. In other words, establishing central control. Al Qaeda can’t do these things, or at least not very easily.
Proponents of the decentralized, self-organizing model will assert that a decentralized, self-organizing network is highly capable of learning, perhaps even faster than a centralized one. Possibly, but the assumption of rapid learning seems to require that the prospective terror cells have unfettered and secure electronic communications. That is clearly not the case.
What’s a conspirator to do? Go back to “dead drops,” chalk marks on walls, and whispered conversations on park benches? Is that how to advance the global jihad in the 21st century?
