The Men Who Would Govern Marjah
The Men Who Would Govern Marjah
by William S. McCallister
Download the full article: The Men Who Would Govern Marjah
Initial reports are optimistic. The combined Afghan and Coalition forces have successfully penetrated into the Taliban heartland and are well on their way toward securing a key population center. Taliban resistance is weak and disorganized. The local market-place has been liberated from the poppy-mafia. The Afghan national flag flies once again over Marjah.
The popular press describes the battle for Marjah in simple cause and effect narratives. The Taliban, disorganized and weak have quit the town. Civil administrators stand ready to assume the reigns of governance and to initiate economic reforms. Economic development projects will attract the local population to the central government. Enhanced security will encourage the locals to pledge their loyalty to the Karzai regime.
Reshaping the political economy of Marjah is a critical task in winning Afghanistan’s population centric counterinsurgency. Afghan forces must be able to compel law and order, impose taxes and draft manpower. They must build new schools, set up health clinics, upgrade the irrigation system, fix the roads and convince farmers and merchants to cultivate and sell something other than poppies and opium. The premise is simple: secure the market-place, fix, upgrade and adapt the infrastructure, administer market commodities and you command the population.
While simple cause and effect narratives make for good reading, cultural complexity is inseparable from the study of cause and effect, especially in a place like Marjah. We continually espouse what we believe ought to happen but rarely how a given political or economic initiative might actually play itself out within a given cultural context. What might the Afghan approach to gaining a foothold in Marjah look like? How might the landowners, merchants and farmers, civil administrators, leaders of the Afghan National Army (ANA), local police, local fighters, and allies of the Taliban interact with one another? How might the imposition of government authority in Marjah play itself out? How might elements of the ANA and police support government administrators in imposing a central authority?
Download the full article: The Men Who Would Govern Marjah
William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. While on active duty, McCallister served in numerous infantry and special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He is a published author in military affairs and tribal warfare and has guest lectured at Johns Hopkins University and presented numerous papers at academic and government sponsored conferences such as the Watson Institute, Brown University, Department of the Navy Science and Technology, DARPA, and the Central Intelligence Agency. He has also appeared as a guest on National Public Radio (NPR). McCallister is currently employed as a senior consultant for Applied Knowledge International (AKI). He continues to study current events in Iraq and Afghanistan in tribal terms, including the tribal art of war and peace, tribal mediation processes, development of tribal centers of power, and tribal influence in political developments.
