Afghanistan: Connecting Assumptions and Strategy
Afghanistan: Connecting Assumptions and Strategy – Colonel T. X. Hammes, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), Major William S. McCallister, U.S. Army (Retired), and Colonel John M. Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), Proceedings.
Three well-known military thinkers re-evaluate what we’ve assumed to know—that just wasn’t so—about a country where we’ve been fighting for eight years.
The 19th-century humorist Josh Billings once wrote that “It ain’t the things you don’t know what gets you in deep trouble; it’s the things you knows for sure what ain’t so.” The fictional Lieutenant Commander Philip Francis Queeg, who captained the ill-fated minesweeper USS Caine in Herman Wouk’s The Caine Mutiny, claimed, “You can’t assume nothin’ in this man’s Navy.” He was wrong, of course, because military planners frequently must substitute assumptions for absent facts. Those who did so in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom erred so outrageously that key suppositions began to clash with reality before the war was one week old, because what they knew for sure wasn’t so. (For elaboration, see John M. Collins, “You Can’t Assume Nothin’,” Proceedings, May 2003, p. 50.)
The Defense Department’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms clearly states that assumptions concerning current and future events must precede sound estimates of the situation and decisions regarding sensible courses of action. Connections between assumptions and strategy for Afghanistan accordingly are inseparable, but the architects of U.S. military involvement cling tenaciously to presumptions that simply aren’t so. Armed combat consequently continues to escalate eight years after early victory seemed assured.
President Barack Obama and his advisers will find it difficult (perhaps impossible) to craft sound policies, plans, force postures, and operations without first determining which underlying assumptions to retain, which to discard, and which blank spots to fill, then revise their list accordingly. Senator John Kerry (D-MA), in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, recently announced that “we in Congress have our own assignment: to test all of the underlying assumptions in Afghanistan and make sure they are the right ones before embarking on a new strategy.” No official compendium is publicly accessible (if indeed one exists), but several perceived assumptions based on observable behavior seem worthy of reconsideration…
Much more at Proceedings.
