Hard? Or SOF?

In war, the General Purpose Forces (GPF) and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) are needed in a sensible mix and they must work together. They do not now do that as well as they should. Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have not properly addressed that long standing problem; this one should do so by firmly allotting roles and missions to the GPF and SOF. Currently, long standing biases are in the way of proper task migration and allocation. The issue is the all important fight for funds, flags and spaces. That does the nation, the services and those who serve no favors.

That perspective is based on serving long ago on both sides of the GPF / SOF fence and on current conversations with relatives having recent multiple deployments on both sides of that fence today. My belief and their belief is that there is a problem, that it is significant and that it will take a major effort to fix. Some may differ; discussion would be welcome.

To place this in perspective, look at today’s force array and functions. There are the GPF and the SOF including SF (in a Direct Action role), SEALS, MarSOC, AFSOC, JSOC and others. We also have MTT, ETT, BTT, NPTT, PTT, NPoETT, OMLT, MCTAG, SF (in their designed UW/FID role), 6th SOS, the Navy has NECC advisors, the USGC has DOG, there are some Joint advisory elements and enablers like JIEDDO, REF, AWG and others. Plus DoJ/ DoS have contracts for DYNCORP and others for police advisors. There is also the ArNG and / or the Partnership for Peace. We are in a war and none of those things urgently requires change now. For possible future commitments, we can do better.

That cluster of hard working elements exists today as a result of actions in the mid 1970s. At that time, recruiting for all services was down and the quality of personnel recruited was marginal in many respects so the system in effect, dumbed down. We degraded training to an elementary level and a number of missions and tasks that the GPF had formerly performed were migrated to the SOF community. This was partly due to GPF concentration on a single theater and battle type and partly due to the poor quality of much GPF training at the time. It was also due to efforts to provide adequate ‘mission’ justification for the activation of USSOCOM in 1987 — delayed until after Goldwater Nichols was signed into law in October 1986. Twenty three years ago…

The law and the activation were results of the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, coordination problems in Operation Urgent Fury in 1983 and the bombing of the Marine Billets in Lebanon in 1983. Those also led to the Weinberger Doctrine and its follower, the Powell Doctrine, both were attempts to influence foreign policy and to avoid messy, tedious and expensive counterinsurgency operations. While there was logic in both, they failed in their intent to deter or preclude national action. A President decided that over 20 years of provocations emanating from the Middle East required a more robust response than his four successors had attempted and the doctrines became history. Another President in another day may make a similar decision.

A significant amount of mission migration occurred during the 25 or so years between the mid-70s and 2001.

The possibilities of FID and operations similar to our current deployments were largely ignored by both GPF and SOF. ‘Relevance’ was sought, roles and missions were changed. Thus SF, the FID and UW specialists, were diverted into CIF and Strategic Reconnaissance missions among others. While some pointed out the fallacy of using SF for those missions, one well within the capability of any truly competent Infantry Battalion and the other of a decently trained Long Range Surveillance Company, they were ignored and we elected, in essence, to use a Cadillac to do an Oldsmobile job. Oldsmobile, as we know, no longer exists…

Intervention in Panama and the liberation of Kuwait reinforced the view of each Force that its mission sets were correct and any comingling or cooperation was diligently avoided. The political debacle in Somalia and issues in the Balkans led to a hardening of positions between SOF and GPF, but also within the GPF between Light and Heavy and Combat Arms and other branches of the Army. Regrettably, the Army seemed to forget that it was now a professional force and the marginal quality of the mid 1970s troop unit was no longer the rule. The GPF was — and now emphatically is — capable of doing much more than it was or is allowed to do. At the same time, some SOF elements are performing routine tasks that detract from their primary mission sets.

In 2001 the Armed Forces showed that against a mediocre opponent in conventional combat, significant over match was available. What was also shown was a significant lack of adaptability and flexibility. It took some time to adapt to unexpected missions. That adaptation led to the elements cited above and to a number of ad hoc ‘fixes.’ The SOF adapted more rapidly as was to be expected but they were stretched due to finite number as only so many can qualify. That led to the GPF performing some ‘SOF like missions’ — actually, those missions, raids, HVT capture and similar missions were and are not ‘SOF-like’ at all, they are simple and normal infantry missions. The types of missions that in World War II, in Korea and in Viet Nam common infantry Battalions routinely performed but which were not trained by the Infantry during the 1990s for the reasons stated above.

Strategic Direct Action (DA) is undeniably a SOF mission — though under most circumstances Operational and Tactical DA is not. Adequate dedicated strategic DA elements are required and probably more than are currently available would be prudent. Those highly trained specialists should not be wasted on DA missions that Infantry units can perform. Nor should SF be used for DA missions under most circumstances.

Strategic Reconnaissance could, mission dependent, arguably be a SOF mission but it is not or should not be a SF mission. Operational and tactical reconnaissance are not SOF missions.

True FID is emphatically an SF mission. However, if the dedicated FID element, SF, does not have the numbers for a midsize, multiyear FID effort, then the GPF will be tasked to assist in that job as well. This means a cooperative effort by the DoD proponent, USSOCOM and TRADOC is needed to develop, emplace and support a good training regimen for the broader Army to be implemented on order. During Viet Nam, the Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course operated by SWC was quite successful in training potential advisors of all ranks and services for duty in Southeast Asia. That seems to be a good model.

The QDR cannot stop arguments over roles and missions. It should not. Such argument can be helpful. Unfortunately, arguments can also be carried too far and do great harm. At Battalion and lower level, the GPF / SOF cooperation is generally quite good; it seems the bias problem is more severe in the upper echelons on both sides of the divide. This bias and separation is aided by excessive over-classification and compartmentalization of intelligence and that too must be addressed. The entire problem will take strong command effort to eliminate.

Required is a realization, no matter how painful, that most of warfare is really a general purpose sort of thing and that a lot of Chevrolets work quite well to oppose a good many Toyotas. Upgrade some Chevrolets to backfill the Oldsmobiles. Save the Cadillacs to oppose the odd imported Rolls or Lexus.

Define ‘Special’ down too far and it no longer is special…