Military Review: May – June 2008 Issue
The May — June 2008 issue of Military Review has been posted to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center web site.
Since 1922, Military Review has provided a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs. Subsequently, publications have proliferated throughout the Army education system that specialize either in tactical issues associated with particular Branches or on strategic issues at the Senior Service School level. Bridging these two levels of intellectual inquiry, Military Review focuses on research and analysis of the concepts, doctrine and principles of warfighting between the tactical and operational levels of war.
Military Review is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Military Review also supports the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Addendum: Anbar Awakens by Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army.
In the March-April issue of Military Review of Military Review, Major Niel Smith and I wrote about the accomplishments of the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who fought in Ramadi from June 2006 through February 2007. I would like to elaborate on an important point raised in the article: the Al Anbar campaign was a model of joint operational effectiveness.
Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN by Lieutenant Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Before Operation Al Fajr, the second battle of Fallujah (in November-December 2004), an estimated 4,000 insurgents roamed the streets of Fallujah, Iraq, killing government soldiers and policemen and essentially turning the city into a rebel stronghold. They could do so not just because of their numbers and ruthlessness, but because they derived significant strength from the local population. In essence, the people provided the insurgents with the recruits and support necessary to thrive and move freely within the battlespace.
To attack this strength, the Marine Corps’ Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) would use a powerful weapon—money—to drive a wedge between the insurgents and the people and help win the second battle of Fallujah. In particular, the combat team’s civil affairs units influenced the people by providing money to alleviate their immediate needs, settle grievances, and reduce frustration arising during the course of the battle. At the same time, the units developed long-term reconstruction efforts to help local Iraqi leaders gain control of the area. In this way, RCT-1 built legitimacy for coalition forces and further increased rifts between insurgents and their much-needed popular support. These actions reduced the enemy’s base of operations and ability to maneuver. As this article will show, RCT-1 civil affairs units wielded financial power as a combat multiplier and reduced the enemy’s overall combat potential.
Reforming the Madrasah: A Disregarded Dimension in the War on Terrorism by Major Todd Schmidt, U.S. Army.
The Global War on Terror is a war of ideas.” We have heard this and similar statements repeatedly over the past five years. We read it in the papers and blogs. We listen to it from our leaders and politicians. It is an accurate statement, but it remains widely underappreciated.
The U.S. government has committed itself to a strong, concerted, and necessary effort to fight in the “war of ideas” using strategic communications, information operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs. In an effort to augment this effort, U.S. troops collect beanie babies, soccer balls, and second-hand clothes to distribute to Afghan and Iraqi children. But Soldiers’ well-intentioned actions, like those of their higher-ups in the military and government, have been largely ineffective. Promoting good will via humanitarian assistance and gestures has made little lasting impact, because such actions do not successfully challenge the ideological forces underpinning Middle Eastern cultural perceptions—and these perceptions are at the root of the conflict between Islamic terrorists and the West. To win the war of ideas, the U.S. and its allies must counter the formation of extremist attitudes where they are born and inculcated: in the Islamic madrasah school system.
From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines by Major Gary J. Morea, U.S. Army.
With the exception of a brief period of American control in the first half of the twentieth century, conflict has persisted in the Mindanao, the southern island group of the Philippines, for 500 years, since the first acts of resistance towards Spanish colonization in the sixteenth century.
In fact, this conflict is the second longest internal conflict in history.
The population of the Philippines is a mosaic of diverse ideologies, religions, and cultures that have coalesced into three distinct regions of the archipelago. At times, these regions have been at odds with each other. While several attempts at conflict resolution have been made over the years through many different forms of government, the conflict has not yet been resolved and groups continue to struggle against the central government for political consideration, concessions, and/or autonomy. Those living in the Mindanao, for whom resistance is central to identity, still writhe against the forces that wish to control them.
Title 10 Domestic Humanitarian Assistance: New Orleans by Major Michael C. Donahue, U.S. Army.
On Thursday, 1 September 2005, the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, was alerted to deploy to New Orleans to assist in humanitarian relief operations following Hurricane Katrina. Coming out of a year-long deployment in Iraq, the Black Jack Brigade had lost a significant percentage of its officers and enlisted Soldiers to post-deployment reassignments. Consequently, many staff members were new and unfamiliar with the brigade’s standardized operating procedures. Moreover, the brigade was undergoing transition to modularity, which involved complete structural reorganization and the realignment of personnel and equipment. Nevertheless, the vanguard element of the brigade—1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry—deployed on 3 September. The remaining brigade elements deployed and closed on the Naval Support Activity, New Orleans, by 6 September 2005.
The brigade operated under the control of the 82d Airborne Division and was assigned the Algiers district of Orleans Parish as its area of responsibility (AOR). Although Algiers had suffered severe wind damage and the loss of essential services, the parish did not experience the flooding that devastated the northern areas of New Orleans.
The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis by Major Shahid Afsar, Pakistan Army; Major Chris Samples, U.S. Army; and Major Thomas Wood, U.S. Army.
The Taliban did not grow out of the dark overnight, nor was it unknown in the Middle East, the region of the world most severely affected after 9/11. Following its emergence in 1994 from madrassas, the Taliban achieved surprising victories over its enemies and assumed rule over much of Afghanistan.2 Simultaneously hailed as saviors and feared as oppressors, the Taliban were an almost mythical phenomenon that seemed to embody the very essence of Afghan cultural beliefs, especially revenge for transgression, hospitality for enemies, and readiness to die for honor. The Taliban knew the Afghan people and their ways and embedded themselves in the complex Afghan web of tribalism, religion, and ethnicity.
Despite their quick overthrow in 2002 by a small coalition of U.S. forces and anti-Taliban groups, the Taliban has not gone away. In fact, today, in the face of thousands of NATO and U.S. troops, a growing Afghan National Army (ANA), and a popularly elected government, the movement’s influence in Afghanistan is increasing. It continues to wage an insurgency that has prevented the new government from establishing legitimacy, and it has created massive unrest in Pakistan. Clearly, it behooves us to know something more about this archaic but formidable enemy.
The Al-Qaeda Media Machine by Philip Seib, J.D.
Like an aging rock star who has dropped out of the public eye, Osama bin-Laden occasionally decides to remind people that he’s still around. He makes video appearances that first appear on Arabic television channels but which the world quickly sees on television or on multiple Web sites. Bin-Laden’s message is “Hey, they haven’t caught me yet,” which cheers up his fans, but his threats and pronouncements are mostly terrorist boilerplate. For all the parsing of his sentences and scrutinizing of the color of his beard, hardly anything in his videos helps us better understand and combat terrorism.
Meanwhile, significant Al-Qaeda media efforts go largely unnoticed by news organizations and the public. This myopia is characteristic of an approach to antiterrorism that focuses on Bin-Laden as terror-celebrity while ignoring the deep-rooted dynamism of a global enemy. Most jihadist media products make no mention of Bin-Laden, but they deserve attention because they are vital to Al-Qaeda’s mission and to its efforts to extend its influence. Al-Qaeda has become a significant player in global politics largely because it has developed a sophisticated media strategy.
Through an Arab Cultural Lens by Helen Altman Klein, Ph.D., and Gilbert Kuperman.
Retired Major General Robert H. Scales has described how in today’s world, military victory “will be defined more in terms of capturing the psych-cultural rather than the geographical high ground.”1 It is in this spirit that we look at the Arab Middle East.
U.S. military and civilian personnel are increasingly sensitive to customs, social organization, leadership, and religion as aspects of Arab culture. It is clear that, with international events as they are, America and its allies need to appreciate how Arabs think. When we misunderstand the Arab perspective and fail to see events through Arab eyes, we can make costly mistakes. To this end, the U.S. Air Force commissioned a study of the Arab mind to identify key differences between Arab and Western thinking.2 Study members reviewed research literature, religious texts, and even business and travel guides. The United Nation’s report on Arab culture proved particularly valuable.3 The group conducted in-depth interviews with 16 Arabs from Egypt, Israel’s West Bank, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and with 6 Westerners with extensive experience in dealing with Arabs from Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Islam and Symbolism by First Sergeant António Rodrigues, Portuguese Army.
Islamic culture is resplendent with symbols containing historical, religious, and mystical elements. Persons working in the Middle East are advised to become familiar with them.
Symbols resonate throughout Islamic cultures, from high art and literature to popular culture. They can be found everywhere in everyday social life. It is fair to say that an understanding of Islamic culture is incomplete without an appreciation for the rich panoply of symbols that tie ancient history and tradition to modern cultures and societies that have embraced or largely embraced Islam.
Islamic symbols come from diverse sources. Most share a common nexus with the life and mission of the Prophet Mohammed and the genesis of Islam, but others are legacies of ancient sources that date from before the emergence of Islam.
Transition Teams: Adapt and Win by Captain William C. Taylor, U.S. Army.
Having served as executive officer and operations officer of a battalion military transition team (MiTT) in Iraq from May 2007 to April 2008, I found that operations varied greatly from team to team. At first this surprised me, since the mission we’d been given before deploying seemed fairly clear-cut: “provide advisory support and direct access to coalition effects to enhance the ability of Iraqi forces to operate independently, advise the Iraqi Army (IA) on tactics, military decision-making process, counterinsurgency (COIN ) warfare, leadership, teamwork, communications, urban combat, and provide knowledge on combat arms management and organizational experience.” Some teams had taken this mission statement at its word and adhered strictly to their advisory tasks, disdaining any interaction with the local coalition unit. Other teams focused heavily on liaising between their IA and parent coalition unit, and did minimal advising. Even among the MiTTs that focused on training, there were differences. Few teams, for example, dared to wade into leadership, teamwork, and ethics with their IA unit’s leaders. Internal MiTT leadership varied too: some team leaders were democratic, others more traditionally hierarchical. How, I began to wonder, given all these different examples and some obvious differences among Iraqi units, should we operate on our own team?
Constructive Engagement: A Proven Method for Conducting Stability and Support Operations by Sergeant Major Martin Rodriguez, U.S. Army, Retired; Major Andrew Farnsler, U.S. Army; and John Bott.
In the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO), successful conduct of stability and support operations (SASO) requires an imaginative combination of lethal and nonlethal methods. For the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division, the combination is known as constructive engagement (CE) and is conducted in battalion sectors throughout Baghdad. Constructive engagement combines the full spectrum of military operations with diplomacy at the tactical level, a strategy described by top commanders in Iraq in a 2004 New York Times article as “a mix of military tactics, political maneuvering, media management and a generous dollop of cash for quickly rebuilding war-ravaged cities—a formula that, if it survives the test of time, could become a model for future fighting against the persistent insurrections plaguing Iraq.”
During full-spectrum operations in a SASO environment, a commander must balance the application of military (lethal and civil-military) operations with diplomatic engagement to achieve the desired end state. CE describes the methods commanders use to reach this balance, and in Baghdad the goal is the creation of a safe and secure environment in which the seeds of a republic will flourish. The mix of military and diplomatic tactics required very much depends on the environment within each unit sector and the personality of the battalion commander; a commander’s skill as a Soldier and diplomat often determine the unit’s level of success. Many small-unit leaders and commanders in Baghdad found diplomatic methods are often the most efficient means of reducing the insurgent base.
The Most Important Thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System by James R. Locher III.
The National Security System that the president uses to manage the instruments of national power, and the manner in which Congress oversees and funds the system, do not permit the agility required to protect the United States and its interests in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world. From 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and emerging threats to the homeland, 21st-century national security challenges demand more effective communication across traditional organizational boundaries. Meeting these challenges requires a common vision and organizational culture and better integration of expertise and capabilities.
The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947 by Charles A. Stevenson, Ph.D.
Harry Truman was at Washington D.C.’s National Airport on Saturday, 26 July 1947, waiting impatiently to fly home to Missouri to see his dying mother. First, however, he wanted to sign a long-delayed bill reorganizing the government to deal with national security matters. Congress had completed action on the measure, but the printing office had closed, so there was a delay in preparing the bill for Truman’s signature.
A little after noon, congressional clerks brought the bill on board the Sacred Cow, the four-engine C-54 presidential plane. Truman promptly signed it, as well as an executive order setting forth roles and missions for the Armed Forces and a paper nominating James Forrestal to be the first Secretary of Defense. An hour later, en route to Missouri, Truman learned that his mother had died. Meanwhile, just before adjourning until November, the Senate quickly approved Forrestal’s nomination by voice vote.
Will the Army Ever Learn Good Media Relations Techniques? Walter Reed as a Case Study by Colonel James T. Currie, U.S. Army Reserves, Retired, Ph.D.
If you ever wanted a near-perfect case study of how not to deal with the press, the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) controversy would be a great place to start. Of course, the Walter Reed episode also offers lessons in leadership and accountability. Some of those lessons manifest themselves in this article, but the focus here is on the Army’s bungled interaction with the news media and on how to avoid a repeat of the nightmarish fiasco.