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Towards a Theory of Applied Strategy in Tribal Society

by Shawn

02.22.2008 at 10:20pm

The term strategy is generally applied to describe an “idea” of a direction, plan, concept, and courses of action in which to proceed. (1) Strategy is fundamentally concerned with the application of instruments or elements of power (diplomatic/political, economic, martial and informational) to achieve political objectives in cooperation or competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives.

The underlying assumption of strategy is that other competitive entities have interests that they pursue to the best of their abilities. Strategy reflects a choice, a preference for a future state or condition. In an attempt to create this condition, strategy confronts adversaries and unforeseen events beyond one’s direct control.

Strategy is about how (way or concept) available power (means or resources) is applied to achieve objectives (end) in support of interests. Experts stress that the strategist must know what is to be accomplished and that only by analyzing and understanding the internal and external environment in which he operates can the strategist develop appropriate objectives leading to the desired end-state. The theory itself highlights the requirement for strategy to ensure an appropriate balance among objectives, methods, and available resources. (The force that balances the objective, methods and available resources is an example of a Center of Gravity and reflects Chinese military thought to first “attack the strategy, then the alliance, and lastly the soldiers themselves”).

Discussion of power should not be limited to only two categories; soft and hard power. Power may also be described as potential power. The power to initiate change; applied force to drastically change the existing sociopolitical condition. Initiating fundamental changes in the present with expected benefits to be realized in the future.

Hierarchical versus Networked Strategy

The western way of strategy is based on the premise that strategy is hierarchical and that best case it is both a reflection of national consensus and comprehensive direction. It further purposes that the political leadership both insures and maintains its control and influence through the hierarchical nature of state strategy. (2) Strategy in tribal society on the other hand is of a networked nature. The reason why is found in the way the tribe is governed and administered.

The paramount sheikh of a given tribe is assisted by a number of confidential advisors and principal lieutenants consisting predominantly of senior nobles and a few outstanding commoners. His brothers and paternal uncles, in particular, are everywhere entitled and expected to assist him and thus have special authority over portions of the tribe as a whole. In carrying out his specific duties the paramount sheik, in addition to his immediate family, is also assisted by various grades of local authority. The tribe is therefore administered not so much by the paramount sheikh alone as by the whole of his family and local authority, though as holder of the office he personally has distinctive powers and privileges. In terms of tribal strategy development, all factions represent powerful interests whether based on familial politics, economic or security considerations competing for position and influence.

While the paramount sheikh is the representative and spokesman of the tribe and is responsible for the tribe’s external relations, the strategy to care for his people and to promote the tribe’s welfare and security is a reflection of various powerful interest groups competing with one another for positions of advantage within the tribe. The outward expression of what we perceive to be strategic consensus at any given moment is the product of adaptation, competition and cooperation within the tribe itself and subject to change as one or another faction gains or loses influence. Much adaptation is intuitive and less based on rational cost-benefit analysis but influenced by traditional rules of behavior that governs competition and cooperation amongst the various factions. A good deal of confusion can result when Coalition Forces are approached by one faction or another trying to improve their relative position within the tribe, or as one local authority seeks to strengthen his specific political, economic or security jurisdiction, and is believed to speak for the tribe as a whole. In this case, if the local authority is successful, his initiative may well be adopted into the overall tribal strategy and the strategy evolves from that point forward. On the other hand, his attempt may fail, regardless of whether he is individually successful especially if he is opposed by a more powerful faction or is unable to attract enough allies to support his effort. As a result, his strategic design reflects a mixture of intuition, flexibility, competition, cooperation and adaptation to local conditions vice a hierarchical design seeking a decisive battle in every encounter. This same dynamic can be observed when political parties compete for power.

Western hierarchical strategy rests on the premise that it must be comprehensive and conducive to facilitating control. It encourages the strategist to think holistically and to reflect on the whole of the strategic environment in his analysis. Analysis is based on comprehensive knowledge of what is happening and the potential first; second, third, etc., order effects at the tactical and operational levels. Strategy is therefore the product of a thorough analysis and knowledge of the situation and environment.

The Achilles Heel of western hierarchical strategy may well be exposed when confronted by a networked tribal strategic design. While there is no disagreement that we must appreciate the situation and achieve an appreciation for the potential first, second, and third effects at the tactical and operational levels, comprehensive knowledge of all the things that might influence the overall strategic design may be a bridge too far. Effects are determined not simply by preceding causes but are part of a continuous process of evolution. These complex interactions are too numerous to predict, identify and observe as they manifest themselves in their various end states along the historical timeline.

Our emphasis on comprehensive knowledge and control and reflected in a rigid strategic design limits our flexibility is the primary cause of much surprise when confronted with unpredicted events. Unpredicted events cause the system to revert to a reactive mode and therefore require time to realign itself so as to focus on the changed condition. Time that is used by an adversary who relies on intuitive, flexible and adaptive behavior to exploit opportunities so as to shape the situation in his favor. As the system realigns itself and is unable to adapt quickly enough to the changed circumstances we are forced to press on with inappropriate tactical and operational level actions so as to maintain momentum regardless of the applicability or desirability of the potential long-term strategic effects we may be initiating with these actions. It took three and a half years of hard fighting in Iraq to begin to change our mental model.

There is no need to change the strategy model. The model works well in structuring the analysis. There is a need, on the other hand, when engaged in a tribal society to adapt our thinking and to accept the fact that how we think is susceptible to exploitation, not necessarily because our opponent is smarter but because he thinks differently. An apt analogy to reinforce this point is to imagine a contest between two strategists. One thinks in terms of chess; the other backgammon. Success in both games is realized through the appropriate application of strategy and skill. But here is where the games diverge. The chess master is faced with diminishing options and opportunities over time. A certain opening gambit locks the strategist into a specific series of combinations that seek to take advantage of an opponent’s mistake and to minimize the risk of making a mistake in return. The critical component missing in this relationship is chance. The operational environment is less dynamic for the strategist is focused on initiating the appropriate combination of moves in the attack to reinforce the defense or vice versa. Backgammon on the other hand also combines strategy and skill but the operational environment is inundated with the effects of chance; every throw of the dice in backgammon changes the conditions and by default the operational environment of the game. Just like in the game of chess, the strategist seeks not only to take advantage of an opponent’s mistake, but also to exploit emerging opportunities presented with each throw of the dice. The strategist in backgammon therefore is likely to be more flexible, intuitive and opportunistic something that is also reflected in the execution of tribal strategy. This should not come as a surprise since backgammon is the game of choice in the Middle East and an expression of the way people think and act.

The strategist planning for operations in a tribal society must early on gain an appreciation for the historical, cultural, traditional and sociopolitical context of the environment she or he is attempting to shape. He should therefore begin to think in terms of social and cultural operating codes and coordinating messages. The social codes and coordinating messages are the foundation for the existing social contract upon which the existing political formula is based. The political formula in turn greatly influences the form and function of indigenous social institutions and organizations and reflects the accepted norms of behavior between individuals and groups. Although we will never gain a detailed understanding of cultures and societies different from our own, an appreciation for the cultural operating environment will go a long way in achieving political objectives in cooperation or competition with others pursuing their own objectives.

William S. McCallister is a retired Army officer who served in the Middle East in special operations assignments. He is a published author and authority on tribal warfare. Mr. McCallister is currently employed as a senior consultant for Applied Knowledge International in Iraq.

Endnotes

1. H. Richard Yarger, “Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model”, http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm

2. Ibid