Cartels, Terrorism Designations, and US Policy: A Mexican Perspective

The influence of Mexican cartels has evolved dramatically over the past few decades—from localized criminal organizations to powerful transnational networks posing significant threats to national and international security. As their operations have grown in scope and brutality, these groups have increasingly become a focus of both public concern and government action. The Trump administration notably prioritized border security and designated six Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in an effort to counter them more effectively.

While this issue has sparked extensive debate across many platforms, this article focuses specifically on the Mexican viewpoint through an interview with journalist Eduardo Zerón García (EZ)  With a career spanning multiple high-level roles in federal and state institutions in Mexico—including General Director of Criminal Intelligence and membership in the Technical Secretariat of the National Security Council—Zerón brings both analytical depth and firsthand experience to the conversation. He currently writes as a columnist for La Silla Rota, specializing in national security and political affairs.

Our discussion covers the historical rise of cartels, their growing role as security threats, the structural conditions behind their dominance, the contentious debate over FTO designations, and the broader implications of these policies. Finally, we explore potential strategies for reducing cartel influence and violence moving forward.

The Evolution of Mexican Cartels

MC: Can you briefly walk us through the historical evolution of major drug cartels in Mexico? How did they originate and consolidate power over time?

EZ: “Absolutely. The beginnings of drug trafficking can be traced back to the 1920s and 1930s, when Ignacia Jasso, known as “La Nacha,” from Ciudad Juárez, joined Enrique Fernandez and became part of his criminal syndicate. They were responsible for large-scale trafficking operations involving morphine, marijuana, opium, and hemp, maintaining control of Ciudad Juárez well into the 1970s. Their activities laid the groundwork for a criminal business model that figures like Pedro Avilés Pérez and the Guadalajara Cartel would later institutionalize.”

“In the 1970s, Pedro Avilés Pérez, also known as “El León de la Sierra,” began his operations in Sinaloa. He was the first to organize smuggling routes for marijuana and opium into the US by air. He also initiated the use of bribes to influence authorities, establish territorial control, and build distribution networks.”

“Additionally, he mentored several key figures, including Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, Rafael Caro Quintero, and Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo, who would later go on to found the Guadalajara Cartel.”

“The Guadalajara Cartel, led by Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo in the 1980s, was the first major centralized organization to evolve from local smuggling groups into an international syndicate, coordinating drug shipments from South America to the United States. After his arrest in 1989, the cartel fractured, giving rise to powerful regional groups such as the Tijuana Cartel, Juárez Cartel, and Sinaloa Cartel, each controlling key trafficking routes. This marked the collapse of Félix Gallardo’s vision for a National Federation of Drug Traffickers.”

“During the 2000s, Mexican cartels became increasingly militarized, particularly with the emergence of Los Zetas, a group formed by former special forces soldiers. Their entry into the criminal underworld escalated violence across the country, introducing tactics such as mass executions and public displays of brutality. At the same time, the Sinaloa Cartel consolidated its power through strategic alliances, extensive corruption networks, and logistical control, becoming one of the most dominant drug trafficking organizations globally, with major exports to the United States. However, internal disputes and increased government pressure led to further fragmentation, spawning splinter groups and localized conflicts.”

“In the 2010s, the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) emerged as a proxy force for the Sinaloa Cartel, drawing from remnants of the Milenio Cartel. Key figures such as Armando Valencia Cornejo (“El Maradona”) and Óscar Nava Valencia (“El Lobo”) had previously collaborated closely with the Sinaloa Cartel, particularly with Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, in efforts to eliminate their main rival, Los Zetas. Over time, the CJNG broke away and directly challenged the Sinaloa Cartel through paramilitary-style operations and aggressive territorial expansion.”

“Cartels also diversified their criminal activities, expanding into extortion, fuel theft, and human trafficking, effectively becoming de facto authorities in many regions. Today, Mexico’s criminal landscape is defined by decentralized networks, shifting alliances, and hybrid warfare tactics, with the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG remaining the two principal actors in an increasingly fragmented and volatile ecosystem.”

MC: Which cartels were initially dominant, and how has the power structure shifted among them over the past few decades?

EZ: “Initially, in the 1980s, the Guadalajara Cartel was the dominant criminal organization in Mexico, serving as the central distributor for drug trafficking routes into the United States. This cartel operated with protection from political and security elites, which allowed it to grow and control vast trafficking networks. Following its eventual fragmentation, several powerful regional cartels emerged: the Tijuana Cartel, led by the Arellano Félix family; the Juárez Cartel, led by the Carrillo Fuentes family; and the Sinaloa Cartel, led by Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, and others. Each inherited key smuggling corridors and expanded its influence accordingly.”

“Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the Sinaloa Cartel gradually consolidated power through strategic alliances, a corporate-like operational structure, and the widespread use of corruption and logistical sophistication. However, this dominance was increasingly challenged by the emergence of Los Zetas—a group composed of former Mexican special forces soldiers—originally formed as the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel. The eventual split between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas in 2010 triggered a wave of extreme violence and further fragmentation of Mexico’s criminal landscape.”

“By the 2010s, a significant power shift occurred with the rise of the CJNG. This group expanded rapidly by absorbing local gangs and waging brutal campaigns against rivals, including direct confrontations with the Sinaloa Cartel. Today, Mexico’s cartel landscape consists of approximately 10 to 15 major organizations and numerous subgroups, including localized criminal gangs. Despite this fragmentation, a bipolar dominance persists between the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG, with many smaller factions acting as splinter or proxy groups aligned with one of the two.”

“Unlike the earlier periods of centralized cartel control, the current environment is far more complex. As scholar Víctor Hugo Guerra describes, “it is a complex, interdependent, and multidimensional structure, with nodes that have a specific function and may not even know or rely on other nodes.” This decentralized model is shaped by fluid alliances, shifting loyalties, and ongoing territorial disputes.”

MC: How has the relationship between cartels and the Mexican state evolved since the 1980s?

EZ: “In the 1980s, the relationship between Mexican drug cartels and the state shifted from covert collusion to open confrontation, with a major turning point marked by the assassination of DEA agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena. At the time, the Guadalajara Cartel operated with near impunity, protected by elements within Mexican law enforcement and intelligence services, particularly the now-defunct Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS), which functioned as both an intelligence agency and political police.”

“This tacit arrangement began to unravel in the 1990s and 2000s, as the major cartels splintered and competition among them intensified. In response, Presidents Felipe Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto launched military-led campaigns aimed at dismantling cartel leadership. These efforts led to widespread militarization and inadvertently deepened the cartels’ infiltration of state institutions, particularly at the municipal and regional levels. Cartels increasingly co-opted local police forces, governors, and political candidates, turning some areas into zones of parallel criminal governance.”

“Today, the relationship between the state and cartels is marked by asymmetrical warfare and selective corruption. While the federal government continues to promote a hardline, confrontational stance, many local and state institutions remain deeply compromised. In some regions, cartels have filled the vacuum left by the government by offering economic opportunities and a form of “security,” thereby gaining legitimacy and control over local populations. This dynamic highlights the blurred boundaries between state authority and criminal governance in parts of contemporary Mexico.”

Cartels as a Growing Security Threat

MC: In recent years, cartels have expanded beyond drug trafficking. How would you describe their transformation into broader criminal enterprises?

EZ: “The cartels expanded so rapidly that diversification became essential to sustain their criminal operations, revenue streams, and territorial control. This shift marked a reactive transformation: first, in response to increasing law enforcement pressure, and second, in pursuit of higher profits. Today, Mexican cartels are recognized as transnational criminal organizations engaged in a wide array of illicit activities. Beyond drug trafficking, they are involved in money laundering, extortion, fuel theft (commonly known as huachicol), illegal mining, human smuggling, arms trafficking, and cybercrime. In many cases, these ventures have become even more profitable than drug trafficking itself, allowing cartels to broaden their influence both domestically and internationally.”

MC: What distinguishes the current cartel violence from earlier periods? Are we seeing new tactics, levels of brutality, or geographic expansion?

EZ: “Cartels have refined their tactics over time and now exert greater influence through intimidation and terror. As a result, they have become increasingly violent, excessive, and brutal, with their actions growing in scale and sophistication. However, it is important to recognize that each cartel operates differently, employing strategies tailored to its specific interests and goals. For example, comparing the Sinaloa Cartel to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) highlights distinct operational models. The Sinaloa Cartel functions more like the Sicilian Mafia, using calculated and targeted violence, while CJNG is known for its overt brutality and displays of force. Although their tactics may resemble insurgent warfare, the more accurate term is asymmetric warfare.”

“Today, cartels are also receiving training from foreign actors, including former Colombian military personnel and even individuals from the United States. These trainers provide instruction in the use of emerging technologies such as drones, as well as in human trafficking and other advanced methods, enabling cartels to expand their reach and capabilities in the global criminal landscape.”

MC: Have cartels increasingly resembled insurgent or terrorist groups in their use of violence and territorial control? Are the resemble of what?

EZ: “I believe there is a point where we can see that cartels adopt tactics from all over the world. They replicate, for example, car bombings used in Ireland in the 1990s or employ hitmen on motorcycles, like Colombia did during Pablo Escobar’s era. The cartels provide their associates with paramilitary training designed to enhance and adapt their approaches to engagement. We often discuss the Zetas cartel, known for utilizing military training. These traffickers use very sophisticated military techniques to exert territorial control and send clear messages to the community and authorities about what to expect if they are not allowed to act in their own interests.”

Structural Factors Behind Cartel Dominance

MC: What economic, social, or institutional factors have enabled cartels to dominate the illicit economy and exert control across much of Mexico?

EZ: “Cartels have gained influence in Mexico due to the convergence of economic, social, and institutional vulnerabilities that facilitate their dominance in the illicit economy. They exert territorial control. Widespread poverty, inequality, and lack of formal employment, especially in rural marginalized regions, make organized crime an attractive source of income.”

“Cartels offer high wages and provide a sense of status, protection, and belonging to communities that the state has neglected or overlooked. Socially, the erosion of trust in public institutions, combined with generational exposure to violence, has normalized criminal presence everywhere. In many areas, cartels fill the void left by weak governance. They provide security, mediate disputes, and distribute resources—functions traditionally expected from the state.”

“This criminal governance model, for some, further enhances their legitimacy in communities where state presence is limited or abusive. Institutionally, cartels exploit corruption, impunity, and fragmented law enforcement.”

“Local police forces, prosecutors, and even elected officials frequently collude with cartels to operate with near-total impunity. This combination of state weakness and criminal adaptability has enabled these groups to embed themselves not only in the economy but also in the very structures of local power.”

MC: To what extent has corruption at local or national levels facilitated cartel expansion?

EZ: “A clear example of cartel expansion driven by corruption is the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), which, during the Peña Nieto administration, grew from operating in four states to controlling territory in 26. It is impossible to understand the level of expansion of the cartel without the state’s sponsorship, particularly the security forces under the leadership of the Minister of the Interior at that time.”

“Under the López Obrador government, a new paradigm emerged in which cartels were allowed to operate with impunity virtually everywhere, resulting in a violent toll of almost 200,000 people killed. Like multinational corporations, cartels rely on weakening institutions from within, strategically corrupting key officials to secure impunity and access. By understanding this, we see that even the most well-designed institutions—whether in Mexico, the US, Canada, or China—are vulnerable if their integrity is compromised at critical points. Once cartels gain intelligence or influence through even a few corrupted actors, they can exploit that access to expand rapidly.”

“This is why corruption is not only a domestic problem but also a transnational security concern, a threat that needs to be understood as a significant risk to the state. For countries like the US and Canada, undermining the political and financial networks that support cartel-state collusion should be a strategic priority.”

MC: What role do international markets—such as US drug demand or European trafficking routes—play in sustaining cartel power?

EZ: “International markets, especially US demand and emerging European trafficking routes, play a crucial role in maintaining cartel power. Without sustained demand for narcotics abroad, the financial engine that fuels their operations would collapse. The United States remains the largest consumer of cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl produced by traffickers, generating billions in illicit profits. Similarly, Europe has become an increasingly attractive and profitable market, particularly for cocaine and synthetic drugs. These profits are reinvested into weapons, recruitment, logistics, corruption, reinforcement, and the cartel’s ability to operate transnationally. In short, international demand is not just a consequence; it is a structural pillar of cartel power. Reducing this demand and strengthening international cooperation are essential to undermining their financial and operational capabilities.”

US Designation of Cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations

MC: On February 20, 2025, the new administration designated six Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. What’s the significance of this move?

EZ: “This move is extremely significant because it marks a new paradigm in the prosecution of international drug trafficking organizations. For years, the approach to combating cartels had remained largely the same, relying on conventional law enforcement methods. By classifying them as terrorist organizations, a new level of legal and operational tools becomes available, which has already yielded significant results.”

“In the United States, for instance, authorities have reported up to a 20% reduction in overdose-related deaths. However, 80% of these deaths still originate from drug trafficking in large quantities from Mexico, as well as other countries. Additionally, criminal groups are adapting their strategies and increasingly shifting operations to other nations, such as Canada.”

“Therefore, it’s essential to understand that this shift in classification goes beyond theoretical debates about whether these groups meet the doctrinal definition of terrorism. What matters is that this new framework enables enhanced cooperation between the US and Mexico and is already delivering concrete outcomes in the fight against transnational organized crime.”

MC: How have these cartels responded so far to their designation? Has there been any noticeable change in their behavior, tactics, or visibility?

EZ: “Cartels are highly resilient and adaptable structures. Since their designation as foreign terrorist organizations, we haven’t seen a drastic or overtly violent reaction. Instead, what we’ve observed is a shift toward strategic adaptation. Some groups have chosen to hibernate—reducing their visibility and operational footprint—while others are exhibiting what we might call strategic patience, waiting for the environment to stabilize before reasserting their influence.”

“At the same time, there’s evidence that certain factions are relocating or expanding internationally, particularly to countries like Canada, where law enforcement agencies have noted an uptick in cartel-linked activity. Internally, cartels like Sinaloa are undergoing leadership transitions, with power struggles among their factions and ongoing efforts to preserve strategic alliances with groups like the CJNG.”

“Rather than collapsing, these organizations are reorganizing. They’re reassessing their structures, modifying their methods, and recalibrating their operations. Meanwhile, ongoing judicial cooperation—such as in the case of Ovidio Guzmán—could contribute to further fragmentation and internal conflict. But to be clear: while the designation has increased pressure, the cartels are evolving, not retreating.”

MC: Has this designation had any measurable impact on the level of violence or trafficking activities?

EZ: “This isn’t a question that can be answered in binary terms. The impact of the designation must be analyzed within the broader context of bilateral cooperation between the United States and Mexico. Following certain key developments—such as the targeting or neutralization of cartel leaders—we’ve seen an intensification of proxy conflicts among criminal organizations, which has escalated violence in some regions.”

“The designation itself is part of a larger strategic framework. It provides both governments with enhanced tools for investigations, asset freezes, intelligence exchange, surveillance, and coordinated enforcement. While we can’t attribute changes in violence or trafficking directly to the designation alone, it’s clear that it strengthens the broader effort to disrupt cartel operations.”

“In short, the real impact comes not just from the label of “terrorist organization,” but from the combined effect of legal, financial, and intelligence-based actions that follow it.”

Reactions and Implications

MC: How has the Mexican government responded to the US designation of these cartels as terrorist organizations? Has there been cooperation or resistance?

EZ: “The Mexican government has been cautious and reserved about these designations. Mexico has always, under every administration, preferred cooperation and collaboration without subordination, as President Sheinbaum states, which is correct. There is also concern about unilateral actions by the United States that will not be tolerated by Mexican authorities, particularly regarding international law and the potential violation of sovereignty. Mexico has the tools and the potential to deal with these criminal organizations, and cooperation is evident, yielding extraordinary results.”

• What is the general perception among the Mexican public—do these designations impact how people view cartels or the US role in Mexican security affairs?

EZ: “I believe that not many people today directly associate actions against the cartels with their designation as terrorist organizations. While people may be aware of the designation itself, when violence becomes deeply embedded in daily life, they tend to focus more on immediate events rather than the broader legal or political classifications behind them.”

“In my view, the parallel actions resulting from the designation—such as sanctions against two banks and a brokerage firm—are more visible and debated within political and institutional circles (the establishment) than among the general public, even if the designation is widely known.”

“Operations like intelligence-gathering flights or the extradition of Mexican gang members to the US are clearly tied to this designation, but the connection is often blurred. For the public, the link between these actions and the terrorist designation remains vague and poorly understood.”

MC: Have these designations-driven cartels to shift operations—perhaps toward Europe, Asia, or into alternative illicit markets like human smuggling, arms trafficking, or illegal mining?

EZ: “Yes, and this has prompted cartels to adapt and diversify, but that isn’t solely due to the designations; they tend to expand into new markets or alternative illicit economies because there is a need—either to launder their assets or to merge into the licit economy.”

“We’ve already seen Mexican cartels increase their footprint in Europe and Asia, particularly in synthetic drugs, as the CJNG does—first because the Cártel de Sinaloa had already co-opted the US market, and second because the revenue is so large that it has made them the richest cartel in the world. With that amount of money, moving it into the cartel’s pockets becomes a gigantic problem, so the cartel is moving its interests into any business that helps hide it and generate profit. It’s not just geography—it’s also diversification in the types of crime.”

“Cartels are now deeply involved in human smuggling, arms trafficking, extortion, illegal logging, counterfeiting, illegal mining, restaurants, hospitals, and housing. One of the most profitable sources recently has been fuel theft, or huachicol, which not only generates huge profits but also undermines state authority and infrastructure.”

“When enforcement actions began to disrupt China’s chemical supply chain, cartels quickly redirected their sourcing strategies toward India. As pressure mounts on India as well, Turkiye is now emerging—as some trends demonstrate—as an alternative supply market. Why? Because Turkiye offers a great strategic geographic position, sitting at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and combines that with relatively weak regulatory oversight over chemical trade. This makes it highly attractive for traffickers.”

“We’re also likely to see the cartels form partnerships with Turkish criminal networks to introduce drugs into Europe and Asia. This will facilitate decentralized sourcing and supply of precursors—particularly toward Latin America, Canada, Europe, Asia, and the broader North American market. Turkiye risks becoming a critical blind spot in the global chemical supply chain. And as we’ve seen time and again, criminal organizations are constantly analyzing structural vulnerabilities to exploit them faster than policy can react in their favor.”

Looking Forward

MC: What are the risks and benefits of designating cartels as terrorist organizations from a policy and enforcement perspective?

EZ: “Well, the idea of designating cartels as terrorist organizations offers both strategic advantages and serious complications. For instance, it gives law enforcement and intelligence agencies access to a broader set of tools. These include asset freezes, extraterritorial prosecutions, intelligence operations, and even the ability to target individuals for providing material support—not only to criminals but also to terrorists and illegal entities. This shift can significantly change priorities and promote better coordination between countries, especially regarding extradition and tracking.”

“It also sends a strong political message. These groups aren’t just trafficking organizations; they are destabilizing entire regions, intimidating populations, and sometimes even challenging the state itself. Therefore, treating them as a national security threat rather than just organized criminals helps align resources accordingly, but the risk is also significant.”

“First, there’s the diplomatic fallout. A country like México may oppose these kinds of designations because they could imply foreign intervention and justify actions that infringe on their sovereignty. It also militarizes the problem. Second, from a strategic perspective, labeling cartels as terrorists could escalate the conflict. The risk of a strategic surprise in retaliation is obvious, as is the strategic risk of cartels adopting more insurgent tactics.”

MC: Can designations alone have any deterrent effect, or do they require coordinated strategies on corruption, governance, and economic reform?

EZ: “This strategy cannot succeed without deterrence, and I will sum it up as deception. That is a fundamental part of the strategy, and it also requires a coordinated approach to corruption, governance, and economic reform that targets choke points against cartels—such as the seizure of cartel assets, or extinción de dominio, to rapidly take goods away from them without the interference of bureaucratic machinery.”

“When we discuss deterrence, we’re referring to one of the most crucial aspects of the United States’ culture of intelligence and national security. When these designations grant authorities numerous tools, cartels recognize that the potential damage from engaging in illegal activities could be so significant that the economic losses might be dramatic and possibly unrecoverable. As a result, strategic patience will be maintained.”

“One of the core issues we need to confront is corruption. You can’t seriously talk about dismantling cartels or deterring their growth without tackling the systems that allow them to thrive. Corruption should be seen as a central element in any risk assessment involving organized crime and terrorism.”

“But if corruption remains unchecked, those same cartels will just find ways to buy protection, manipulate institutions, and continue operating. So yes, deterrence has value—but only when it’s backed by serious reforms that improve institutional integrity, strengthen the rule of law, and offer economic alternatives to communities caught in the crossfire. Many of these reforms, and some related to intelligence, are currently being approved in México’s Congress in an effort to make this work more efficiently.”

MC: What should both the US and Mexican governments be prioritizing if the goal is to effectively counter the growing power of cartels?

EZ: “The governments should prioritize two things—among many others—but these are key:”

“First, we need to undermine the economic power of cartels using every legal tool available. That means going after their assets, their front businesses, their financial networks—aggressively and systematically. Second, we need to build a hemispheric jurisdiction—something that integrates prosecution, security, financial intelligence, and enforcement across borders. Cartels are no longer just a national or even regional problem. This is a transnational threat—one that spans Mexico, the US, Central America, and beyond.”

“If we could harmonize our legal frameworks, we wouldn’t need to rely on slow, politicized extradition processes. Imagine being able to transfer a Mexican cartel operative to stand trial in El Salvador, or a corrupt US official facing justice in Canada. That level of cooperation would redefine the rules of engagement.”

“We could see an Argentinian money launderer tried in a fast-track tribunal in El Salvador, or coordinated prosecutions happening simultaneously in different countries under a special jurisdiction—completely outside traditional institutions like the OAS. That’s how we start leveling the playing field. Some of my colleagues refer to this as a kind of “NAFTA for Crime”—and honestly, I think that captures the vision. It’s about creating a common framework to deal with a common threat.”

MC: As the threat posed by Mexican cartels continues to grow in complexity and reach, it is clear that addressing their influence requires more than conventional law enforcement tactics. The insights shared by the journalist underscore how deeply rooted these organizations are in political, economic, and social structures—both in Mexico and across borders. The debate over designating cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations reveals not only the urgency of the crisis but also the need for carefully balanced policy decisions that uphold legal standards and human rights. Looking ahead, a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach that includes international cooperation, institutional reform, and community-based prevention strategies may offer the most promising path toward lasting solutions. The conversation around cartels must continue—with a clear-eyed understanding of both the challenges and the stakes involved.