16 August SWJ Roundup

To achieve our goals today (security) it is commonly suggested that we must prevail against those actors, organizations and agencies (foreign and domestic) -- and state and/or non-state entities -- who oppose the state and societal changes that are needed to optimally provide for the global economy and maximum economic growth.

Question: Can security be achieved minus these changes and/or minus a confrontation with those who would violently oppose such, in our eyes, necessary state and societal reforms?

(The number and types of military capabilities needed to be determined -- in some degree -- by the answer to this question.)

Adding to Dave's observation:

ADM McRaven is committed to not growing USSOCOM beyond what is currently programmed. Even sustaining that as the total force shrinks in coming years will be a challenge on many levels; from determining and preserving the right-sized, right-type of SOF force in general, to being able to recruit, assess and train a sufficient number of SOF forces from a shrinking conventional force base.

Break:

In a separate article on Green on Blue attacks in Afghanistan General Amos offers to the force in Afghanistan:

"In a letter Tuesday to commanders in Afghanistan, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos sought to soothe the rattled nerves of troops. He said such attacks show that the U.S. is winning the war against Taliban insurgents.

“When faced with the stark reality of what has just happened, it would be easy to give in to the belief that these attacks indicate we are losing the fight,” Gen. Amos wrote in his letter, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Times. “In fact, the opposite is true.

“These attacks are occurring because we are winning the fight in [regional command southwest],” he said. “Over the last four years, we have steadily improved the security situation in Helmand [province]. Historical casualty levels have steadily declined. Afghan security forces have made dramatic improvements in dependability, capability and performance.”

(Read more: Afghan attacks on allies alarm departing nations - Washington Times)

I would only note that in such conflicts is very easy to "win the fight" and lose the war. The war has never been about "the fight," it has been about a competition for governance, opportunity and power between those who align with the Taliban government that we deposed into exile and the Northern Alliance government that we elevated into power. We changed who the "legal" party was, but we have done little to change the nature of the competition, and in many ways (the constitution we enabled that centralized Afghan patronage in the Executive; the pouring of Billions of dollars, Euros and Pounds into the mix; the artificial empowerment of one side by putting our military weight behind them, etc) we have made this competition even more essential and more violent for the participants.

In design we talk about "reframing" a problem to keep our understanding of it as current and accurate as possible. Afghanistan is long overdue for a major reframing if we are to convert "winning the fight" into achieving our goals.

Bob

I would like to comment on Mr. Pincus' piece in the Washington Post today called "Navy Special Forces units: How many are needed?"

Someone really needs to sit down and give Mr. Pincus a tutorial on SOF based on the excerpt below. But something everyone should know: SEALs do not equal Special Forces (Green Berets) do not equal Rangers do not equal Combat Controllers do not equal Special Tactics Teams do not equal Pararescuemen do not equal Civil Affairs do not equal SOF Aviation (Army and Air Force aviation are different as well) do not equal Psychological Operations/MISO do not equal Special Warfare Combatant Crewman do not equal SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams do not equal MARSOC Critical Skills Operators do not equal Special Mission Units and do not equal all the supporting staff and logistics at Tampa, Bragg, Coronado, Virginia Beach, Lejuene, Pendleton, and Hurlburt, etc. SOF has very complementary joint capabilities that are among some of the most effectively integrated on a routine basis. But to answer the CRS question I think USSOCOM has about reached the limit that can be sustained by our Services. I do not think it can or should grow too much more in the operational force but there will probably never be sufficient enablers without sustained support from the Services. There is always a need for more enabling capabilities.

Excerpt:

The real questions are these: How are all these Special Forces capabilities in all the services being integrated? How many overlap? How many are needed, and how many can this country afford?

Navy Special Forces units: How many are needed?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/navy-special-forc…

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