Thoughts on the Future of Special Operations
11.03.2013 at 05:16pm
Thoughts on the Future of Special Operations – Okay, days ago you read the SWJ article, now go back and read the comments.
Missing, I would suggest, from both the article and the comments is something that would tie unconventional war and counter-unconventional warfare, more directly, to our currently defined interests and national security strategy. Thereby, and via this connection, making this proposal more understandable and relevant.
Let me provide an example:
1. In the introductory letter to our current national security strategy, President Obama emphasized the following terms and concepts:
a. Globalization.
b. Global markets.
c. Open markets.
d. Global leadership.
e. International system.
f. International order. And, most importantly,
g. The current “era of globalization.”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf
If we look at previous national security documents, by this or the last few presidents, I believe we will see similar terms and emphasis used.
2. How do we view “self-determination” within the context of globalization? These remarks by President Obama on the Middle East and North Africa would seem to clarify that “self-determination” means that people have the right to a western-like way of life, to include: rule of law, freedom of the press, democracy, elections and open markets:
a. “That story of self-determination began six months ago in Tunisia.”
b. “In too many countries, power has been concentrated in the hands of a few. In too many countries, a citizen like that young vendor had nowhere to turn -– no honest judiciary to hear his case; no independent media to give him voice; no credible political party to represent his views; no free and fair election where he could choose his leader.”
c. “And this lack of self-determination –- the chance to make your life what you will –- has applied to the region’s economy as well. Yes, some nations are blessed with wealth in oil and gas, and that has led to pockets of prosperity. But in a global economy based on knowledge, based on innovation, no development strategy can be based solely upon what comes out of the ground. Nor can people reach their potential when you cannot start a business without paying a bribe.”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa
3. So where does unconventional warfare fit into this picture, wherein: (1) globalization is the context and (2) “self-determination” (but only as defined above) is the goal? Here is a suggestion:
a. We understand that both goverments — and/or populations — may not wish to abandon their current or traditional way of life and adopt, in the place of these, our modern western ways.
b. Likewise governments and/or populations have before, are now and will again in the future resist such unwanted transformation requirements; most often, using unconventional means (due to their weaker status).
c. Therefore, to secure our interests, we must be prepared to use:
(1) Unconventional warfare measures to deal with those governments (ex: N. Korea; Iran) who do not wish to make this necessary transition to the western way of life and
(2) Counter-unconventional warfare measures to deal with populations who do not wish to undergo the state and societal changes that we desire.
To sum up:
Our strategy and interests, writ-large, are seen as (1) using globalization as a vehicle by which to transform outlier states and societies along modern western lines; (2) peace and prosperity for all the nations and peoples of the world to be best realized via this process. We understand that our efforts to secure these interests — via this strategy — will meet with resistance from both governments and populations using unconventional means. We must prepared, therefore, to defeat these resisting goverments and/or populations using unconventional warfare skills, strategies and capabilites which are up to the task.
Thus, one way to view the increased relevance of UW in the currrent “age of globalization” and, by extention, the increased relevance of the SOFs, is via (1) “our” intentional to transform “different” states and societies along modern western lines and (2) “their” intention to resist such unwanted transformation — primarily by unconventional means.
I do believe we suffer as a nation from a good mix of inappropriate strategic inertia of obsolete Cold War perspectives, policies, programs and treaties that push us into problems we could otherwise avoid or deal with more effectively in the current strategic environment; and newer, post-Cold War strategic thinking in recent versions of our National Security strategy that to me seems far too ideological in nature and broad in scope to serve what are truly our vital interests as a nation. But while it is important that strategists think about the strengths and weaknesses of our strategic guidance, all of that is largely moot as to what UW is, what CounterUW might be, or how either might be applied, or what effects either is employed to achieve. Both are frameworks, or tools for securing our interests. Neither defines what those interests are, and both can be employed in appropriate situations to address any interests we are tasked to advance.
Doctrine and Definitions are necessary evils. They guide and clarify; but also canalize and confine in equal parts. We do well to appreciate those dynamics and to maintain our intellectual flexibility to the degree possible.
Military doctrine gives me a definition for UW and no definition for counter UW. That does not mean that the former only exists in the manner as defined by the US Army, not that the latter does not exist simply because the US Army does not recognize the concept. I’m ok with that (though many who guard the gates of doctrine certainly are not. I’m ok with that as well).
In most fundamental terms, UW is any effort to leverage the insurgent energy of someone else’s populace to advance one’s own interests. Counter UW are those efforts to prevent, disrupt, deny, frustrate or defeat some organization or individual’s efforts to conduct UW. (My definitions, reasonable minds can and will differ, but this is how I think about this topic)
This is not rocket science, this is human science. There is no single set of mathematical steps that will produce an answer, or dogmatic steps that will generate some repeatable result. Human nature provides a certain framework of predictability, but human behavior, culture, history, choice, etc., etc., make every case infinitely unique. This is high art and requires a certain aptitude, maturity and experience to apply successfully. This is why Special Forces conduct the type of assessment and selection that they do. It is why Special Forces have the rank structure that it does. The goal is to produce teams with the appropriate aptitude, training, maturity and experience to successfully be able to assess a situation and apply these military arts in a manner that ultimately advances the interests and mission at hand.
Overthrowing regimes in clean black and white, old school approaches to advancing interests is a crude, in-artful approach to advancing interests in the modern environment. While it is easy to crush a weaker government and military, even Clausewitz might observe “Ahh, yes, but what about the people”?? What about the people, indeed. The American approach to the events of 9/11 has lacked, to be nice, has not been very subtle. Nor has it been very appropriate. The results have been a dozen years of frustration and expenses, with our egos satiated only by our tactical successes and reliance on tactical metrics to measure our progress.
It is time to be a bit less tactical, and a great deal more subtle. Carefully tailored UW and CounterUW operations offer a ways to pursue our interests that is both more strategic in nature, and more subtle in character – but only if artfully applied.
Some background:
When one views the territory of less powerful states and societies today, as in the past, one often encounters ways of life and ways of governance which are vastly different from that of the more powerful and more ambitious nations of the world.
And if these different ways of life and ways of government tend to deny the great nations of the world optimal access to and utilization of the resources within these less powerful states and societies, then this can create a problem.
The great nations often see the less powerful states and societies — more specifically, their human and other resources — as a means to better provide for the prosperity and security of their (the more powerful nations’) citizenry.
This often compels the great nations to act to “transform” and assimilate these under-utilized assets and bring them more “on line.”
(Herein, the great nations also feeling that they can “cure,” via transformation and assimilation of the lesser states and societies, many of the problems found therein, such as: genocide, poverty, hunger, insurgency, terrorism, humanitarinan crisis, etc.)
The less powerful (and very different) states and societies, however, are frequently unwilling or simply unable to trade their “sacred” way of life and way of governance for the “profane” way of life and governance of the great nations; regardless of the material or other benefit that, via this process, they might realize. In their view, the cost is not worth the benefit.
This decision, however, by the less powerful states and societies — not to be transformed and assimilated — does not often deter the great nations.
When this is the case, then the less powerful states and societies understand they must find a way — within their limited resources and ability — to deter the great nations.
It is within this context, I believe, that we may wish to understand unconventional warfare between the great nations and the less powerful states and societies — yesterday and today. Herein acknowledging that those things that the great nations desire most are not necessarily the same things by which other peoples wish to orient, organize and order their lives.
Bottom line: If we believe that, within the span of human history, unconventional warfare should be viewed as “timeless,” then we must likewise acknowledge that the conditions which give rise to UW between (1) great nations and (2) less powerful states and societies (as described above) also may be viewed as timeless and, therefore, worthy of consideration as to our circumstances today and the employment of our SOFs.