The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift From Iraq/Afghanistan to Mexico/The Americas and the Stabilization of Europe
by Dr. Robert J. Bunker
Download the Full Article: The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift
The United States currently faces two strategic level non-state (network) threats—but only one of them is openly recognized. Al Qaeda, and other elements of radical Islam, have been recognized as the #1 threat since the 11 September 2001 attacks which killed nearly 3,000 Americans and caused well over 100 billion dollars in infrastructure damage, emergency response, and economic disruption. This threat which garners ongoing media attention, however, on many fronts pales in comparison to that represented by the drug cartels and narco-gangs which for decades now have been evolving, mutating, and growing in capabilities and power in the Americas. While presently viewed as a 'crime and law enforcement issue', as Al Qaeda was pre 9-11, this more subtle and encompassing strategic threat has resulted in the deaths of well over 100,000 citizens of the Americas (roughly 30,000 in Mexico alone in the last 4 years) and has caused the destabilization of a number of nations including Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras, and witnessed the rise of heightened narco influence within regions of the US homeland along its Southern Border. Economically, the sustained damage and disruption caused by drug cartel and narco-gang activities to private individuals, local economies, and governmental bodies is well past the trillion dollar mark and rising. Both of these non-state (network) threats challenge the institutions of the many nations affected, the loyalty of the indigenous populations to the state itself, and are indicative of the 'war over social and political organization' now being waged in various regions of the globe.
Download the Full Article: The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift
Dr. Robert J. Bunker holds degrees in political science, government, behavioral science, social science, anthropology-geography, and history. Training taken includes that provided by DHS, FLETC, DIA, Cal DOJ, Cal POST, LA JRIC, NTOA, and private security entities in counter-terrorism, counter-surveillance, incident-response, force protection, and intelligence. Dr. Bunker has been involved in red teaming and counter-terrorism exercises and has provided operations support within Los Angeles County.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Robert,
First, this is a really powerful and provocative piece! I think you did an excellent job stating the importance of coming to grips with transnational non-state actors (both Islamist and criminal/commercial). These are critical emerging strategic policy issues.
Second, I'm really surprised at the lack of commentary here (as well as on the entire issue of 'crime wars' in general). These are cutting edge issues of importance--and certainly critical to US policy in the Americas! I suspect the lack of discussion is a characteristic of a "time of anomalies and transitions." In that regard, consider the following quote about the power of transnational organized crime (aka 'criminal networks').
<i>What we have in reality is a complex network, through which different criminal factions relate to each other by cooperating and competing for the control of illegality, impacting democratic environments and transforming themselves into a real force that could end up determining the destiny of institutions and communities. <b>Juan Carlos Garzón</b></i>
Garzón made this comment in his work <i> Mafia & Co.: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia</i> (See: Juan Carlos Garzón, <i>Mafia & Co.: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia</i>,Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2008 at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Mafia%20and%20Company.pdf). It is this transitional force that is 'insurgent.' It has the real potential to alter the nature of sovereignty as criminal entities (i.e., non-state violent armed actors or criminal soldiers: gangs, cartels, private armies) usurp the role of the state in 'zones of impunity.' As such the gangs become more than simple brigands. At times they become 'social bandits'; at other times they have the potential to become 'new state-making entities' (recall Eric Hobsbawm, Mancur Olson and Charles Tilly).
Perhaps the readers would find your earlier edited collection <i>Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers</i> useful background to the thought behind your strategic assessment. (See: Robert J. Bunker, editor, <i>Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers</i>at http://www.amazon.com/Criminal-States-Criminal-Soldiers-Robert-J-Bunker… .
I suspect some of the reticence to discuss comes from a fear that acknowledging the threat to sovereignty posed by narco-cartels and 'crime wars' as a form of 'criminal insurgency' would require a policy outcome that drives US <i>military</i> intervention. While I agree that expeditionary military COIN operations in Mexico are not the solution, it is sad that fear of US overreach clouds the ability to see what's happening.
Acknowledging the existence of 'criminal insurgencies' (note the distinction between 'conventional' or 'classic" insurgencies) does not unilaterally require US expeditionary operations; rather it could, and should, help formulate internal Mexican and Central American policy options. The situation is what it is; the policy prescription is a separate issue. Unless we can accurately define the 'societal warfare' we are confronting, we are likely to see it expand beyond the tipping point. These 'new wars' (consider Mary Kaldor) require us to confront our assumptions and empirically assess our observations. I believe your essay helps pave the way for that assessment.
Thanks for an excellent and thought provoking essay!
John P. Sullivan
p.s., Thanks for the 'hat tip' re 'criminal insurgency' (a topic I have addressed at length in previous essays, separately and with Adam Elkus, here at <i>SWJ</i>). I should however note that my assessment builds from not only my past work, but our collaborative pieces, your research, as well as the seminal works of Martin van Creveld (<i>The Transformation of War</i>) and Steve Metz (i.e., the discussion of 'commercial insurgency' as seen in "Rethinking Insurgency" and elsewhere in his body of works). See: Steven Metz, "Rethinking Insurgency" at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub790.pdf . <i>JPS</i>
Thank you to the many individuals who have contacted me off line about this article and your positive comments. I well understand the need not to publicly comment on the recommendations contained in the article/the article itself because of the toxicity of the issues involved. I had hoped to help generate a wider open debate on these issues but was premature in my assumptions.