Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State
Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State
by David C. Ellis and James Sisco
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The failure of ISAF’s COIN strategy to achieve its political objectives is the result of a conceptual error in its COIN implementation framework. Though ISAF places meeting the needs of the population at the center of its strategy, attempting to do so through a kleptocratic, illegitimate, and unaccountable Afghan national government (GIRoA) will not succeed. This conceptual error is due to a reading of COIN theory that defines “the counterinsurgent” doctrinally as the national government. Thus, while ISAF strategy now claims to adopt a population centric, district-focused COIN strategy, it still tries with predictable results to reach the population top down through the very kleptocratic government that has precipitated the current political crisis.
Alternatively, COIN implementation has also historically been practiced from a village centric, bottom up framework. This COIN framework is better suited to conflicts where the government is considered to be a threat by the population because it directly builds up village capacity for security and self-governance, negating powerbrokers’ malign influence. Defining “the counterinsurgent” in terms of natural political communities, as opposed to the national government, offers ISAF greater flexibility in meeting the needs of population and is supported by COIN successes in Malaya, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
A bottom up, village centric COIN implementation framework is appropriate for Afghanistan because it can begin to redress the socio-political imbalance in Afghan society that continues to empower malign actors through extensive government corruption, patronage networks, and narco-trafficking. Afghanistan’s population lacks the basic knowledge, resources, and skills for self-governance, making it subservient to powerbrokers and subject to their predations. International financial and political support of powerbrokers working directly for or with GIRoA only serves to reinforce the utility of the Taliban to oppressed villages since it represents the only organized resistance to what threatens them.
ISAF’s political objectives in Afghanistan can be best achieved by initiating a dual COIN implementation framework designed to increase the political space necessary to grow functioning village level governance and civil society organizations. This can be achieved by building up traditional, village level security, justice, and agricultural development structures to nurture district stability while pushing good governance and anti-corruption reforms through national and provincial level GIRoA. Such a framework requires directing all diplomatic, development, governance, and military assets toward the goal of rebalancing Afghan society. By creating local governance structures based around existing political communities, ISAF can restore political legitimacy and relative stability in Afghanistan in a short period of time.
This is the first of two papers that explain how to implement COIN doctrine in the absence of a legitimate state. It establishes the conceptual context of COIN doctrine in Afghanistan, illustrates why ISAF’s political objectives have eluded it so far, and briefly describes the blueprint for a village centric COIN framework. The forthcoming second paper lays out in detail the operational and tactical guidelines for implementing a dual COIN implementation framework.
Download the Full Article: Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State
LCDR James Sisco is an Afghan Hand currently serving in Afghanistan. His previous tours include the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, Deep Blue, and service in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 as the military liaison for President Karzai.
Dr. David C. Ellis is a SOCOM human terrain analyst currently deployed to Afghanistan. His research covers peacekeeping, ethnic conflict, democratization, and economic development.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
